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Jeffrey H. Aziz, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007 
 
 
This dissertation recovers Shakespeare’s Sir John Falstaff as a politically radical 
character, linked to Jack Cade and the plebian revolutionaries of 2 Henry VI, and to 16th-
century radical-egalitarian movements including Anabaptism and the “Family of Love.” 
Working from the earliest texts dealing with Sir John Oldcastle, Falstaff’s historical 
precedent, this work explores the radical potential of reform beginning with the work of 
the late-14th-century Oxford theologian John Wyclif.  Thought to have inspired the 1381 
Peasants’ Rebellion, Wyclif’s writings on dominion were directed at the organized 
church, but had social implications that Wyclif himself was unwilling to confront.  
Burned in 1417 for the combined crimes of heresy and treason, the historical Oldcastle 
either was or was not involved with an abortive rising against Henry V, and this work 
argues that the instability between Oldcastle as loyal Lancastrian subject and social 
revolutionary characterizes all subsequent representations of Oldcastle, from John Bale’s 
prototype martyrology to Shakespeare’s histories.   
Historically locating the appropriation of Oldcastle as the prototype Protestant 
martyr in a time of widespread destruction of traditional holy images, this work examines 
the works of the controversialists John Bale and John Foxe, with their accompanying 
woodcut illustrations, to argue for a continuity between the logic of reformed martyrdom 
 iv 
 
and that of Protestant iconoclasm in a shared notion of ordeal and confession.  In these 
polemical works, the testimony of the martyr on his pyre is valorized while the icon is 
revealed by fire or hammer to be mere matter.  Working from Slavoj Žižek’s claim that 
political identity is often founded on the fetishistic disavowal of a shared guilt, this work 
argues that the two parts of Henry IV, in their insistent metadramatic reminders of 
Oldcastle’s treason and execution, function to disturb the audience’s interpellation as 
subjects of Tudor-Protestant power.  This is done in order to put the audience in the 
position of choosing between two modes of social life, represented by the essential 
kingship of Henry V on one hand, and on the other by the frightening social hybridity and 
radical utopianism of Falstaff. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
This work treads on hallowed ground, in an area where other fine workers have labored 
for many years.  If I have had the audacity to caper where giants have trod, it is because I 
have had encouragement and support beyond my deserving.  The English Department of 
the University of Pittsburgh has been more than generous, offering me both the Mellon 
and the Barbara Nietzsche Tobias Fellowships during the writing of this dissertation.  
When it comes to my teachers and advisors, I must make special mention of Richard 
Tobias, my teacher and friend of many years.  I can think of no one who has had a greater 
influence on my notion of what an intellectual could be.  That I was the first graduate 
student to receive the fellowship that Tob inaugurated in his wife’s name is my most 
cherished academic honor. 
 My committee have looked on my labors with patience and consideration.  My 
Chairperson, John Twyning, is someone who has always understood my work, and with 
whom I have shared such a long and fruitful exchange that I’m happy to finally be able to 
show him what I’ve seen with his eyes.  I think the project might have run aground were 
it not for the incisive critical feedback provided by Kellie Robertson, which shaped my 
sense of how a document like a dissertation might work.  Janelle Greenberg and Jim 
Knapp, in distinct ways, were the intellectual conscience of the committee, insisting that 
the most daring claims must be grounded in responsible intellectual work.  Even with the 
benefit of hindsight, I could not have chosen a better committee. 
 When approaching the broader intellectual context of this work, I remember Tob 
telling me how fortunate I was in the circle of friends I have found in graduate school.  
Tanya Reyes has been a great source of strength to me, and in many ways is the graduate 
student whose perspective on the institution is most like my own.  The “three 
musketeers” – Malkiel Choseed, Jeff Hole, and Chris Warnick – shaped the culture of the 
graduate program and my own experience of it.  Their friendship has been of tremendous 
value to me.  This dissertation has benefited in countless ways from my conversations 
with Jeff Hole, an intellectual who almost intuitively understood the work I was trying to 
do.  I remain convinced that Jeff’s work and my own, different though they may be in 
some ways, are a part of the same intellectual project.  When it comes to friends from 
whose support I have benefited during the writing of this dissertation, I must mention 
Maggie Rehm, David Evans, Marin Cogan, and Josh Fennel. 
 My greatest debt is to my family.  My brother Tony has always been in my 
corner.  I would never have had the wherewithal to return to school and re-invent myself 
as a professional intellectual were it not for the encouragement of my wife, Betsy.  A 
person of no small accomplishment in her own right, I know of no one who better 
embodies the quality of generosity of spirit.  I write these words on our daughter 
Samantha’s eighth birthday.  Sam is a wellspring of creativity and energy, a force to be 
reckoned with.  If I have completed this work, it is, in part, because one ought to imagine 
big things and see them through.  I dedicate this work to my wife and daughter. . . and 
don’t worry, Sam; you don’t have to write a dissertation if you don’t want to. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The argument that unifies this work is that, beginning in his own lifetime, the various 
representations of the Lollard knight Sir John Oldcastle always straddle the critical cultural fault 
line between “the felt center of cultural power”1 as it is constituted at given historical moments 
and the threat to that power from radical social forces that challenge it, be it the Lollard heresy, 
the unlettered commons, or the radical Anabaptist movement in Protestantism. The corollary of 
this is the way in which Oldcastle in his textual and dramatic productions continues to function 
as a collective figure in distinct modes: the exemplar or representative of a movement or social 
group, or the surreptitious agency behind seemingly collective action.  The fact that Oldcastle is 
recovered in the service of a sixteenth-century Protestant orthodoxy cannot stabilize his radical 
potential. 
Oldcastle as a historical actor is implicated in the most frightening potential of the vulgar 
mob.  The religious movement of Lollardy, understood by the traditional church as heresy, 
shared with the Protestantism that was to follow an enhanced notion of the layperson as an agent 
of her own religiosity, even her relationship with God.  Agency is implied by the Greek root of 
the term “heresy,” haeresis or choice. The scope of choice that the teachings of Wyclif appeared 
to offer threatened both ecclesiastical and secular power.  The problem of Oldcastle’s presence 
or absence at St. Giles’ Fields during what has become known as  “Oldcastle’s Rebellion” is the 
problem of the relationship between oppositional social movements and our predisposition to 
locate their actions in “leaders.” This work argues that Oldcastle’s radicalism in his complicity 
                                                 
1 This phrase is from Allon White, Carnival, Hysteria, and Writing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 122. 
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with the events at St. Giles’ Fields (if such it was) is fundamental to understanding his sixteenth-
century appropriation, when the history of Lollard militancy is conflated with that of the 
Peasants’ Rebellion, the Cade Rebellion, and contemporary popular unrest in that period. 
This dissertation argues that the appropriation of Oldcastle as the prototype Protestant 
martyr must be understood in the context of sixteenth-century English iconoclasm.  It argues that 
the logic of the image breakers is intimately related to the logic of Protestant martyr narrative: 
tested to destruction, the body of the martyr as witness to the word becomes a text, amenable to 
the stabilizing influence of other texts.  The palpable religious icon is, in many instances of 
English iconoclasm, another sort of body to which a duplicitous agency is attributed.  Burnt or 
broken, it reveals that the traditions and history in which it is embedded, its “aura” to employ 
Benjamin’s term,2 inhere in crude substance with no uncanny properties. In examining theatrical 
spectacle through the dramatis persona, this work reveals various modes of theatrical 
representation, some of which endorse iconoclastic or anti-theatrical discourses, and others that 
recuperate sight as a legitimate way of apprehending the moral world. 
 In reading Shakespeare’s second Lancastrian cycle, this dissertation explores the 
relationship between body, religion and nation in a reading informed by the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, but working at its foundation from a close reading of the play texts, revealing a 
consistent tropology of quasi-religious national bodies.  The body of Sir John Falstaff is revealed 
as a threatening hybrid, connected through Falstaff’s claim to a “vocation” to two other class-
suspect, religiously-inspired Lancastrian opponents: Jack Cade and Joan de Pucelle 
(Shakespeare’s dramatization of Joan of Arc).  Eschewing the sort of reductive categorizing that 
has by turns produced Falstaff as a “grotesque Puritan,” Hal as either “Calvinist” or “Catholic,” 
this work uncovers a drama that functions through techniques akin to defamiliarization, undoing 
                                                 
2 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Shocken Books, 1968), pp. 220-2. 
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sixteenth-century historicisms to reveal a dramatic world in which the Lancastrian heir and the 
fat knight struggle over the question of which social world is endorsed by God and scripture: one 
categorized by moral surveillance under the aegis of the sovereign, or an alternative egalitarian 
utopia figured dramatically as a kingdom of thieves. 
 At stake in these readings is the recovery of the radical possibility of social change on the 
cusp of the early-modern period.  In its reading of the “popular,” of the social and political 
agency of the people, this work uncovers in its early-modern texts an anti-popular discourse at 
odds with both liberal and radical notions of popular government.  Constructed against these is a 
radical alternative delegitimized and viewed through the categories of the power that rejects it as 
theft, anarchy, and antinomianism.  Framed by the founding crime of the deposition and murder 
of a king, the Henry plays ask that the audience accept certain crimes at the highest level to 
shield the polity from the utter dissolution of property and social hierarchy. 
 It is not the aim of this work to provide a totalizing account of any of its texts.  In many 
instances, and particularly in the reading of Shakespeare’s dramatic works, this dissertation aims 
at what Alan Sinfield has called “dissident reading.”3  Rather than valorizing the dominant or 
normative positions of the text, this work seeks to recover the those voices that the text puts 
forward in order to contain, undermine, or delegitimize them.  Such critical or theoretical 
apparatus as is mobilized in this effort is not intended to reduce the works in question to an 
articulation of some privileged model (whether Marxist, Lacanian, rhetorical, or what have you), 
but in an attempt to reveal censored meaning.  
 
                                                 
3 Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992). 
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Chapter One recovers the dialectic through which Lollardy and the Lancastrian dynasty 
arrived at the antipathy made tangible in the burning or Sir John Oldcastle for the crimes of 
heresy and treason.  The chapter argues that the public representations involved in the Peasants’ 
Rebellion of 1381 and the conflict between Lollards and the traditional church took the form of a 
dispute over scriptural bodies: the body of Christ, as well as the bodies of Adam and Cain.  The 
community identity of Lollard and orthodox churchman are developed in the public dispute over 
the political and social significance of these bodies, and in diverging traditions of scriptural 
interpretation.  The investment of the Lancastrian royal dynasty in the practices and sacramental 
theory of the traditional church is made concrete in the punishment of Oldcastle.  Burnt while 
hanging in chains, Oldcastle’s punishment makes manifest the legal identification of heresy and 
treason.  
 
Chapter two explores two related problems: the appropriation by Protestantism of 
martyrology, the textual celebration of saints’ lives in traditional religion, and the use of woodcut 
illustrations—often involving the pictorial conventions of condemned “popish” icons—in 
Protestant texts that are explicitly iconoclastic.  Against a certain critical and historical tendency 
that has located an emergent “public sphere” in the discourses of religious controversy, this study 
understands that arena as fundamentally polemical and fractious.   The representations of 
Oldcastle are not immune to this polemical struggle, and religious controversialists are forced to 
continually revise the avatars of this prototypical Lollard martyr.  This work argues that the 
revisions of Oldcastle in his textual and visual representations are an effort to contain the radical 
potential of reform, the anxiety that sixteenth-century Protestants displace on movements like 
Anabaptism and the Family of Love. 
 4 
 
 Chapter three locates the dramatis persona, the embodied figure of the stage illusion, in 
the ferment over images and the theater in Protestant anti-theatrical polemic.   It argues that the 
stage representation is often constituted through iconoclastic categories and the distrust of the 
visual mode.  In Doctor Faustus, the theatrical illusion is both indicted in an iconoclastic register, 
and recuperated through sanctioned modes of seeing.   
In the character of Henry Bolingbroke, we find dramatized a particular historical development in 
the understanding of juridical agency: in its early acts, the play Richard III  is concerned with 
trothplight, the legal notion of producing truth through certain social acts (in this case, juridical 
combat); in the events leading up to the deposition of Richard II, we are increasingly pushed 
toward the modern alternative, the concept of intention.  The complexity of Henry’s persona is 
produced from without through the very opacity of his characterization. 
 
Chapter Four, through a close reading of the opening of 1 Henry IV, reveals the central 
sacramental trope of the second Lancastrian cycle, the figure of England as the Virgin Mary in 
the form of the Vierge Ouvrante, that informs the incarnational logic of the play.  It is here 
argued that the plays enact an essentialist logic of embodiment.  In this chapter, the function of 
the “chronotope,” the insulated island of time in which Sir John Falstaff exists, is explored as it 
eventually succumbs to the pressures of a modern, “historical” time.  The genealogy of Falstaff 
is revealed through Shakespeare’s idiosyncratic use of the term “vocation”: one of his closest kin 
is Jack Cade, leader of a rebellion of the commons in 2 Henry VI that is itself conflated with the 
Peasants’ Rebellion and radical-Protestant notions of social equity.  In a religious register, 
Falstaff reveals a significant affinity for the Catholic Saint Martin of Tours. 
 5 
 
 In Chapter Five, Sir John Falstaff is placed in his alternate sphere, the world of revolt.  In 
a reading of the Henry plays, the Protestant drama The First Part of Sir John Oldcastle, and 
contemporary religious and political writings, this chapter situates the dramatic opposition 
between prince Hal and Falstaff in the anti-popular political discourses of its time.  What is 
revealed is a contest between a “purified” king of essential majesty, and a dissimulating, hybrid 
plebian-aristocrat.  On the question of legitimate sovereignty raised by Henry IV’s usurpation of 
the throne, this work argues that the Prince recovers the divine sanction lost by his father in a 
final theft, a new act of what Antonio Negri has called “constituting power”4 that the audience is 
encouraged to endorse.  The price of this restoration is the disciplining of the radical tendencies 
of the margin by a new juridical covenant under the eye of King Henry V’s Pauline Christian 
order. 
                                                 
4 Antonio Negri, Il potere constituente: Saggio sulle alternative del moderno (Milan: SugarCo, 1992), p 31, quoted 
in Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
p. 43. 
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II.   POWER TOO GREAT TO KEEP, OR TO RESIGN : HERESY,  
UPRISING, AND A NEW POPULISM 
 
 
 
 
Thise cookes, how they stampe, and streyne, and grynde,  
And turnen substaunce into accident,  
To fulfillen al thy likerous talent! 
    --Chaucer, The Pardoner’s Tale, 538-540 
 
 
 
The problem of the most radical possibilities of religious reform in the area of secular politics 
begins in the prehistory of English Protestantism.  Originally intended as a critique from within 
the intellectual purview of the church-university system, the writings of John Wyclif would 
ultimately be deemed heresy for their attack on Papal supremacy, on secular sovereignty, and for 
their view of the agency of the believer in his own faith and salvation.  If, etymologically, the 
defining quality of heresy is haeresis, “taking, choosing, choice,”1 then the Wycliffite heresy 
seemed to its detractors to offer choice in its most protean, threatening aspect.  While Wyclif in 
the years of his most important intellectual production was a client of the great magnate John of 
Gaunt, the movement that endeavored to implement and propagate his teachings found itself 
increasingly at odds with the Lancastrian sovereign, a dialectic in which each had a part in 
constituting the other. 
The self-understanding of both traditionalist and Wycliffite was mediated through the 
notion of a set of ancestral bodies, a sort of religious patrimony.  Foremost in this pantheon was 
Christ, whose sacramental body served to cement the divergent interests of different social strata.  
                                                 
1 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. heresy. 
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If the body of Christ seemed to endorse both social hierarchy and a God-sanctioned sovereignty, 
the participants in the Peasants’ Rebellion of 1381 could proffer a radical revision: the patrimony 
of man as the sons of Adam in a sort of primordial egalitarian utopia.  The bodies of Christ, 
Adam and Cain were the site of contests over how social power should vest in a Christian state, 
the first skirmishes in a struggle over the appropriation of these bodies that would continue 
through the Reformation.  These struggles over sovereignty and social power become, in the 
Wycliffite moment, problems of biblical exegesis.  In the examination of the Lollard cleric 
William Thorpe by Archbishop Arundel, the site of these arguments is the Epistles of Paul, the 
locus of the New Testament’s most explicit meditation on authority, and a set of texts whose 
interpretation reveals both Lollard and traditionalist exegetical strategies. 
Oldcastle himself is produced by chronicle history as a figure of tremendous personal 
agency.  In his person cohere acts ranging from the authorship of supposedly “Lollard” 
legislation in parliament to an abortive coup against the reign of Henry V.  The “empirical 
Oldcastle,” leaving a surprisingly light imprint on the historical record, is imbued with meaning 
by his surround: the ferment between Wyclif’s followers, the Lollards, and the House of 
Lancaster, at one time Wyclif’s patron.  The presence or absence of Oldcastle in the rising at St. 
Giles’ Fields is a point of obscurity at the intersection of Lollard doctrine and sovereign power.  
Like Thorpe’s testimony, it raises the question of whether reform can be limited to the religious 
realm, or whether its implications are far more radical. 
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A.  UNRULY BODIES AND THE PEASANTS’ REVOLT 
 
If Christ’s sacramental body functioned as a source of cohesion in the service of social power as 
it was constituted in late-fourteenth-century England, so were there radical discourses that sought 
to trace the patrimony of mankind to other scriptural bodies, often with radical implications.  The 
body of Christ, touchstone of contemporary political theology that it was, had more than a 
coincidental role in the Peasants’ Rebellion of 1381. Wyclif’s attack on the theology of 
incarnation in the Eucharist, coupled to the critique of authority in his work on dominion, 
associated him in many minds with the radical pretensions and seeming contempt of property 
relations of the risen commons.  Coinciding with the Feast of Corpus Christi in the month of 
June of 1381, the Peasants’ Revolt actively mobilized a sacramental political theology in the 
service of politically radical ends.  As Margaret Aston has argued, “A day appropriated to 
celebrating the supreme sacrifice of Christ on the cross was. . .a supremely appropriate day to 
celebrate the freedom thereby purchased equally for all men.”2  Aston points to the irregular 
religiosity of a leader like John Ball, as well as the rebellion’s attack on the temporalities and 
hierarchy of the English church.  As priest and controversialist, Ball could boast a string of 
excommunications that preceded the height Wyclif’s notoriety.  In fact, the “vagabond preacher” 
had been excommunicated by Archbishop Simon Sudbury on several occasions, and in more 
than one diocese.3  As Aston suggests, there may be a Eucharistic referent suggestive of the 
coming Corpus Christi celebration in the documents circulated to rally humble folk to the 
revolutionary cause: 
 
                                                 
2 Margaret Aston, “Corpus Christi and Corpus Regni: Heresy and the Peasant’s Revolt,” Past and Present, No. 143 
(May, 1994), 19. 
3 ibid., 21-2. 
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Johan the Mullere hath ygrounde smal, smal, small; 
The Kynges sone of hevene schal paye for al.4 
 
If Aston is correct in ascribing here a reference to flour prepared for the communion host, then 
this is quite an interesting couplet, emphasizing not the intercessory role of the clergyman, but 
the labor of the miller in preparing the flour for the altar bread, reminiscent of the Lollard John 
Badby’s later claim that a predestinate man could make the body of Christ as well as any priest.  
While the labor of the cooks who “stampe and streyne” is satirized in Chaucer’s eucharistic 
quibble, here there is an appeal to the solidarity of labor, more explicit in Knighton’s chronicle 
version, “Jake Mylner asketh help to turne hys mylne aright. . .”5  While Corpus Christi might be 
employed as symbolic support for the cohesion of the estates, the radicals were more than willing 
to turn its symbolic force toward less conservative projects.  If the spark that ignited the powder 
keg was struck by an Essex tax collector, any spontaneous quality to the rising must have been 
coupled with an organizational effort on a prodigious scale, hinted at in Walsingham’s account: 
To give their plans a greater chance of fulfillment, men of just two villages, who were the 
originators and prime movers of this evil, began by getting messages sent immediately to 
every small village, asking all . . to put aside all excuses and come to meet them, 
equipped with weapons as best they could.  Those who refrained from coming or ignored 
them or who despised the idea should realize that their goods should be ransacked, their 
homes burnt or knocked down, their heads cut off.6 
 
Though he attributes “madness” and “stupidity” to the authors of the rising, Walsingham’s 
chronicle account reveals the savvy of the leaders, who deploy a homespun counter-discourse to 
the dominant political theology, who broadcast their call across the region, who employ coercion 
when persuasion is not effective.  Ever arguing against the notion that there was a broadly 
popular element to these events, Walsingham portrays in his narrative the manipulative efforts of 
                                                 
4 Walsingham, Thomas, Chronicon Angliae, ed. Thompson, (Rolls Series 64, 1874), p. 322, quoted in Aston, p. 26. 
5 Chronicon Henrici Knighton, ed. Lumby (London, HMSO,1889, 1895), ii, 138-9, quoted in Margaret Aston, 
“Corpus Christi,” p. 27 
6 Walsingham, Thomas. The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham, trans. David Preest ed. James G. Clark 
(Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2005), p. 121. 
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a narrow cabal, and when he is forced to recount events that disrupt this reading—events like the 
enthusiasm of the Londoners in the sacking and burning of the Savoy—he must fall back once 
again on categories like “madness,” even though his treatment of those events reveals a 
remarkable level of organization and even political purpose:  
They wanted it to be clear to the people of the whole kingdom that they were not doing 
this out of greed, and so they ordered a proclamation to be made that no one, on pain of 
death, should dare to touch anything or keep any of the things found there for their own 
use.7 
 
 The slogans of the rising give us a glimpse of subaltern political discourses, rarely 
recorded in their day. Disappointed by Bishop Thomas Brinton, who did not respond to the 
rebels’ invitation to preach to their assembly on Corpus Christi day,8 it was John Ball who 
addressed them on the day of the feast.  The text of his sermon is well-known: 
Whan Adam dalf, and Eve span, 
W[h]o was thane a gentilman?9 
 
Picking up on the rhetoric of the letters reported in Walsingham and Knighton, Ball emphasizes 
the solidarity of a laboring humanity.  In a subversive way, the body of Christ is displaced by the 
bodies of Adam and Eve, and even the mild sexual doubles entendres evoke an earthy carnality 
and a plebian tone, the progenitors of working man and woman in the act of that generation. 
 The couplet’s implication that the heirs of Adam and Eve are being exploited by a 
parasitic class points to concrete economic motives for the rising of the sort of little interest to 
Walsingham.  The modern historiography of the rising suggests that the revolt was in the long 
term a response to that Statute of Laborers of  1351 and more immediately a reaction to a poll tax 
instituted by Gaunt in 1377.   The rebels’ animosity toward John of Gaunt is clear: 
                                                 
7 Chronica Maiora, 123. 
8 Eulogium Historiarum, ed. F. S. Haydon, 3 vols. (Rolls Series no. 9 :London, 1858-63), iii, 352, quoted in Aston, 
“Corpus Christi,” p. 16 
9 Chronicon Angliae, 321; Walsingham, Thomas, Historia Anglicana, ed. Riley, ii, 32. 
 11 
 
 
“. . .they blocked all the roads used by pilgrims on their way to Canterbury, and stopping 
all pilgrims, of whatever class, they made them swear an oath: first that thy would stay 
loyal to king Richard and his commons, and accept no king who was called ‘John’ (this 
was owing to their dislike of John [of Gaunt], duke of Lancaster. . .”10 
 
The Savoy, one of Gaunt’s residences and perhaps the richest private dwelling in England, was 
burned, and the rebels abused an effigy dressed in a fine coat from Gaunt’s wardrobe.  Gaunt 
would never rebuild the Savoy, and there may have been a certain wisdom in this. 
 The account of the death of the death of Archbishop Sudbury at the hands of the Rebels 
in Walsingham’s Chronica Maiora is noteworthy not alone for its treatment of the humility and 
resignation with which he faced his killers, but also for the manner in which the chronicler 
carefully situates his death within an orthodox account of God’s grace in which a theology of the 
body plays a part.  Not only is Sudbury’s ham-fisted executioner stricken with blindness and 
insanity, but 
. . .[a] man who had been blind for many years and who for a long time had been 
supported by alms from the archbishop, on hearing of the death and the cause of it, in 
faith asked God for his sight to be restored through the archbishop’s merits, and his sight 
was given back to him.  At his grave a  man of Dover, who had now been blind for two 
years and had been instructed in a vision to go to the body, that same night rejoiced that 
his sight had been restored to him.  A pregnant woman who was completely unable to 
give birth, asked for the archbishop’s help and on that day was delivered of three boys.11 
 
Walsingham’s is the only account that details miraculous phenomena associated with the 
archbishop.12  In life an affable if unremarkable functionary, in death Sudbury takes on the 
qualities of a saint (though the plodding Sudbury has not to date been canonized).  The 
intercessory virtue of the fallen bishop is significantly mediated through his body, so we learn 
that a member of the peasant mob, attempting to steal a ring from the dead man’s finger, lost his 
sight in perfect symmetry with the blind man of Dover whose pilgrimage to Sudbury’s body 
                                                 
10 Chronica Maiora, p. 121. 
11 Chronica Maiora, 127. 
12 James G. Clark in Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, n. 127. 
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restored his own vision.  If a critical quality of the sacrament of the Eucharist was the material 
presence of Christ’s body within the bread, so too could other bodies partake of a miraculous 
potency.  This quality of material, fleshly intercession is multiplied by the diffusion of saintly 
relics, spreading the virtues of such bodies to distant geographic points in a manner congruent 
with the presence of Christ “seven foot tall in every point of the host.”  Such bodies are the 
source of a new profusion, and in this way John Calvin’s Treatise of Relics misses the point: it 
may be perfectly within such an incarnational logic that in death a saint might have in parts what 
would amount to several bodies.  Such a profusion is marked in Walsingham’s narrative by the 
miraculous birth of male triplets, an excess of flesh that leaves no doubt of God’s providence or 
the dead Sudbury’s status. 
Ball’s invocation and revision of sacramental political theology intervened in an 
important figuration of the social world.  In his foundational 1983 article, Mervyn James argues 
that the increasing importance of the Corpus Christi celebration in late-medieval England is 
related to an incarnational understanding of the nature of community.   Through the religious 
drama and processions of Corpus Christi, the social body of the community is knit by the 
presence in its midst of the sacrificial body of Christ: 
I. . .argue that the theme of Corpus Christi is society seen in terms of the body; and that 
the concept of the body provided urban societies with a mythology and a ritual in terms 
of which the opposites of social wholeness and social differentiation could be both 
affirmed, and also brought into a creative tension, one with the other.13 
 
The body of Christ offered, at least potentially, a negotiation of the tensions produced by class 
and other divisions.  The body of Christ is a social-political metaphor and something extra, the 
actual flesh of Christ assimilated to the fleshly life of the communicants as a redeemed humanity.  
In a similar vein, John Bossy discusses a record in the Rotuli Parliamentorum of 1401: “ [I]t 
                                                 
13 Mervyn James, “Ritual, Drama and Social Body in the Late Medieval English Town,” Past and Present, no. 98 
(1983), 4. 
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likened a meeting of parliament to a mass considered as a sacrifice, in that it served to unite the 
otherwise disparate purposes of king, lords, and commons.”14 
 The promotion of an orthodox doctrine of transubstantiation was part of a general project on 
the part of the papacy to emphasize and enhance the power of the priesthood.  The officiating 
clergyman was able to perform the miracle of the altar not simply by virtue of office but because 
this authority had been conveyed to him in an unbroken patrimony originating in Christ’s 
apostles.  An attack on the nature of the sacrament was thus an attack on the patriarchy that 
legitimated the power of the Pope.  This is not to imply that the orthodox position on the 
sacrament was in any way cynical, and it appears that there was agreement among clergy and 
laity that the central mystery of the celebration of the mass was a phenomenon of great power.  
Performed behind a screen that excluded the congregation, the words of the canon were taken to 
be so potent and sacred that they remained a clerical secret until the 1530s.15  If the celebration 
of the mass was an exercise of power in the social and political senses as well as the theological 
one, this does not mean that the lay communicant was a helpless dupe of that power.  The 
communicant as consumer of Christ’s body is also the consumer of a religious-political ideology 
and the theological, political and legal discourses through which it is articulated (insofar as she 
knows or understands them), but such a consumption, as Michel de Certeau has argued, must not 
be thought of as a passive process.16  It is reasonable to ask, “What use did late-Medieval 
communicants make of the sacrament of the altar, considered as a cultural artifact?”  Thomas 
Netter of Walden was inclined to dismiss any agency on the part of lay people in the reception of 
                                                 
14 John Bossy, “The Mass as a Social Institution 1200 – 1700,” Past and Present , No. 100 (August, 1983), p. 35; 
Rotuli Parliamentorum , 6 vols. (Record Commission, London, 1783) iii, pp. 459-60. 
15 ibid., p. 33. 
16 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), especially pp. 
34-37. 
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sacramental theology: “In affairs of faith, skilled spiritual men are said to understand, the rest of 
the people only simply to believe.”17   
In fact, an investigation into the reception of eucharistic doctrine reveals a spectrum of 
uses or modes of consumption.  At one end of that spectrum are beliefs that would come to be 
associated with Lollardy, among them the belief that a layperson could make the body of Christ 
as well as any priest.  On the far side of orthodoxy from the Lollards and their forebears was the 
extreme veneration of the host that Wyclif decried as an “idolatry” of the Eucharist. As a result 
of what seemed to Wyclif the false and extra-scriptural doctrine of transubstantiation, there was a 
heretical tendency shared by lay people and clergy who so revered the Eucharist that “the 
consecrated host is their God.”18  A comprehensive study of the reception of Eucharistic teaching 
and practice would also consider uses like the phenomenon of frequent communion among holy 
women explored by Caroline Walker Bynum.19 
When Wyclif sought to situate the Eucharist in his revisionist theology, he tread on 
dangerous ground not only in terms of abstruse intellectual debate, but also with regard to the 
great investment by the faithful in a particular understanding of sacramental incarnation.  The 
dominant position in Wyclif scholarship maintains that the understanding of Christ’s presence in 
the Eucharist developed by Wyclif in the last decades of the fourteenth century is more-or-less 
consistent, continuous with his general philosophical project.20  The position of the church on the 
sacrament of the altar had evolved from a model originally suggested by Aquinas, for whom 
transubstantiation was properly a fundamental change in the substance of the altar bread and 
                                                 
17 Margaret Aston, Faith and Fire: Popular and Unpopular Religion: 1350 – 1600 (London: The Hambledon Press, 
1993), p. 47. 
18 De Eucharistia, 14, in J. I. Catto, “Wyclif and the Cult of the Eucharist,” The Bible in the Medieval World: 
Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 275. 
19 Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
20 For a different position, see Catto, 270-3.   
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wine.  To account for the evidence of the senses that the bread and wine remain, he appealed to 
the Aristotelian category of quantity.  While the bread and wine were no longer present, their 
sensible qualities or accidents were maintained by their quantity, which survived this miraculous 
transaction.  If there was a sensory deception, it was for the benefit of the communicant, “First of 
all, because it is not customary, but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. . . . 
therefore Christ’s flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of under the species of those 
things which are more commonly used by men.”21 The carnal materiality that transubstantiation 
attributes to the host raised certain problems.  The ramifications of the embodiment of Christ in 
the Eucharist include a theological question that may amuse moderns, but indicates a real 
problem for the proponents of the doctrine of transubstantiation: “Quid mus sumit?” or “What 
does the mouse eat?”  St. Bonaventure held that the body of Christ was not consumed by the 
rodent: the bread lacked the ratio alimenti, the quality of being food, with regard to the mouse.  
And yet the bread is consumed by men, with implications that are not satisfied by Bonaventure’s 
formula. 
 The nominalist William of Ockham, with a distaste for just such Aristotelian 
metaphysical baggage as Aquinas’ elusive quantity, joined with John Duns Scotus in a revised 
understanding of transubstantiation.  The sacrament of the altar was by its nature a miracle, and 
for Ockham God’s power was not to be delimited.  The substance of bread and wine were 
annihilated in transubstantiation, and their accidents or sensible qualities were miraculously 
maintained, accidens sine subjecto.  It was against this position that Wyclif constructed his own 
understanding of the sacrament.  The notion that the sacrament might be the place in which God 
stooped to a sort of deception was not only distasteful, but ran afoul of Wyclif’s understanding of 
                                                 
21 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part III, q. 75, a. 5. 
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“real proposition,” the effort to identify ens with veritas, being with truth.  In De eucharistia, 
Wyclif writes, 
To talk of accidents without a substance is self-contradictory.  Every accident which 
formally inheres in a substance is nothing other than the truth that the substance is such-
and-such in an accidental manner; but there cannot be such a truth without a substance, 
any more than there can be a creature without God; so there is no such thing as a heap of 
accidents without a subject which is the consecrated host. . . .  Christ is in the host as a 
sign, otherwise the host would not be a sacrament; but he is not in the signs in a way 
which means he is not really and truly there according to his whole humanity; and so it is 
granted that Christ is there not only as in a sign; nor is it inconsistent, but perfectly 
consistent, that one in the same thing should be both a truth and a figure or a sign.22 
 
In fact, “real proposition” requires that truths operate like signs on the most fundamental level.  
As Jeremy Catto has observed, it is unlikely in the extreme that it was Wyclif’s intention to 
debase the sacrament of the altar or to deny the real presence.  Rather, by rescuing the bread and 
wine from the doctrinal errors that misrepresented their nature, he would exalt them, correcting 
practices that confounded priests and confused the laity.23  Indeed, Wyclif saw the intellectual 
failure of the clergy in providing an adequate explanation for transubstantiation as an invitation 
to idolatry on the part of the laity, worshiping the sacrament “as the body of Christ.”24 
 If his work on sacramental incarnation had the potential to undermine a sacramental 
political theology that endorsed the authority of the church and functioned to harmonize the 
potentially divergent projects of the three estates, Wyclif’s writings on the origins of civil and 
ecclesiastical authority in De civili dominio and De dominio divino could be understood to 
threaten all established social relations.  Wyclif’s work on dominion and property built upon the 
work of Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh, whose De pauperie salvatoris touched upon 
the problem of civil lordship.  In FitzRalph’s analysis, temporal dominion was originally 
                                                 
22 Anthony Kenny, Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 83-4; Wyclif, De eucharistia, J. Loserth, ed., 
London: Trübner for the Wyclif Society, 1892, 63, 115. 
23 Catto, 273. 
24 Wyclif, De Apostolica, 163; Aston, 1993, 58. 
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assigned to humans by God.  This primordial agreement was sundered in the fall, so that 
dominion in the fallen world was doubly contingent and, importantly, turned upon the question 
of grace.  This marks the point of departure for Wyclif’s revision of Fitzralph.  Wyclif took the 
axiom of dominion founded upon grace and sought to articulate it through his own understanding 
of the nature of the church.  The papacy’s position on what constitutes the church had been set 
forth at the time of the Hildebrandine reforms: the Roman church as an institution with the Pope 
at its head was “at once clerical corporation and the immaculate bride of Christ.”25 Wyclif’s 
ecclesiology expressly rejects this understanding.  Sempiternally in the mind of God, Wyclif 
would argue, is the knowledge of those who will be saved, the predestinati, and those who will 
be damned, the presciti.  The universal church, for Wyclif, is that company of those predestined 
for salvation. It is nevertheless impossible to know in this world who belongs to each cadre,  
Indeed, nobody can know whether he is himself predestined or not.  Without a special 
revelation no one should assert that he is predestined; and similarly he should not assert 
that he is a member of the church or for that matter its head.  Human office cannot confer 
grace.26 
 
Neither position nor knowledge of predestination can serve us as a basis for dominion.  What we 
can know is if a given person is in grace at the present moment.  This clearly applies to Popes 
just as it does to the humble, so that the authority and legitimacy of the Pope is much 
circumscribed.  The Pope is the head of the Roman church insofar as he keeps Christ’s law, but 
in practical terms he could well be one of those slotted for damnation, and abandons his authority 
when he falls away from grace.  Wyclif insists that we can make a judgment about the conduct of 
a cleric, and from this determine his relation to God’s grace.  What mechanism has the authority 
to correct a Pope if he has strayed?  The 1302 decree Unam Sanctam had made a strong claim for 
papal supremacy: 
                                                 
25 Howard Kaminsky, “Wyclifism as Ideology of Revolution,” Church History, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Mar., 1963), 59. 
26 Wyclif, De Ecclesia, 5, cited in Anthony Kenny, Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 70. 
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We are taught by the words of the gospel that in this church and in her power there are 
two swords, a spiritual one and a temporal one. . . . One sword ought to be put under the 
power of the other and the temporal authority subject to the spiritual power. . . .Therefore, 
if the earthly power errs, it shall be judged by the spiritual power, if a lesser spiritual 
power errs it shall be judged by its superior, but if the supreme spiritual power errs it can 
be judged only by god not by man…27 
 
Wyclif’s understanding of dominion left no room for such an argument, and he noted that in 
claiming such an authority over the temporal realm, the Popes had arrogated to themselves a 
power that Christ himself had never claimed.28  Following St. Augustine (ever his touchstone), 
Wyclif allows that the bishop of Rome might be the vicar of Christ, but the king is the vicar of 
God.29  In Wyclif’s estimation, as John Thomas McNeil has written, 
The King may use force; a priest must humbly minister, and accept the rule of the king.  
To demand his subjection to the king is not necessarily to deny the superiority of the 
priest, since grace itself is marked by obedience and obligates to it.  As to bad kings, they 
have not true lordship, though they possess power, and should be obeyed.30 
 
It is finally the place of kings to correct erring priests.  The above passage fairly explores both 
the equivocal nature of Wyclif’s understanding of dominion and his unwillingness to follow it to 
its most extreme formulation.  If dominion is founded in grace, then this implicates both king and 
bishop, yet Wyclif ever shies from applying its full force to secular dominion.  In other hands, 
nevertheless, the theory of dominion expressed in De civili dominio and De dominio divino could 
be read as a challenge to both ecclesiastical and civil authority.  Wyclif seems to have been 
aware of the potentially incendiary content of his work on dominion.  He observed publicly 
                                                 
27 Brian Tierney, “Unam Sanctam,” The Crisis of Church and State, 1050 – 1300 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1964), 188-9. 
28 Kaminsky, 60. 
29 John Thomas McNeil, “Some Emphases of Wyclif’s Teaching,” The Journal of Religion Vol. 7, No. 4 (July, 
1927), 460. 
30 ibid, 460. 
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while lecturing at Oxford that some among his auditors might be attending with the intention of 
betraying him.31 
 Wyclif’s teachings on both the Eucharist and dominion seemed to some a recipe for 
revolution.  For the orthodox chroniclers Walsingham and Knighton, it was certain that Wyclif 
was to blame for the 1381 uprising.  Writing shortly before the first burning of a Lollard heretic, 
Knighton portrayed John Ball as “preparing the way,” as John the Baptist announcing the 
ministry of his master, with Wyclif’s explicit sanction.32  The Fasciculi Zizaniorum makes a 
similar claim33 and, like Knighton’s account, reads the Peasants’ Revolt through subsequent 
decades of conflict between Lollards and the orthodox church.  Anne Hudson sees a possible 
relationship between the Oxford master and the leaders of the rising, probably in the register of 
influence rather than complicity.34  Wyclif’s criticism of the rebels is quite mild, and he 
understands the clergy’s drain on the wealth of the kingdom as a prime cause of the uprising, and 
recommends disendowment, a policy that Wat Tyler may have endorsed.35 
If Ball wanted an abolition of privilege and class, Wyclif argued that the aberration of 
civil property should give way to Christian communism: “All the goods of God should be in 
common.”36  The problem of the relationship of Wyclif’s  thought to the Peasants’ Revolt is not 
simply the question of his real involvement, but a crucial if difficult problem of the relationship 
of intellectual production to the social world.  A traditional sort of intellectual biography would 
look to Wyclif’s patrimony in theologians like Grosseteste and Augustine; of course, there is a 
body of such scholarly work on Wyclif.  The work of Antonio Gramsci in “Gli intellettuali e 
                                                 
31 Jeremy Catto, “Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford, 1356-1430,” The History of the University of Oxford, Vol. II, 
Late Medieval Oxford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 202, n. 89. 
32 Anne Hudson, The Premature Reformation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 67. 
33 ibid; Fasciculi Zizaniorum , 272-4. 
34 ibid., 68-9. 
35 ibid., 69; Anonimalle Chronicle, 147. 
36 Kenny, 46-7; De Civili Dominio, 96. 
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l'organizzazione della cultura”37 and the complementary work of Georg Lukács in “Reification 
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat”38 invite us to see intellectual production, and 
particularly radical thought, as driven by conflicts within social power.  The Peasants’ Revolt 
reveals how complexly situated was Wyclif in relation to conflicting social forces of his 
historical moment.  The chroniclers Knighton and Walsingham, as we have seen, place Wyclif 
with John Ball in responsibility for the uprising, yet Wyclif was the pet intellectual of John of 
Gaunt, a target of the fury of the rioters.  Considering the resonance between the thought of Ball 
and Wyclif, it could be argued that the Oxford theologian was not simply the author of a durable 
heresy, but himself functioned to elucidate in scholarly terms something of the popular response 
to dominant social power as it existed in the late fourteenth century.  The question raised the 
resonant anti-authoritarian doctrines in Wyclif’s work and the Peasants’ Uprising is one that 
would remain relevant for the next few centuries: what is the relationship between religious 
reformation and civil revolt? 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Antonio Gramsci, Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura, ed. by F. Platone. (Turin: Nuovo Universale 
Einaudi, 1949); Antonio Gramsci, “The Intellectuals”, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. by Q. Hoare and G. 
N. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 3-23. 
38 Georg Lukács, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,”  History and Class Consciousness (Verlag: 
Berlin, 1968), pp. 83-222. 
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B.  THE EMPIRICAL OLDCASTLE 
 
Whether as their ally or their opponent, the knight John Oldcastle and the Lancastrian kings 
cannot be understood without one another.  The author of the Gesta Henrici Quinti was an 
orthodox cleric and a passionate supporter of the Lancastrian state and of Thomas Arundel, the 
exiled and restored Archbishop of Canterbury.  The Gesta , a chronicle of the early period of the 
reign of Henry V, sets historical events in a providential framework, drawing significantly on 
Lancastrian propaganda,39 and never fails to portray the young king in a flattering light.  At the 
beginning of his chronicle, having spent some hundred words on the young king’s coronation, 
the Gesta author moves immediately to Oldcastle, an adversary permitted by God to test the elect 
nation and its young prince.  In a document perhaps intended to justify Henry V’s military 
campaign in France to the Council of Constance, Oldcastle is produced as the quintessential 
rebel, at once a potential challenge to Lancastrian ascendancy and a guarantee of Henry’s 
legitimacy. 
The Gesta notwithstanding, for much of his life, Oldcastle was anything but an enemy of 
Lancaster.  Much of what can be said of Oldcastle before the year 1400 consists of rather dry 
biographical fact.  The Oldcastle family is drawn from Almeley, Herefordshire, not far from the 
Welsh border.  A John Oldcastle, grandfather of the renowned Lollard, represented 
Herefordshire in parliaments held in 1368 and 1372,40 the latter the year in which commons 
petitioned that the Chancellor should be a layman rather than a cleric, resulting in the 
appointment of Sir John Knyvett as Lord Chancellor.  It is not established that this earlier 
Oldcastle supported the petition.  Thomas Oldcastle, uncle of the familiar Sir John, sat in the 
                                                 
39 Frank Taylor and John S. Roskell, “Introduction,” Gesta Henrici Quinti (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975),  xxix. 
40 W. T. Waugh, “Sir John Oldcastle,” The English Historical Review, vol. 20, no. 79 (July, 1905), p. 435; Rotuli 
Parliamentorum, i. 179, 188. 
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parliaments of 1390 and 1393 and held several offices of some responsibility.41  He appears to 
have been quite orthodox in religious orientation, having been charged by the king in 1393 to 
prevent interference in the trial of a Welsh Lollard, one Walter Brut.42  Sir John’s father, 
Richard, was the first Oldcastle to be knighted, and at the time of John’s birth in the 1370s, the 
family was rather richer in accomplishment than property, but their fortunes generally on the 
rise. 
 Oldcastle emerges on the national scene as a knight in the service of Henry IV’s 1400 
campaign in Scotland.43  His actions over the following years show him an enthusiastic supporter 
of Henry IV’s rule.  The author of the Gesta Henrici Quinti would write, “slaughtering and 
pillaging the Welsh secured his promotion to knighthood,”44 piling inaccuracy—Oldcastle was 
knighted on Henry’s expedition in  Scotland—on distortion—Oldcastle’s service was perfectly 
consistent with the aims of the crown, though there is a grain of truth in the fact that the Glyn 
Dŵr rising offered opportunities for royalist knights in the west country.  In 1401 he is found 
among a number of Herefordshire knights charged with bringing Welsh rebels to justice.45  Over 
the following years, Oldcastle was in command of castles Hay and Builth, and given 
responsibility over rebels surrendering in sundry parts of south Wales, and charged with 
investigating allegations of material support given the rebels from both Herefordshire and 
Gloucestershire.46  In 1404, he represented Herefordshire in parliament as knight of the shire.47  
He served as a justice of the peace and later, like his uncle Thomas, as sheriff.48  Walsingham 
                                                 
41 For details of his career, see Waugh, 435. 
42 John A. F. Thomson, “John Oldcastle,” The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 
2004), v. 41, p. 668.  Thomas Oldcastle’s will was also decidedly orthodox. 
43 Waugh, p. 436. 
44 Gesta Henrici Quinti, p. 11. 
45 Waugh, p. 436. 
46 Thomson, p. 669; Waugh, p. 437. 
47 Waugh, p. 437. 
48 ibid. 
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numbers him among the nobles in the company of the Prince of Wales at the surrender of 
Aberystwyth in 1407.49  That he was seen as a loyal supporter of king and prince is demonstrated 
by royal grants to Oldcastle paid out of the revenues of both Lancaster and Monmouth.50  In all 
his affairs, Oldcastle presented the image of a thriving Herefordshire gentleman and servant of 
the crown. 
 The metamorphosis from a figure of local to one of national significance was facilitated 
by Oldcastle’s marriage to Joan Cobham,51 the granddaughter and sole heir of John, Lord 
Cobham.  The Dictionary of National Biography comments, “[I]t is unlikely that [Joan Cobham] 
would have chosen Oldcastle if he had not been a rising man, who could assist in managing her 
extensive estates, and who would be acceptable to the society within which she moved.”52  This 
marriage brought Oldcastle considerable property in Kent, Cooling Castle, a house called 
Cobham’s Inn in London, and a good deal of revenue and influence.  This is reflected in 
Oldcastle’s being summoned to parliament in 1409 as a member of the upper house.  As Waugh 
has argued, this probably represented a compromise of sorts between Oldcastle’s recognition in 
his wife’s right and the king’s inclination to recognize him for his own accomplishments, a move 
much more politically expedient than simply conferring a barony on a minor Herefordshire 
knight.53 
 The 1409 parliament was the occasion of one of those happenings which call into 
question the historical constitution of past events.  What is known from the Rotuli 
Parliamentorum is that the commons put forward a proposal that would modify the anti-heresy 
statute De haeretico comburendo, effectively nullifying it.  The commons further suggested an 
                                                 
49 Chronica Maiaora, p. 356. 
50 Waugh, n. 437. 
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52 Thomson, p. 669. 
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appropriation to the crown of certain ecclesiastical revenues: half of the incomes of absentee 
office holders and of those who had gotten their positions through fraud.54  Walsingham, 
uniquely among contemporary chronicle accounts, reports a confiscation scheme of an entirely 
different magnitude and political import: 
In this parliament the parliamentary knights (or, to name them more truly, the ‘minions of 
Pilate’) with no thought for the good of the kingdom but with malice in their hearts and 
no time for anything but one crime, proposed despoiling the church of God throughout 
England.55 
 
Walsingham here reproduces a document of significant detail and dubious arithmetic that is in 
effect an inventory of ecclesiastical temporalities in England and the revenues that could be 
extracted from them, followed by an explicitly Lollard commentary on the state of the church.  
What is this document, and what is its provenance?  C. L. Kingsford is of the opinion that it is a 
popular manifesto rather than a piece of legislation.56  Waugh argues that “a comparison between 
the chronicle and official records leaves little doubt that Walsingham has been guilty of gross 
exaggeration, if not of sheer invention.”57  The details of the disendowment scheme appear to 
have been drawn from a text describing the anti-clerical projects of the Lollard John Purvey.58  
On the other hand, McNiven accepts it as a genuine piece of legislation emerging from “the 
commons” and reflecting “a great deal of homework” on the part of its authors.59  J.H. Wylie 
inclined toward the belief that a scheme resembling that suggested by Walsingham was put 
forward, and that Oldcastle himself was behind it.60  The record does not seem to support these 
speculations, and Walsingham’s suggestion that the commons were dominated by a Lollard 
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contingent seems particularly suspicious.  Whatever the events of that parliament, Walsingham’s 
account has been accepted by many, and along with it the notion of a significant effort toward a 
Lollard power-grab.  In the chronicle record, Oldcastle gives an aristocratic body and a unitary 
agency to the acts of the amorphous commons. 
 
 
C. LOLLARDS, LANCASTER, AND THE THRONE 
 
Contrary to the construction of these institutions in some Tudor Protestant writings, in late-
fourteenth-century England, the English church and state were not easily separable, and native 
secular social power had a tremendous (but not unlimited) influence in matters of faith.  A 
variety of forces and interests were arrayed around the great magnate John of Gaunt, fourth son 
of Edward III, Duke of Lancaster and scion of an aristocratic family whose influence stretched 
from Iberia to Flanders.61  Gaunt serves as an example of a particularly aristocratic corollary to 
the lay religious initiative that on the continent was manifested in the Devotio Moderna.  
Through the 1360s, Gaunt’s family was granted significant religious latitude by the Pope, 
including the right to choose their own confessor, to keep an altar in their household, to receive 
the sacraments from their chaplain, and so on.62  This sort of aristocratic license would be 
exploited by Lollards like Sir John Oldcastle to promote their own religious projects.  Gaunt’s 
household clergymen appear to have been unobjectionable, though Anthony Goodman credits 
                                                 
61 The genitive “Gaunt” from “Ghent,” the city in which he was born. 
62 Anthony Goodman, John of Gaunt: The Exercise of Princely Power in Fourteenth-Century Europe (Harlow, 
Essex: Longman Group, 1992), 244. 
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Gaunt’s patronage of the Carmelites with shaping a distinctive Lancastrian religiosity.63  This is 
not to say that all of Gaunt’s religious connections were perfectly conventional. 
In January of 1377, Gaunt and other lights of the realm including Thomas of Woodstock, 
Thomas Langley, and Thomas Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, accompanied Prince Richard—
Gaunt’s own nephew—in a procession featuring over a hundred masked mummers representing 
both secular and religious figures including papal functionaries, cardinals and the Pope.  The 
mummers representing papal legates wore demoniacal masks, and were dramatized as villains.64  
In parliament that year, Gaunt was a key player in the enactment of a new manner of subsidy, a 
“poll tax” from which clergy were not exempt.  Perhaps in concert with the anticlericalism he 
demonstrated in both policy and public spectacle, Gaunt continued in his vehement support of 
Wyclif, whose influence at Oxford was near its apex.  In this year, the dissemination Wyclif’s De 
civili dominio and related works had stirred the Pope to take measures against the renegade 
scholastic. 
It may be that it was Wyclif’s writings on dominion appealed to Gaunt, holding out the 
possibility of securing some part of the wealth of the church for secular ends .  Whatever the 
reason, he was at first an enthusiastic supporter of the controversial cleric.  Early in 1377, 
Gaunt’s public promotion of Wyclif extended to having him deliver a series of sermons in 
London criticizing clerical wealth.65  The escalation between the anti-clerical party and such 
powerful churchmen as London’s Bishop Courtenay and Winchester’s Bishop Wykeham led to a 
confrontation in February of that year.  Archbishop Sudbury,66 along with Courtenay, convened 
a tribunal in London to examine Wyclif’s errors.  Wyclif arrived in the company of Gaunt, Lord 
                                                 
63 ibid. 
64 V. H. Galbraith, ed., The Anonimalle Chronicle: 1333-1381 (London: Manchester University Press, 1970), 102-3, 
quoted in Goodman, , 59-60. 
65 Kenny, 53. 
66 Himself a long-time client of Gaunt, Sudbury must have pursued proceedings against Wyclif only reluctantly. 
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Percy, and a number of his clerical supporters.  Gaunt appeared to be prepared to put into 
practical effect the theory of dominion that Wyclif had come to defend.  He encouraged Percy, 
who was carrying the baton of his office as Marshal of the Realm, to arrest the ecclesiastical 
panel.  Courtenay threatened the lay lords with excommunication.  Gaunt is reported to have told 
the panel that Wyclif “was more worthy of sitting there than any of them.”67  Gaunt’s party 
retreated, with certain parting threats.68  In an intimation of events to come in the following 
decade, there were demonstrations in London against Gaunt and in defense of their Bishop.69 
As late as 1382, John of Gaunt appears to have been ignorant about Wyclif’s Eucharistic 
teaching, and may have become aware of it only when Wyclif’s theological disciples Philip 
Repingdon and Nicholas Hereford appealed to him after the Blackfriar’s Council of that year 
condemned twenty-four of the master’s theses.   Initially supporting the Lollard position on the 
familiar grounds of his inclination toward disendowment and enhanced secular power, Gaunt 
seems to have been genuinely shocked by the Eucharistic doctrine of Wyclif’s supporters.  As 
historian Anthony Goodman writes, “He called them odious for their opinion on the Eucharist 
and himself expounded conventional beliefs, forbidding any doctor to answer them, and did this 
so eloquently himself that the orthodox doctors had nothing to add.”70 
 The position of the heirs of John of Gaunt with regard to religious orthodoxy was not a 
certain one before the deposition of Richard II.  It was reported by Sir William Bagot during his 
trial before parliament that King Richard himself had once observed that Henry Bolingbroke 
should never be permitted the throne because he would destroy the church.71  As it would turn 
out, the evolving attitude of Lancastrian monarchs to the inheritors of Wyclif’s legacy would be 
                                                 
67 The Anonimalle Chronicle 103-4, quoted in Goodman, 60-1. 
68 Gaunt told Courtenay that he would “drag him from his see by the hair” (Goodman 61). 
69 Kenny, 53. 
70 Goodman, 242. 
71 Chris Given Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution: 1397-1400 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993), p. 17. 
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a complicated development, conditioned by an astute populism and an unprecedented sense of 
political spectacle.  It is entirely conceivable that Henry, son of John of Gaunt and heir to the 
duchy of Lancaster, might capture the crown through legal and constitutional means.  Instead, in 
a manner explored with great elegance by workers like Gaillard Lapsley and Paul Strohm, 
Lancaster became England through a series of subtle and powerful exercises of public political 
representation backed by the preponderance of military force.  The Lancastrian cabal saw the law 
of England not as a normative code restraining their power, but rather as one of many symbolic 
resources to be turned to the project of legitimizing Henry’s usurpation.  While the record of the 
Lancastrian revolution depends almost exclusively on the ex parte reports of chroniclers 
sympathetic to Henry’s accession,72 Lapsley has revealed a pattern of inconsistencies and 
outright misrepresentations that give the lie to what had appeared to William Stubbs in his 
Constitutional History to be an earnest and proper parliamentary exercise anticipating modern 
constitutionalism.73 
 In the course of pursuing his military campaign, Henry’s ouster of his cousin Richard was 
preceded by a less noted but crucial displacement.  While in Chester, Henry was visited by a 
deputation including representatives of the aldermen of the city of London, who offered him 
their support and renounced their fealty to Richard.  They also brought the no-doubt welcome 
news that, in storming Westminster abbey in search of the king, they had seized and imprisoned 
the incumbent Archbishop of Canterbury, Roger Walden.74  This gave perfect freedom to 
Thomas Arundel to resume his archbishopric by fiat, a fact that would be crucial in the days to 
follow.  Exiled by Richard in part for his defense of the earl his brother, Arundel had been 
                                                 
72 In a manner more than trivially similar to the dependence upon Tudor histories of the accession of Henry VII. 
73 Galliard Lapsley, “The Parliamentary Title of Henry IV,’ The English Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 195 (July, 
1934), 423-449; William Stubbs, Constitutional History of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874), ii, 533. 
74 The Chronicle of Adam of Usk 1377-1421  ed. Chris Given-Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 61. 
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chancellor of England, and had a credibility that even Richard himself was bound to respect.  
The Dieulacres chronicler reports that it was an oath sworn by Arundel on a consecrated host that 
persuaded Richard to enter into negotiations with Henry: the king’s safety assured,  Henry 
sought only his Lancastrian inheritance, and had no intention of deposing him.75   This portion of 
the Dieulacres Chronicle is one of the most Ricardian records of the deposition, possibly written 
by a monk of Chester,76 and must be understood as such.77  This accepted, it is not the bare 
historicity of the act which is most interesting, but its symbolic force, the body of Christ at its 
intersection with the body of the king, the oath of the greatest prelate of England, possibly 
forsworn.78  The rupture of the social world is figured in the breach of an oath sworn on the body 
of him who is its guarantee. 
 As important as Arundel’s confidential negotiations may have been, they may be the 
lesser part of his service to Henry’s cause when compared to his public acts of September and 
October 1399.  The work of Lapsley has demonstrated how problematic is the Lancastrian claim 
to parliamentary sanction of Henry’s accession.  As Walsingham reports, “writs were sent in the 
name of King Richard to the persons in the land who had a legal obligation to attend parliament, 
bidding them assemble in London at Westminster on the day after the feast of St. Michael.”79  
On the 30th of September, an assembly was convened in the great hall at Westminster, where the 
king’s throne stood empty.  The assembled estates were presented with a fait accompli: the king 
had resigned to a commission representing the estates of the realm.  Archbishop Arundel set the 
                                                 
75 Given-Wilson (1993), p. 165; McNiven, 68; The Dieulacres Chronicle, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, xiv 
(1930), p. 173. 
76 Given Wilson (1993), p. 10. 
77 The chronicle was continued by a clerk of more prudent Lancastrian sympathies. 
78 Accusations of being forsworn on the host are by no means limited to the Ricardian camp; the clearly Lancastrian 
“Record and Process of the renunciation of King Richard the Second” reports that, among Richard’s other crimes, he 
swore that he pardoned the duke of Gloucester “for any offenses which he might have been said to have committed 
against the king’s person” “The Record and Process,” in Given-Wilson (1993), p. 183. 
79 Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, p. 309. 
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tone nicely with his sermon on the theme, “Incumbit nobis ordinare pro regno”: “It falls upon us 
to govern on behalf of the king,”80  The implication, at least, is that the assembly Arundel was 
addressing had, in this moment of interregnum, the authority to set the nation in order once more.  
In the pro-Lancastrian chronicles, the event has a ring of optimistic inevitability.  In  
Walsingham’s account, “As it was obvious from these happenings and the opportunity provided 
by them that the kingdom of England with its appurtenances was now vacant, the aforesaid 
Henry, duke of Lancaster, hurriedly rose. . .”81 Adam of Usk is more effusive: 
And Thus—why delay?—even though he had self evidently deposed himself, the 
sentence of deposition, which had been set down in writing, was, with the consent and 
authority of the whole parliament, clearly, solemnly, and publicly read out. . .  
The office of king thus vacated, the aforesaid Duke of Lancaster, having been chosen as 
king with the consent of the whole parliament, was conducted to the throne. . .and 
promptly enthroned.82   
 
One of the fascinating aspects of Usk’s account is the way in which agency is distributed to all 
parties save one: Richard abdicates voluntarily, “the whole parliament” manages the proceedings 
and chooses Henry as king, and Henry himself is a sort of passive object of the operation as the 
archbishops of Canterbury and York conduct him to his throne.  The sentence of deposition is 
“self-evident” even though it is a process executed off-stage, even though Richard had been 
neither present no represented by counsel.   
 In fact, the meeting of the estates summoned under Richard’s name at the end of 
September to receive the news of his abdication was not a parliament under the law.  The 
irregularity of this session is discussed by Lapsley: 
It was not, indeed, recorded as a parliament at all.  Nor was it arranged or organized as a 
parliament.  When the estates were convened the throne was vacant, the king was 
unrepresented, so that the meeting was without a presiding officer, and no opening 
                                                 
80 This is my own translation, and I’m willing to entertain alternatives; ordinare here has at least the possible 
valence of “to appoint,” which is germane to this argument. 
81 Chronica Maiaora, p. 311. 
82 The Chronicle of Adam of Usk, p. 69. 
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discourse constituting the parliament and explaining the business at hand was delivered.  
The commons did not retire nor did they choose a speaker. . .83  
 
As Lapsley points out, it would be surprising if the extra-legal nature of this meeting and the 
commission that sought Richard’s deposition had escaped Adam of Usk, trained as he was in 
canon law.84  Writing a decade after these events, Usk nevertheless recalls an impeccable 
parliamentary exercise, though, as Lapsley concludes, “The body. . .that raised Henry to the 
throne could not upon any constitutional theory have been a parliament as Adam. . .calls it.”85  In 
place of the constitutional problem of replacing a legitimate monarch with his well-heeled 
cousin, Usk gives us a series of tableaux that emphasize the voluntary nature of Richard’s 
renunciation and a pageant of Henry’s popular legitimacy.  There is not a hint of the friction 
between the commission and the imprisoned king that is to be found in “The Manner of King 
Richard’s Renunciation,” in which Richard at first refuses to abdicate to the advantage of Henry.  
As Chris Given-Wilson has written, in contrast to the Lancastrian propagandists, “The picture 
which the document presents is of a king coerced into (in effect) unconditional resignation”86 
The position stated by the newly-crowned Henry IV seemed designed to address such 
anxieties. As Lapsley reports 
Henry, speaking in English, thanked the lords spiritual and temporal and all the estates of 
the land, and disclaimed any intention of pressing the consequence of his now admitted 
claim to rule by virtue of the reconquest of his inheritance, to the point of expropriation.  
All interests secured by law and custom were to be respected, except in the case of 
persons that ‘have been against the good purpose and common profit of the realm.’87 
 
Claiming his own against the seizure of his inheritance by Richard, Henry could represent 
himself as the champion of property rights that had been made unsure in Richard’s reign.  That 
                                                 
83 Lapsley, p. 430. 
84 ibid., 436 
85 ibid., 437. 
86 Chris Given Wilson, “The Manner of King Richard’s Renunciation: A ‘Lancastrian Narrative’?” The English 
Historical Review, vol. 108, no. 427 (April, 1993), p. 369. 
87 Lapsley, p. 428. 
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Henry had been party to such policy in the confiscation of the property of the late earl of Arundel 
was  matter best forgotten, and the message conveyed to landed wealth was on the whole a 
reassuring one, notwithstanding the proviso in the case of those persons who may have injured 
the “common profit.”  In his address to parliament, in his coalition with Archbishop Arundel, the 
policy asserted by Henry IV at the very inception of his reign excluded the possibility of the sort 
of disendowment contemplated each in his own way by John of Gaunt and Wyclif. 
 In ascending the throne, Henry IV revealed a talent for populist political representation 
unimaginable in the fiery John of Gaunt.  At this point, a distinction must be made between these 
representations and real representative institutions.  Henry was able to revive certain “ ‘elective’ 
or acclamatory”88 practices in a new register and on a national scale, disseminated in the writings 
of pet intellectuals, while avoiding the checks on royal prerogative that had plagued Richard II.  
As Paul Strohm writes, “. . .his genius was to use power ruthlessly, but to encourage its 
misrecognition as a participatory exercise.  The “participation” of which I speak is by no means 
to be understood (a la Bishop Stubbs) as precocious parliamentarianism.  The participation 
encouraged by Henry IV’s ceremonies of acclamation and assertions of free election was less 
parliamentary than ritualistic and spectacular.”89 
 In the notional space evolving between Lancaster and Lollardy was a populist idea, a 
figuration of the agency of the people.  If  Lancastrian populism invoked the will of the people to 
endorse what were not intrinsically acts of political representation, the writings of Wyclif 
suggested, if only potentially, that every form of sovereignty was ultimately conditional.  The lay 
believer, humble though he might be, was imbued with the agency to judge his social betters, 
even unto the bishop, perhaps even unto the king.  While Lancastrian monarchs might be 
                                                 
88 J. W. McKenna, “The Myth of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Late-Medieval England,” The English Historical 
Review, vol. 94, no. 372 (July, 1979), p. 491. 
89 Strohm, 200, p. 42. 
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inclined to invoke the acclamation of the commons in their public political spectacles, the notion 
of a dominion founded in grace and judged by all the people was not one with which the new 
dynasty could be perfectly comfortable. 
 
 
D. FIGURING HERESY: THE WEEDS IN CHRIST’S GARDEN 
 
Like the tropes with which Lollards and the traditional church figured one another, the very label 
applied to the Lollard heresy was a site of symbolic contention.  Coming into English from the 
Dutch “lollaerd” or mumbler—perhaps referring to the mumbling of prayers—the term has an 
affinity for the Latin “lollii,” the tares that grow amongst the wheat in Matthew 13, expressed 
elsewhere as “zizania,”  as they appear in the title of Thomas Netter of Walden’s orthodox 
account of the Lollard heresy, the Fasciculi Zizanoirum.  The notion that the wellsprings of faith 
had been polluted was one shared by the author of the Lanterne of Light90: 
Certes, the wicked man that Crist spekith of hath done this dede. . .Inimicus homo 
superseminavit zizania.  That is to seie: “The enemy of God hath sowen taaris upon  the 
seed” of Jesu Christ.  That wicked man is Anticrist, that clowtith his lawis as roten raggis 
to the clene cloth of Cristis Gospel. . .91 
 
In a familiar Lollard position, it is the obscuring of the word of the gospel with the rotten rags of 
extra-scriptural accretions that is figured by the mixing of the wheat and tares.  For the Lanterne 
author, it is the opponents of the Lollards—and emphatically the upper clergy and the Pope—
who are the chaff to be winnowed from the good grain. 
                                                 
90 The possession of the Lanterne of Light was considered by Archbishop Chichele sufficient evidence that the 
London currier John Claydon was a relapsed heretic.  
91 The Lanterne of Light, ed. James M. Dean (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Medieval Institute Publications, 1996). 
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 In English religious discourses of the late-fourteenth century, the tainted grain became 
associated with the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, in a manner examined at length by Margaret 
Aston: 
[B]y a process of association, Cain came to be thought a heretic.  Thanks to a fusion 
accomplished in early exegesis, the passage in Genesis 4 describing the offerings of Cain 
and Abel became linked with the parable of the sower’s wheat and tares in Matthew 13.  
In fact, Genesis tells of Cain offering fruits of the ground while Abel offered the firstlings 
of his flock, but they came to be seen in terms of true and false offerers of tithe—Abel 
rendering his best beast, or sometimes pure wheat; Cain giving wheat mixed with tares.  
‘Caim cum lolio’; these words were placed over Cain’s head in a twelfth-century 
sculpture that clearly depicts the weeds among the wheat.92 
 
Aston is primarily interested in the figure of Cain as he is articulated in Lollard anti-clerical 
discourses in which “that caitiff cursed Caym” is associated with “Caim’s castles”: churches 
understood as the exclusive locus of proper worship, but by extension the wealth and property of 
the regular clergy.  What I would like to emphasize here is the ambivalence of the Cain figure.93  
Wycliff himself put forward “the heresiarch Caym”94 as the type for all the abuses of the friars 
and other suspect clerks.  What is important here is not the moot question of whether the Lollards 
or their enemies were of the race of Cain, were lanterns of light or darkness, but that Lollard and 
orthodox churchman struggled over the same discursive territory, each in their own way. To 
some clergymen, the Lollard religious texts, theological argumentation in English rather than 
Latin, must have seemed a profanation of religious language, an unwelcome intrusion of the 
mundane into the space of the holy. 
As an aristocratic representative of Lollardy, Oldcastle stands in an unstable position 
between aristocratic power and a heresy understood as base and “popular”; between the race of 
Cain and their betters.  His own religious error is an instance of a broader disruption of social 
                                                 
92 Aston, 1993, 96. 
93 I’m sure that Aston would acknowledge this as well. 
94 Tractatus de mandatis divines, ed. J. Loserth and F. D. Matthew (WS, 1922), 327, quoted in Aston 1993, 98. 
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hierarchy.  This is evident in Hoccleve’s “Remonstrance Against Oldcastle,”95 with its effort to 
separate its two addressees: there is Oldcastle, the “brother” fallen into error (“The 
Remonstrance,” line 2), and the Lollards who have led him into heresy, and receive the stronger 
criticism.96  “Brother” Oldcastle is potentially the Cain figure, but the greater force of the Cain 
metaphor is displaced on the “cursid caitiffs" who have led him astray (15).  The possibility of 
Oldcastle’s redemption is never withdrawn, “if thow the wilt amende. . . Axe him mercy and He 
wole it thee sende” (73-5).  Hoccleve’s poem is forced to negotiate an ill-defined landscape, a 
vernacular religious argument in the defense of orthodoxy, where such arguments in English are 
the province of the Lollard heresy.  Hoccleve is careful to keep the “Remonstrance” in the mode 
of orthodox argumentation, appealing to the church fathers, and placing an absolute constraint of 
the agency of the believer: 
Lete Holy chirche medle of the doctrine 
Of Crystes lawes and of his byleeue, 
And let alle other folk therto enclyne 
And of our feith noon arguments meeue. 
For if we mighte our feith by reson preeue, 
We sholde no meryt of our feith haue. 
But nowadayes a baillif or a reeue 
Or man of craft wole in it dote or raue. (137-44) 
 
The position that Hoccleve takes in his “Remonstrance” is a conservative one and, like many 
conservative representations, it invokes a historical moment that has passed.  It would not have 
been possible, at this late date, for a layman to take the position, “I believe as holy church 
believes in this matter.”  Much had changed since Wyclif, and the church in its investigative 
                                                 
95 All citations from the “Remonstrance” from Thomas Hoccleve, “The Remonstrance Against Oldcastle,” 
Selections From Hoccleve, ed. M. C. Seymour (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). 
96 Ethan Knapp, The Bureaucratic Muse: Thomas Hoccleve and the Literature of Late Medieval England (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), p. 143. 
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function had been forced to grant to even the most humble believer an opinion on certain obscure 
theological matters.97 
 Written after Oldcastle’s escape from prison, Hoccleve’s poem manages the anxiety 
produced by Oldcastle’s troubling absence by calling him into a rhetorical presence.  As Ethan 
Knapp has argued, “Hoccleve’s poem is founded on the trope of prosopeia, the trope in which 
the conjuring of an absent person is meant, literally, to draw a face where there was none.”98  
Hoccleve’s project is to make the obscure visible, to draw Lollardy out of a “darkness” that he, 
as the spokesman of Lancastrian orthodoxy, attributes to it.  According to Knapp, “paranoia over 
Lollardy’s very murky outlines led Lancastrian propagandists to project the difficulty of 
surveillance into an ethical charge that Lollards were duplicitous.”99 The furtive qualities 
ascribed to the Lollards are the antithesis of openness of orthodoxy as exemplified and 
guaranteed by the Lancastrian king and his rule.  Investment in this understanding on the part of 
the subject of power is the necessary ideological fiction of Lancastrian rule, itself predicated 
upon calculated political spectacle, on public representations that belie the real operations of 
power.100  In Hoccleve and elsewhere, we understand the privilege of social power and its 
representations to make competing interests and discourses appear clandestine, hidden, the 
operation of a cunning that shuns the light of day.  The repeated tropes of darkness/light and 
                                                 
97 “In 1370, it might have seemed far fetched to the point of insanity to suppose that a glover or skinner in the town 
of Beccles in Suffolk had from reading or hearing texts come to believe ‘that no priest hath power to make God’s 
body in the sacrament of the altar, and that after the sacramental words said of a priest a mass there remaineth 
nothing but only a cake of material bread’.  It was unthinkable for two reasons: first, because no clerk in his right 
mind would speak let alone write of this topic in English; second, because simple laymen did not discuss such 
theology.”  Aston 1993, 34-5. 
98 Knapp, p. 146. 
99 ibid., p. 140. 
100 Or, according to Strohm, “In each of these [texts of Hoccleve], an inauthentic and less wholesome alternative – 
whether heresy, effeminate fashion, female practices of reading and introspection, or false speech, is subversive of 
Lancastrian practice, which is stabilized around ideas of the orthodox, the identity of inner and outer, the refusal of 
debilitating speculation and misrepresentation in any of its forms.  Here held at bay is the embarrassing fact of the 
Lancastrians as a usurping dynasty, and the extent to which misrepresentation and false display reach a crisis point 
during their regime.” Paul Strohm, England’s Empty Throne: Usurpation and the Language of Legitimation, 1399 – 
1422 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 185. 
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visibility cleverly play upon the anti-visual tendency in Lollard treatments of the “idolatry” of 
orthodox worship.   
 Many orthodox churchmen also shared with the followers of Wyclif the conviction that 
some who thought themselves Christian had fallen into damnable error.  This is not all down to 
Wyclif’s increasingly polemical relationship with his clerical critics, but was a thread of 
Christian thought from Augustine through Aquinas.  For St. Thomas, 
A heretic does not have the habit [i.e., the theological virtue] of faith if he disbelieves 
even one article; for by one act of the [sacramentally] infused habit [of faith] the contrary 
is abolished.  For the habit of faith also has this efficacy, that by it the believer’s 
understanding is held back from assenting to things contrary to faith. . .101 
 
Arthur Stephen McGrade has examined the late-Medieval category of heresy in its 
uncomfortable relationship with modern liberal ideas of intellectual pluralism and tolerance.  
“Heresy” is derived from the Greek αίρέσεις via the Latin haeresis, literally meaning “choice,”  
with the particular valence of personal choice.102  To the orthodox, such a choice was both self-
deluded and a turning away from the community of faith and the sort of shared, internally 
consistent understanding of the divine, the sort of shared belief arising from faith to which 
Aquinas appealed.103  In positing personal religious agency, the far-flung Lollard heresy is 
tainted with the ambivalent  valuation placed upon the “popular” in late-Medieval political 
thought. 
 And yet, it would seem that at least in certain aristocratic circles, the religious ideas 
expounded and disseminated by Wyclif were not only tolerated but were in some sense the 
intellectual talk of the day.  Whether endorsed or repudiated, these ideas were in active 
                                                 
101 Thomas Aquinas, Quaetiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14, art. 10, ad. 10, ed. Busa, p. 98, quoted in Arthur 
Stephen McGrade, “The Medieval Idea of Heresy,” The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious 
Life (Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1999), p. 131; the textual interpolations are McGrade’s. 
102 McGrade, p. 116. 
103 ibid., p. 135. 
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circulation even when the Archbishops of Canterbury sought their condemnation at Oxford.  
Geoffrey Chaucer, who had traveled to the French court with the Lollard aristocrat Sir Richard 
Sturry, went so far as to include a highbrow joke about Lollard eucharistic attitudes and the new 
nomenclature they required in his “Pardoner’s Tale.”  Paul Strohm has argued convincingly that 
this sort of lighthearted play places the date of the first circulation of this writing in the mid 
1390s,104 a period of relative tolerance that ended decisively with the burning of the heretical 
cleric William Sawtre. 
 
 
E. EXAMINING LOLLARDY 
 
As the very first English heretic burning would demonstrate, the punishment of the Lollard 
heresy was a not merely an exercise of church power, but was publicly sanctioned by sovereign 
authority. That an escalation had been taking place among church, state and Lollards could not 
be denied.  An important early skirmish surrounded the relapsed heretical priest William Sawtre, 
and demonstrated the mortal consequences that heterodoxy could call down by the second year 
of Henry IV’s reign.   In the preceding year, Sawtre had been examined by Henry Depenser, 
Bishop of Norwich, for a number of heretical positions.  Among them, Sawtre had maintained 
that he would be more inclined to worship the king, or the body of a contrite man than the image 
of a cross,105 and that “one is bound rather to worship a man that is predestinate than an angel of 
God.”106  His most significant error, to the minds of his examiners, was the characteristic Lollard 
position that the Eucharist remained material bread after the words of consecration. In any case, 
                                                 
104 Paul Strohm, Theory and the Premodern Text (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 170. 
105 McNiven, p. 81. 
106 ibid., p. 82. 
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Sawtre recanted these heretical positions and submitted himself to the authority of the church.  
More resilient than prudent, Sawtre quickly returned to preaching his Lollard opinions, with the 
result that he found himself before an even more strict tribunal: the convocation empanelled by 
Archbishop Arundel. 
 Sawtre’s approach to this second disciplinary action betrayed depths he had not shown 
before.  Before this panel, he was able to offer a spirited defense that made most of his positions 
appear, though unconventional, something less than heretical, and, according to McNiven, 
“displayed a considerable grasp of theological argument.”107  The sticking point was, once again, 
the question of the Eucharist, and despite some early success in bringing his view in line with 
orthodoxy, Sawtre’s defense began to collapse, his manner growing abrasive to the perception of 
his inquisitors.  Eventually, it was his clearly Lollard opinion that the Eucharist “remained very 
bread, and the same bread which was before the words were spoken”108 that led to his 
condemnation. 
 This, however, fails to explain why Sawtre would be the first Lollard to face death by 
burning.  McNiven has argued that the punishment of the relatively inconsequential Sawtre was 
used by the convocation to place pressure on the high-profile Lollard who now came before the 
tribunal: John Purvey, Wyclif’s secretary, likely composer of a Wycliffite Bible, and the most 
notorious public promoter of the master’s work.109  Whether or not it was the object lesson of 
Sawtre’s burning at Smithfield, Purvey recanted his Wycliffite positions and submitted himself 
to the authority of the church.  Strohm has argued that Sawtre was deemed worthy of exemplary 
punishment because he was none other than the “Williamus Sautre, clerk” earlier pardoned for 
his role in the Ricardian Epiphany rising.  In Strohm’s understanding, Sawtre’s errors were a 
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useful demonstration of the relationship between heresy and treason,  suiting the propaganda 
interest of Henry’s government.110 
 Of special note in this episode is the characteristically Lancastrian legal process that sent 
Sawtre to his pyre.  The English clergy had been asking that the civil authority take on 
responsibilities in the punishment of heresy since at least 1397, and parliament had acted at last 
in 1401 with the promulgation of the statute that has become known as De haeretico 
comburendo, “Of the burning of heretics.”  Besides the legal mechanism for sentencing heretics 
to death, the new statute placed restrictions on the writing and distribution of religious books and 
warned of sanctions for anyone associating with heretics.111  The curious fact is that Sawtre’s 
execution preceded the passing of the statute.  Sawtre was sentenced to death by royal edict, an 
exercise of the sovereign exception.  The crown took the position that such a sentence was within 
its power, and was in any case the recognized punishment for heresy, though no one had been so 
punished in England in time out of mind.112  The claim that such a punishment was within the 
royal authority is complicated by the fact that a statute authorizing such powers was even at that 
moment in the works; the king, with some urgency, was exercising an authority yet to be given 
to him under the law.113 
 It is around questions of sovereign authority that the Lollard text “The Testimony of 
William Thorpe” is particularly valuable.  While the historical status of Thorpe’s arrest and 
examination has long been in doubt, recent work by Maureen Jurkowski reveals that the received 
text has its basis at least in historical events.114  In his interview with Archbishop Arundel, 
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Thorpe performs as a sophisticated Lollard with an orthodox clerical education, showing 
characteristic doctrinal eccentricity in matters of the Eucharist, the swearing of oaths, and the 
paying of tithes.  The exchange between Arundel and Thorpe repeatedly converges on arguments 
over the Epistles of Paul.  This is not surprising, for Paul represents the most explicit biblical 
treatment of questions of authority and the nature of the church.115  Two can play at the game of 
scriptural interpretation, but the exegesis of Lollard and Orthodox cleric diverge significantly on 
these matters. 
 Arundel challenges Thorpe on his unsanctioned preaching: “Asketh not St. Paul, ‘How 
should priests preach, except they be sent?’  But I sent thee never to preach. . .”116  Predictably, 
Thorpe is able to respond within the same biblical framework, from Corinthians 3:1: 
This sentence approveth Saint Paul, where he speaketh of himself, and of faithful apostles 
and disciples, saying thus, ‘We need no letters of commendations, as some preachers do,’ 
which preach for covetousness of temporal goods, and for men’s praising.’117 
 
The archbishop appeals to the potentially quite conservative construction of duty to social 
hierarchy found in Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians: “Saith not St. Paul, that subjects ought to obey 
their sovereigns, and not only good and virtuous, but also tyrants that are vicious?”118  Thorpe’s 
reply leads him into deep waters with respect to his understanding of authority: 
. . .[W]here ye say, sir, that Paul biddeth subjects obey their sovereigns, that is sooth, and 
may not be denied.  But there is two manner of sovereigns, virtuous sovereigns and 
vicious tyrants.  Therefore, to these last sovereigns, neither men nor women that be 
subject serve to obey in two manners. . . .For, as Paul saith after, these sovereigns, to 
whom subjects owe to obey in following of their manners, work busily in holy studying, 
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how they may withstand and destroy vices, first in themselves, and after all in their 
subjects, and how they may best plant in them virtues.119 
 
Arundel’s reading of Ephesians is, strictly speaking, metaphorical: it relies on an elision between 
social hierarchy in marriage or servitude on one hand, and ecclesiastical authority on the other, 
the latter an area where Paul is inclined to be far more critical.  Witness Paul’s Letter to Titus, 
1:6, “For a bishop must be blameless, as the Steward of God; not selfwilled, not soon  
angry. . .”120  It is to this tendency in Paul that Thorpe appeals.  Thorpe’s critical position is as 
unstable as Arundel’s authoritative one: he takes Paul’s well-delimited critique of church 
authority and expounds it in a statement that could as well be about secular power.  Thorpe reads 
Paul as if Paul were Wyclif, and the result is something as potentially volatile as the most radical 
construction of Wyclif’s work on civil dominion. 
If, in the testimony of Thorpe, Wycliffites were dangerously equivocal in their position 
on secular sovereignty, the crown was consolidating an explicit position on the Lollard heresy.  
Unlike the clerics heretofore examined, John Badby, brought before the convocation in 1410, 
was a very different sort of heretic: a layman of unorthodox opinion.  A Worcestershire 
craftsman, sometimes described as a “scissors” or tailor,121 Badby may have had a smattering of 
education, and would in his travail demonstrate an unexpected rhetorical capacity.  The 
perplexing quality of Badby’s heresy was his seemingly unshakeable confidence in his 
unorthodox beliefs.   Examined first by John Peveril, bishop of Worcester, Badby was persistent 
in his heretical positions, the most significant of which was the rejection of Christ’s presence in 
the altar bread.  After a year in prison, his replies to Archbishop Arundel’s convocation, before 
the assembled might of the English church, were just as intransigent.  The altar bread was a 
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symbol of Christ, in Badby’s understanding, and a “John Rayker” in God’s grace had the same 
power as any priest to make it.  The notion that the Eucharist was the body of Christ contradicted 
his understanding of the incarnation, for “if each Host consecrated on the altar was the body of 
Christ, there must be 20,000 gods in England.”122  In the opinion of his teachers, one who 
received communion in this way was damned.123 
 Badby’s religious opinions were substantially related to Lollard beliefs, but represented 
the most extreme ones with which the convocation had been confronted.  Around the question of 
the Eucharist, Badby expressed positions that Wyclif would never have acknowledged as his 
own.  Just as alarming to the convocation was the assurance with which this laborer continued to 
express himself on these matters, rejecting the opportunity to reconcile himself with the 
organized church.  The sort of personal religious agency promoted by Wyclif’s disciples had 
clearly spawned a monster.  Badby’s error on the Eucharist was symptomatic of his refusal of all 
just rule.  As Gairdner writes, “that a poor tailor’s unrefined common sense should have nerved 
him with courage to die in the conviction that he was right in defiance of the judgments of all the 
most learned divines is surely a fact that calls for sympathy as well as wonder.”124 
 Why should such a fine theological point as the nature of the Eucharist be grounds for 
civil execution?  Strohm argues that the nature of this sacrament is by no means of trivial 
consequence to Lancastrian legitimacy, citing the Dominican Roger Dymmok: 
For if this [Lollard] argument should thrive, all the sacraments of the church, all the oaths 
of kings, and all political exchange should be completely destroyed. . . . I ask, what 
sensible change do you see in a boy newly baptized, in a man who has confessed, in a 
boy or a man who has been confirmed, in consecrated bread, in a man ordained to the 
priesthood, in marriageable persons betrothed or joined?  All receive a new virtue, except 
the bread, which simply ceases to exist without any kind of sensible change, and is 
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transubstantiated into the body of Christ.  In what way also is the body of a king changed, 
when he is newly crowned, or anyone similarly advanced?125   
 
In Strohm’s understanding, the Lollard critique of the orthodox theory of transubstantiation 
disrupts a sacramental economy upon which the legitimacy of Lancastrian rule depends.126  In 
challenging the efficacy of the properly ordained and licensed priest to enact the fundamental, if 
unseen, material change in the bread, the new popular heresy undermines the authority of that 
same hierarchy to transform the duke of Lancaster into the king, the accidents of a revolted 
subject into the material substance of the sovereign. 
 In delivering Badby to the secular authorities for punishment, Archbishop Arundel 
expressed publicly his hope that Badby would not be put to death .  McNiven takes the position 
that Arundel cannot have been sincere, that the handing over of Badby to the lay arm and his 
subsequent execution have all the earmarks of a well-choreographed production.127  Badby was 
conducted to Smithfield, chained to a post and “shut in a cask.”128  Of his execution, 
Walsingham reports the following episode: 
After he had been condemned to burning and shut in the cask at Smithfield, Prince 
Henry, the king’s eldest son, who was then at Smithfield, went up to him and counseled 
him to abandon his foolishness and submit to Christian teaching.  But the worthless rascal 
ignored the salutary advice of so great a prince and chose rather to be burnt to death than 
to show reverence for that life-giving sacrament.  And so, shut up in his cask, he was 
attacked by the flames of devouring fire. . . .The prince was moved by his pitiful shrieks, 
and gave orders for the materials of the fire to be dragged away from him. . . .The man 
was now almost dead, but the prince comforted him and promised that, if he recanted 
even now, he should keep his life and obtain pardon and receive three pence daily from 
the royal treasury for the rest of his life.  But the unhappy fellow had recovered his 
spirits. . .and rejected such a handsome offer. . .129 
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The burning of a heretic in the liminal space of Smithfield, the second such burning of the 
decade, is an eminently public process.  It is entirely likely in one register that Badby had been 
put forth as an example to those of less-than-certain orthodoxy, that he was the first such 
example of a universal reference.  What may be forgotten—what is consistently elided in the 
facile rhetoric of “deterrence”—is the way in which the spectacle of punishment is interpellating.  
It cannot be the case that the spectators of such an event are so without empathy that the “pitiful 
shrieks” of the man doomed for an obscure doctrinal failure fail to move them.  It is the denial of 
that real horror, the effort to contain that painful recognition that makes the spectator the subject 
of the Lancastrian ideology that insists upon the necessity of this example.  In a similar vein, 
Slavoj Žižek suggests the example of a soviet communist of the 1930s, completely inhabited by 
Stalinist ideology, who “knows very well that millions are dying in the camps, yet this 
knowledge only confirms that the sublime ‘true people’ happily and enthusiastically builds 
Socialism.”130 
 The Prince’s intervention is potentially disturbing; it disrupts the overdetermined, 
legitimized functioning of the king’s law in a way that affirms the suffering of the condemned 
and already partly-burned man.  It is here that the “deterrent” or exemplary quality of the 
execution is not irrelevant.  In stopping the process after it has begun, the prince articulates the 
potentially subversive possibility of identification with condemned Badby.  What the prince of 
Wales offers us is the assimilation of our anxieties about the execution to a perfectly orthodox 
position.  His offer of an annuity to Badby is both a personal and a public move.  The prince 
places himself between the severity of the law (which could be understood as his father’s law) 
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and Badby as representative of the people (the first non-clerical victim of the anti-heresy statute).  
That Badby declines his offer is not really of great importance.131  When the flames are applied 
again, the prince has re-imagined the spectacle for the Smithfield crowd.  At a moment when the 
Prince’s party were at odds with both the king and Archbishop Arundel, he was able to stage this 
act of sophisticated populism in a manner distinctly his own. 
The execution of Badby may have been but the first skirmish in a broader battle against 
lay heresy.  In the same year, shortly after Badby’s death, Archbishop Arundel contacted the 
dean of Rochester, informing him that a chaplain sheltered by Oldcastle had been preaching 
heretical doctrines in Cooling and other places tacitly understood to be under Oldcastle’s 
authority.132  The interdict briefly enacted against Cooling church was removed temporarily to 
make possible an aristocratic wedding, and was later suspended entirely,133 but this was only an 
overture.  In March of 1413, Arundel’s convocation summoned John Lay, a chaplain suspected 
of unorthodox preaching who had celebrated mass with Oldcastle that very morning.  Arundel’s 
registrar demanded of Lay his ecclesiastical licenses, but Lay had unaccountably neglected to 
bring them.134  The convocation ordered him to return with the necessary documents, and Lay 
appears to have taken the opportunity provided to skip town.   
It is Waslingham’s claim that the 1413 convocation had been convened specifically to 
deal with Oldcastle, “the chief harbourer of Lollards and their main supporter, protector and 
defender.”135  Decisive action, directed more precisely at Oldcastle himself, would follow 
quickly upon the death of Henry IV.  Ostensibly as part of a general action to discover heretical 
writings, a Lollard pamphlet was seized from the shop of an illuminator in Paternoster Row.  In 
                                                 
131 McNiven argues that, at this point, “The Prince was. . .in a potentially embarrassing position,” p. 216. 
132 ibid., 442. 
133 ibid. 
134 ibid., 446 
135 Chronica Maiaora, p. 390. 
 47 
 
 
custody, the illuminator unburdened himself of the fact that the book had been entrusted to him 
by Oldcastle.136  The actions of the examining clergy reflect the unusual situation in which they 
found themselves.  Representatives of the convocation arranged an interview with the king and 
Oldcastle at the king’s manor at Kennington on June 6th.  On having some of the heretical 
passages read to him, the king expressed his disgust at the contents of the pamphlet.  Oldcastle 
agreed that the book was reprehensible, and endorsed the work of the convocation in 
condemning it, disingenuously claiming that he had only glanced at its contents, an explanation 
not adequate to explain why he had chosen to have the pages illuminated.137 
 It appears that the king was able, for a time, to deal with the matter while keeping it out 
of the hands of Arundel’s convocation.  The chronicles report meetings between Henry and 
Oldcastle on the matter.138  Such modern accounts as we have of these meetings are heavily 
dependent on Bale and other sixteenth-century histories, and are thus rather suspect.  What was 
at stake was significant.  There was a tremendous difference between arraigning friendless John 
Badby and challenging a baron of Oldcastle’s stature, a long-time supporter of the house of 
Lancaster.  In fact, the issue at hand traversed the very problem that had occupied Wyclif: what 
was to be the balance of power between ecclesiastical and secular power?  It would appear that, 
for some decades, a demurrer like that deriving from Oldcastle’s claim that he did not know the 
contents of his Lollard book would be sufficient to shield an aristocratic Wycliffite.  That time 
had passed; ultimately, Henry V ceded authority in the matter to Arundel’s convocation. 
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 Arundel’s first attempts to place Oldcastle under the scrutiny of the convocation might be 
comic were they not played for such obviously high stakes. The archbishop repeatedly tried to 
serve Oldcastle, while Oldcastle just as persistently evaded service, shutting the gates of Castle 
Cooling against Arundel’s summoner, even when John Butler, usher of the king’s chamber, 
attempted to negotiate between them.139  Arundel ordered the summons to be posted on the doors 
of Rochester Cathedral.  When Oldcastle failed to appear on the appointed date, Arundel 
excommunicated him.  Then, on September 23, no doubt to the great surprise of many, “as he 
had been arrested a little while previously by the king’s men and lodged in the Tower,”140 Sir 
Robert Murley brought Oldcastle before Arundel and the Bishops of London and Winchester at 
St. Paul’s in London.141 
 Oldcastle’s examination appears to have begun immediately, with Arundel offering 
himself as a “channel of grace” to the strayed knight.142  Oldcastle did not take the opportunity to 
ask absolution of the Archbishop.  Instead, he produced a written statement of his Christian faith.  
Whatever his motives for setting out in this way, such a vernacular profession of faith could only 
have had a Lollard ring to the ecclesiastical panel.  Oldcastle’s effort at circumspection, careful 
though it must have been, failed to be specific on points that would have been familiar to the 
Convocation.  Archbishop Arundel pressed him to clarify his belief on certain points, 
“. . .particularly whether you hold, believe, and affirm that in the sacrament of the altar 
after the consecration has been properly carried out the bread remains ordinary bread, or 
whether it does not. . . .Also, whether you hold, believe and affirm that in the sacrament 
of repentance it is essential that a Christian. . .makes confession of his sins to a priest 
ordained by the church.”143 
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Oldcastle was unwilling to expand upon his earlier statement, despite Arundel’s warning that to 
remain silent would permit the panel to declare him a heretic. Arundel closed the session by 
stating the orthodox position on the matters in dispute, and informed Oldcastle that he would be 
given until the following Monday to consider his response. 
 In his next interview, Oldcastle appears to have been a victim of his own candor, 
attempting to answer the questions put to him to the best of his ability.  In the three areas on 
which he was examined—images, auricular confession, and in particular the sacrament of the 
altar—Oldcastle elucidated Lollard positions.  His assertion that “in the sacrament of the altar the 
body of Christ, which we do not see, is veiled under the actual substance of the actual bread 
which we do see,”144 might have satisfied a sixteenth-century Lutheran, but to the panel it was 
heresy.  On images, he showed a characteristically Lollard indifference.  What availed in 
forgiveness of sin was contrition, not the intercession of an ordained minister.  Finally, the 
church of which the panel was representative was the Antichrist in his various organs and 
members.  Apparently committed to a course that could not possibly spare him, Oldcastle told 
the witnesses present, “These judges of mine who wish to condemn me are leading both you and 
themselves astray, and are taking you down to hell, so you beware of them.”145 
 Walsingham, on whom this version of the events of that convocation depends, constantly 
stresses the magnanimity of the archbishop and the intransigence of the accused, but it is 
interesting to note how the record could be read against this editorial effort.  Thus, the chronicler 
attributes “compassion” to the Archbishop when he asserts the power the tribunal has over the 
fate of Oldcastle,146 a power the Archbishop had sought to exercise for some time.  The power 
that now declared him a convicted heretic and excommunicate, and transferred him to the 
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jurisdiction of the secular court.  The Gesta author attributes to the king’s generosity the forty-
day reprieve extended to Oldcastle to reconsider his position.147  Before the forty days had 
expired, Oldcastle had escaped from the Tower. 
 
 
F. INSURRECTION AND EXECUTION 
 
A crucial aspect of the ambivalence of Oldcastle as a historical figure emerges from events 
which occurred in the early days of January of 1414 on the outskirts of London.  Oldcastle’s 
complicity in these events, indeed, what actually occurred are matters of no definitive historical 
answer, and it is the indeterminacy of these things that would define Oldcastle thereafter.  Were 
we to believe the chronicle records, there could be no doubt; in January of 1414, there was a 
large-scale uprising in which a great number of persons in armed array sought to overthrow the 
crown in the interest of Lollardy.  In Walsingham’s detailed account, “In the very stillness of the 
night, they came to the fields called St. Giles’ fields near London, where it was said that their 
leader, John Oldcastle, Lord Cobham, was waiting for his supporters.”148  Somehow, forewarned 
by traitors among the rebels, the young king had anticipated his rebellious subjects, and even as 
they arrived at their rallying point, they were taken into custody, killed, or fled before they could 
be captured.  The gates of the city were closed fast against those within who would hurry to the 
aid of the rising. 
 Any assessment of the events of that January is heavily beholden to sources prejudiced 
toward the Lancastrian regime, as most workers have recognized.  The intended gathering at St. 
                                                 
147 Gesta Henrici Quinti, p. 7. 
148 Chronica Maiaora, p. 394. 
 51 
 
 
Giles’ Fields appears to have drawn persons from a variety of social positions (although mostly 
humble folk) and from both within and outside of Lollardy, if only to judge from those tried for 
both heresy and treason, and those prosecuted for only one of the two.149  In a similar way, the 
event gathered participants from as far afield as Bristol to the West and Essex to the East, 
suggesting an element of long-term planning that supports at least an element of what we find in 
Walsingham and Usk.150 
 Paul Strohm has expressed considerable skepticism about the Lancastrian account, and 
has done interesting work with the original documents.  At the heart of his critique are the feats 
of strategic intelligence, planning and logistics demanded of the would-be victims of the rising:  
“Historians—unable to explain how a rising could both occur and be judged on the same day—
have assisted the record by suggesting that the engagement in question actually occurred 
between the hours of midnight and dawn very early in the morning that day,” a variation on an 
argument originally put forward by Foxe.151  Having qualities representative of various 
narratives of Lancastrian legitimation, the chronicle accounts posit the Lollards as at once a dire 
threat and as already defeated by the sophistication of the king’s response, where “dazed 
Lollards fall like stunned birds into the arms of the king’s men.”152  For Strohm, these accounts 
have the streamlined contours of a fiction rather than the “messy and unpredictable resistances, 
cross-currents and delays” we would expect from such a historical situation.   
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Of especial note in Strohm’s treatment is the tampering he has discovered in the very 
documents that constituted the “rising” as an event.  The modifications he details to the Coram 
Rege Roll—the record of the legal response to these events at the King’s Bench—have a single 
purpose: to associate Oldcastle with an incident at which he can not with certainty be placed.  
The original state of the document named the Lollard chaplain Walter Blake and the Shropshire 
knight Sir Roger Acton as the leaders of the rebellion.  The visible emendations to the record153 
make Oldcastle the prime mover, and subordinate Blake and Acton to him.154  For Strohm, 
Oldcastle’s involvement, the nearly impossible choreography of the victors, the very constitution 
of the event were constructed at the convenience of Henry V’s regime. 
 The events of that January offer us not a comforting certainty, but a continuum in which 
responsible workers vary, but in which the role of Henry’s government in shaping what can be 
known is apparent to all.  The testimony of the accusers of likely heretic William Parchmyner 
places Oldcastle at the scene of the supposed rising, but Parchmyner denied these accusations.155  
The arrest of several purported Lollard conspirators at the picturesquely-named “sign of the 
Axe” near Bishopsgate on Twelfth Night156 may have given authorities the sort of advance 
warning that Strohm is disinclined to credit, and tend to support Oldcastle’s involvement, if not 
his presence at St. Giles’ Fields.  For Strohm’s  imputation of a Lancastrian frame-up, we may in 
good conscience “deny his major”: that someone is framed is not a demonstration of their 
innocence.  As much as Strohm’s argument is appealing in a language-foremost sort of way, his 
desire to exclude Oldcastle from St. Giles’ Fields and to defuse the radical potential of that 
gathering articulates the familiar desire to make such a historical event known, in some roughly 
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circumscribed way, if not definitively.   Waugh, who accepts that there was some sort of 
aggressive project afoot on the part of the “Lollard” assembly, by no means uncritically accepts 
Lancastrian representations of its nature and goals: 
Some of the official documents—notably the pardons granted to condemned prisoners—
ascribe to the insurgents projects of the most radical kind. . . .The existing order of the 
state and church was to be destroyed root and branch.  The king and his brothers, the 
higher clergy, and the lay lords were to be slain. . . .Oldcastle was to be made regent, and 
the kingdom divided into a number of small principalities.157 
 
Instead, Waugh suggests that the real goals of the rising may have been far more modest, 
principally tolerance for Lollardy,158 which seems to have been central to Lollard parliamentary 
efforts. 
 The question of motive was of interest to the chronicle writers.  Walsingham argues that 
many among the purported Lollard rebels were in fact recruited with the promise of wages: 
“Many people in their ignorance asked the cause for which or concerning which they ought to 
take up arms, and they were told it did not matter, provided they received handsome 
payment.”159  Walsingham also recounts the case of the wealthy Dunstable brewer, William 
Murley, who had procured golden spurs and two warhorses against Oldcastle’s promise of a 
knighthood.160 From the Chronica Maiaora we have the story of the Lollard conspirators 
captured and examined by Sir Richard Beauchamp, who reveal a secret cache in which Oldcastle 
has hidden money, weapons, and a number of banners, including one figuring “a chalice and the 
host in the shape of a loaf of bread,” and one that depicted “a sort of cross of Christ with 
scourges, and a spear with nails.”161  Walsingham’s account, if it be true, would be a damning 
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160 ibid., p. 395. 
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indictment of the rising as a Lollard project.  If people were drawn to the meeting at St. Giles’ 
Fields under false pretenses, under the promise of preferment, under the banner images  that their 
leaders thought to be tainted, this struck at the core of the self-perception of Lollardy.  Wyclif 
had imagined the moral agency of each Christian soul, acting in a knowledge of a truth not so 
very elusive, in a moral economy where religious and political right were one, with an ideal of 
all things in common for men in God’s grace.  The implication in Walsingham was that, rather 
than a classless utopia of Christian fellowship, the authors of the incident in January 1414 would 
establish a new aristocracy in which religious authority would follow social power, presumably 
with Oldcastle as steward at the apex, the guarantor of reform. 
The deceit attributed to Oldcastle as leader of the rising is also an imputed failure of 
Lollard populism, of their inability to field their forces through an earnest representation of the 
change that they offered.  The depiction of the deceived followers is a jibe at the misguided 
political agency of the mob, which is no more endorsed at this moment than in Walsingham’s 
treatment of the Peasants’ Rebellion.  Those who gathered at St. Giles’ Fields or would have 
done were a mixture the misguided—and intrinsically in need of control—and the malign.  Thus, 
the Lollard true believers betray their nature, “men of religion, who for outer show displayed in 
their looks and words self-restraint patience, humility, and love, but whose minds and inner 
selves. . .were full of bitterness, rancorous bile, disdain, falsity, trickery and deceit and 
vindictiveness in equal measure.”162  The “servants and apprentices,”163 a notorious reservoir of 
riot, are in their rebellion against recognized authority emblematic of the sort of “trickery and 
deceit” that social power characteristically perceives when the cowed subaltern puts aside 
humility and takes up violent action. 
                                                 
162 ibid., p. 396. 
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 Strangely absent from the event he might be assumed to have authored, Oldcastle began a 
curious interval in his life, as an outlaw and the most notorious opponent of Lancastrian rule.  As 
the Gesta author writes,  
Oldcastle himself, who, with his both archaic and new-fangled ideas, had devoted himself 
to Satan, from that time on lurked in holes and corners out of the sight of men, and indeed 
still does, like another Cain, a vagabond and fugitive upon the face of the earth.164   
 
Like Cain, Oldcastle seemed to be imbued with a mark of protection that allowed him to wander 
unmolested.  Since his whereabouts could not be known, he seemed to exist everywhere.  In 
York, Margery Kempe was accused complicity with the Lollard leader: “Than cam tho too men 
which had arestyd hir, seyng with the frer that sche was Combomis [Cobham’s] dowtyr and was 
sent to beryn lettrys abowtyn the cuntre.”165  The notion that Oldcastle was at the center of a 
Lollard network actively involved in revolt after St. Giles’ Fields was in wide circulation.  
Walsingham credits him with involvement in the plot of Lord Scrope and Sir Thomas Gray166 as 
well as the abortive 1417 invasion by the Scots.167  In the popular imagination, Lollardy had 
been emphatically coupled to revolt.  The legal identification of heresy with treason was made 
law by the Leicester parliament of 1414, which determined that the heretic should also be draw
and hung, as well as burned
n 
.168 
                                                
 It would take over three years to produce Oldcastle, a surprising interval considering the 
generous reward offered for his capture.  Oldcastle was captured in late November of 1417, 
through the duplicity of a relative of his by marriage, John Merbury, who revealed that Oldcastle 
had been living in Almeley.169  Perhaps warned of imminent arrest, Oldcastle set out for the 
 
164 Gesta Henrici Quinti, p. 8. 
165 The Book of Margery Kempe, ed. Barry Windeatt (Harlow, England: Longman, 2000), p. 262. 
166 Chronica Maiaora, pp. 404-5. 
167 ibid., p. 425. 
168 Edward Powell, Kingship, Law and Society (London: Oxford, 1989), p. 165-6. 
169 Chronica Maiaora, p. 427; Usk, p. 267, in H. G. Richardson, “John Oldcastle in Hiding,” The English Historical 
Review, vol. 55, no. 219 (July, 1940), pp. 423-3 
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Welsh frontier.  He was captured at a farmhouse near Welshpool by a company in the service of 
Lord Charlton of Powys.170  Walsingham reports that he resisted the effort to capture, wounding 
several of his attackers, but being so injured himself that he had to be conducted to London in a 
litter.171  Oldcastle appeared before parliament on December 14.  The duke of Bedford stood in 
for the king at trial, the king being away on his French expedition.  The session began with the 
reading of an indictment detailing Oldcastle’s purported treasonous acts, including his 
participation in the rising at St. Giles’ Fields.  When asked to reply to the charges, Walsingham 
claims that Oldcastle began to preach of the subject of mercy, until he was interrupted: 
So the ruler of the land ordered him to confine his replies to the charges brought against 
him. . . .He meditated briefly, then, breaking silence, he replied at last, saying, ‘It means 
absolutely nothing to me that I am being judged by you or put to death by men.’  And he 
began again his impertinent prattlings until the chief justice ordered him to. . .tell them, if 
he could, why he should not be put to death.  With consummate arrogance and perversity 
he evaded the question and forthwith replied that he acknowledged no judge among them 
while his liege lord, King Richard, was still alive in Scotland.172   
 
Waugh describes Oldcastle’s conduct before parliament as “discourteous, unconciliatory, and 
tactless,”173 and considers the possibility that Oldcastle was not in his right mind: “It is possible 
that towards the end of his life he was a victim of religious mania.”174 Oldcastle’s performance 
does not seem that of a man bent on saving himself, but no more is it the raving of a religious 
maniac.  What is suggested in this brief account is that Oldcastle was a Lollard who had accepted 
that the polarization between his own sect and the Lancastrian government was irreconcilable, 
marked by his claim about Richard, rumors of whose survival were understood as a classic attack 
on Lancastrian legitimacy.  This complicates Strohm’s claim that Oldcastle ultimately refused 
the role to which he had been called by Lancastrian and Wycliffite alike, as Lollard revolutionary 
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leader.  In his final public speech, Oldcastle appears to have embraced the Lancastrian position 
that a commitment to Lollardy was a rejection of Lancastrian rule, and was willing to face death 
in that resolve.  Whether this is an indication of his complicity in the St. Giles’ Fields incident is, 
once again, ambiguous. 
 Oldcastle was taken to St. Giles’ Fields immediately after his trial, where he was hung 
from a gallows with an iron chain while being burned over a fire, “thus [as Usk recounts] paying 
the penalty of both swords—and deservedly so.”175  In this way, Oldcastle was the emblem of 
the Leicester parliament’s decision that heresy was treason.  A rumor is reproduced in 
Walsingham that Oldcastle claimed he would rise from death on the third day, charging
Thomas Erpingham to take up the cause of the Lollards thereafter.  Consistent with his 
suggestion of religious mania, Waugh claims that “it is unlikely that his prophecy concerning his
resurrection was invented by his enemies,”
 Sir 
 
f the 
ame claim. 
                                                
176 but in fact, just such a claim appears in the 
orthodox accounts of the execution of prominent heretics.  The false Rudolph, a heretic o
“free spirit” movement, is said to have made precisely the s
 The burning of a heretic can be understood as a part of the same sort of resurrectionist, 
incarnational theology as the veneration of saintly relics and the cult of the Host.  Burning sent 
the heretic on his way, depriving him of a body to be raised on the last day, depriving any 
followers of the sort of bodily remnant to be venerated as a saintly relic.  The Lollards took the 
position that the living body of a predestinate man was more worthy of worship than an image or 
a relic.  A Lollard pamphlet claims that, in the dock in parliament, Oldcastle was asked if he 
would worship a cross in the manner described by St. Paul.  Oldcastle is said to have spread his 
 
175 Usk, p. 267. 
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own arms and said, “This is a very cross,”177 in what could only have seemed a heretical and 
subversive identification with the Savior.  If the Eucharist as Christ’s body signified the social 
order now guaranteed by the king, Oldcastle, suspended in chains for treason and burned for 
heresy, is the anti-Eucharist, a body claiming an illicit relationship to Christ’s body, a body to be 
reviled and destroyed.  Burning is a deliberate indignity, a foretaste of the fires of hell to which 
the heretic is conveyed.  Jan Hus, traveling to the conclave under the protection of Sigismund of 
Luxemburg to defend Wyclif’s works, had been burned at the behest of the Council of Constance 
only two years before and died unrepentant, chanting a plea for Christ’s forgiveness.178  When 
Arundel sent 267 heretical extracts from Wyclif’s writings to Rome for condemnations, he 
“prayed that the reformer’s bones might be exhumed and thrown on a dunghill.”179 Ten years 
after Oldcastle’s death, Wyclif’s bones were exhumed, burned, and the ashes cast into the river 
Swift.  The immediate effect of Oldcastle’s death was what perhaps was expected: the 
parliamentary supporters of disendowment were in retreat, Lollardy was marginalized, a sect for 
hard-core believers, but with a diminished appeal for others. . . and yet the tables would turn.  It 
is a truism that there is a subtle difference between the martyrdom of a saint and the just 
execution of a heretic, and in the sixteenth century, England would be forced into a reappraisal of 
its Lollard children.  If the heretic’s burning at the hands of the state is a site of interpellation in 
which social power seeks to draw its audience into ideological alignment with itself, the act 
remains ambivalent, like many instances of interpellation.  It is one event in a dialectic, and 
social power tries and fails to monopolize its significance once and for all time.180 
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 In the historical study of religious reform, there has often been a tendency to understand 
the interplay between orthodoxy and heterodoxy polemically rather than dialectically or 
genealogically, and yet there is much to be gained by understanding both the Lollards and their 
Lancastrian opponents as products of the same historical development.  While Wyclif was 
unwilling to confront the logical consequence in the secular sphere of his theory that dominion 
was founded in grace, Henry Bolingbroke, ever the pragmatic one, put it into violent practice.181  
If Wyclif wanted to enhance the power of the crown by giving the king the power to police 
religious error, the Lancastrian dynasty expanded its own authority into this area, in the 
disciplining of the Lollard heresy.  The historical development from the inquisitions of the 
earliest Wycliffite clerics, where the assimilation into English of technical theological terms was 
greeted with dismay, to the application of the most severe penalty for lay heresy in the person of 
the tailor John Badby marks a watershed in the constitution of the lay person as an agent of 
religious belief and action.  In a historically abrupt period, the very disciplinary apparatus that 
had been mobilized to contend with the Lollard heresy is compelled to grant to the layman the 
authority to answer a question like, “What is your belief concerning the Eucharist?” Far from an 
alienation from the sacrament of the altar, this new moment draws humble folk into a discursive 
intimacy with abstruse questions of the greatest import.  Even such a characteristically Lollard 
practice as the composition of vernacular religious literature for lay readers was picked up by 
their persecutors: Archbishop Arundel himself approved for publication Nicholas Love’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
a platform from which the martyr could project his voice first to the immediate audience and then to an extended 
audience through oral and printed representations” (The Politics of Mixed-Genre Drama: The Comic Treatment of 
Punishment Spectacles in Shakespeare (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1990), p. 36).  While 
Spencer’s work deserves attention, this work wishes to emphasize the inherent ambivalence of interpellating events.  
The beating of Rodney King, the execution of Saddam Hussein, even the events of September 11, 2001 have 
dramatically different ideological meaning depending on membership in certain constituencies. 
181 As McNiven has argued, “The son of the lord who had done most to permit the publicizing of Wyclif’s teachings 
twenty years earlier now took up, doubtless unwittingly, the most extreme doctrine which men had ever inferred 
from Lollard works – that an erring lord could be lawfully dispossessed,” McNiven, p. 62. 
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Myrrour of the Blessed Lyf of Jesu Christ, a translation of a text attributed to Bonaventure, with 
the express intention that it be read by lay Christians.182 
In a mere four decades, England had changed fundamentally.  In the latter part of the 
fourteenth century, the duchy of Lancaster was something singular; virtually a government in its 
own right.  It is a curiosity of the late-medieval state that the house of a great magnate like Gaunt 
and the institutions of government were not terribly dissimilar.  When Henry IV assumed the 
throne, he filled critical positions in the government of the realm—chancellor, treasurer, 
receiver—with officeholders from the same posts in the duchy.183  Lancaster, at this feudal 
moment, was in important ways a state unto itself.  With the granting of a county palatinate to 
Gaunt’s heirs in 1390, the duchy enjoyed semi-sovereign powers granted to few barons indeed, a 
“kingdom within a kingdom,” as Richard Dutton has called it.184  In the reign of Henry V, the 
Lancastrian state would mutate into something new and distinct, with new prerogatives, an 
unprecedented national organization, and a secular bureaucracy using Chancery English.  The 
Lancastrian monarchs were able to change the very conception of the nature of the king.  As 
Helen Castor writes, “Where Richard’s Kingship was increasingly focusing on his personal 
lordship over one section of his subjects, Henry was seeking to develop his specific lordship into 
a universal kingship, a distinction crucial to a proper understanding of the two reigns.”185  
Richard had unsettled the great with his creation of baronies for his cronies, while Henry showed 
no inclination to expand the ranks of the upper aristocracy.  This is an aspect of  a general 
Lancastrian policy that dates to the beginning of the reign of Henry  IV: to make of the crown 
and its government something distinct from other feudal relationships.  The assimilation to the 
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crown of certain religious prerogatives in the struggle against heresy has the force of such a 
universalizing symbolic act, “catholic” in the technical sense of encompassing all, but 
representing a certain nationalization of an area of religious authority.   
Considered as the object of nationalism, the state is more than simply a hierarchy, more 
than institutions, more than the national language, though these things are all important and 
necessary.  The nation is defined as much by the other that is excluded as by the people who are 
included.  In fifteenth-century England, the nascent national identity coalescing around 
chauvinism against foreigners such as the French or the Welsh was made manifest and concrete 
through acts of legislation intended to curb what were perceived as foreign abuses in trade and 
other matters.  The 1414 dissolution of alien priories was intended to remove what were 
popularly seen as nests of foreign influence on English soil.  While it is perfectly just and 
rational to say that Henry V was a Norman prince pursuing his interests in France, that the 
campaign was itself based on the argument that the English king was French, this may be 
precisely why it was necessary to promote a new sense of Englishness on the home front with 
Henry V’s signet letters in the national language.   Though he promoted both the power of the 
sovereign and the vernacular language, Wyclif does not seem to have had a premonition of what 
we would call “nationalism,” but it would be difficult to say the same thing about Henry V. 
With the definitive identification of Lollardy with treason in the burning of Oldcastle, 
much of the imaginative space in which an English Lollard subjectivity could thrive had 
vanished.  Wyclif’s original theoretical formulation of reform had been, after all, quite royalist, 
and surprisingly consistent with the Lancastrian notion of universal kingship.  In a manner 
remarkably similar to the fate of English Catholicism under the Tudors, the possibility of being 
loyal to one’s sovereign while rejecting the state religion—the position that the Lollard Knights 
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had once occupied – had become problematic indeed.  Faith had become a matter of state, 
enforced by statute and punished under secular law.  Just as important, the English monarch had 
become closely identified with the church: Henry V was styled “princeps presbyterorum,” more 
than hinting at the role that the Tudors would assume for themselves. 
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III. THE FIRES OF REFORM: ICONOCLASM, 
MARTYRDOM, AND NATION 
 
 
 
 
“Thou shalt understand therefore that the scripture hath but one sense which is the literal 
sense.  And that literal sense is the root and ground of all and the anchor that never faileth 
where unto if thou cleave thou canst not err or go out of the way.” 
--William Tyndale, Obedience of a Christian Man1  
 
 
 
It is an unfortunate fact that the contemporary historiography of the Reformation has had a 
tendency to reproduce the sort of polemical conflict that marked religious controversy in that 
period.  In a 2001 article, John N. King writes, “In focusing on the smashing of saints’ images, 
shattering of stained-glass windows, dismantling of altars, and despoliation of shrines, [so-called 
“revisionist historians”] maintain an embarrassing silence about the emergence of a richly 
diverse and powerful literature grounded upon Tyndale’s scriptural translations.”2  King’s 
argument poses a problem for the empiricist, since it suggests that even the choice of critical 
object can be located ideologically.  The question that King is not inclined to confront is actually 
much more interesting than the spurious opposition he poses: what is the relationship between 
Protestant iconoclasm on the one hand and the burgeoning reformist literature – often 
incorporating images of its own – on the other? The fact of the matter is that the genealogy that 
included Tyndale, Bale and Foxe was anything but silent or embarrassed on the topic of 
Protestant iconoclasm.  The new technology of the printing press enabled the unprecedented 
                                                 
1 William Tyndale, “Obedience of a Christian Man,” in Voices of the Reformation ed. John N. King (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 41. 
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circulation of a huge cultural production around questions of the image, the Mass, the souls of 
Christians, and the appropriate relationship between sovereign and religious authority.  Were it 
not for the need on the part of sixteenth-century Protestants to find a past consistent with their 
self-understanding, Sir John Oldcastle would have remained little more than a historical footnote, 
of interest only to the antiquarian.  Instead, with the English Protestant appropriation of Wyclif 
as the “morning star of the Reformation,” traduced Oldcastle would once again be found near the 
heart of religious controversy.  As the prototypical Protestant martyr, the very anxieties produced 
by Oldcastle as potentially a militant political dissident make him the locus of a reformist self-
understanding in a Tudor state undergoing a top-down Reformation.  Through the 
controversialists Bale and Foxe (and possibly including Tyndale as well), the Oldcastle 
narratives and images of the Wycliffite martyr are one site of an evolving notion of the 
representation of martyrdom in a historical moment in which traditional modes of veneration of 
the saints, the adoration of images and the veneration of relics in particular, have been rejected 
by ascendant Protestantism.  The problem of recovering Oldcastle as Protestant martyr is 
intimately related to the problem of licit images in the context of iconoclasm. 
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A.  REPRESENTING ICONOCLASM, PRINTING GOD’S WORD 
 
William Tyndale’s scriptural translations were not aloof of the struggle between visual piety and 
iconoclasm.  Tyndale’s work did not emerge from a vacuum, but in a historical dialectic, in the 
ferment between traditional and reformist positions marked in Tyndale’s time by the polemical 
exchange between himself and Thomas More.3  More complained that the reformist who 
appealed to the “one sense” of scripture as the anchor for lay biblical understanding had made 
polemic of the scriptures themselves in his New Testament: 
So yt was now that amonge other tokens of Tyndale’s euyll entent in his tranlacyon / I 
shewed for ensample yt he changed comenly this worde chyrche in to this worde 
congregacyon, and this worde preste, into this worde senyour, and cheryte in to loue, and 
grace in to fauor, . . .with many wordes mo which he chaungeth and vseth dayly, as in 
turnyng idoles in to ymages. . .4 
 
Indeed, an iconoclastic rhetoric pervades Tyndale’s writing.  In his Obedience of a Christian 
Man, Tyndale renders Ephesians 5:5 in this manner:  “For this ye know that no whoremonger, or 
other unclean person, or covetous person (which is the worshipper of images) hath any 
inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and God.”5  The  liberties Tyndale takes with this passage 
from Ephesians can be understood if we look at his sources.  In the Vulgate, the Latin “aut 
avarus quod est idolorum servitus” translates more plainly as “the greedy [person] who is of 
idols the servant.”6  In rendering the biblical text in an iconoclastic sixteenth-century Protestant 
vocabulary, Tyndale emphasizes the oblique reference to idolatry at the expense of the logical 
connection of the clause to its context (there is no necessary relation between covetousness and 
                                                 
3 In much the same manner as the later exchanges between Nicholas Harpsfield and John Foxe. 
4 Thomas More, The Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer, Book II, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), vol. 8 part I, p. 144. 
5 Tyndale, “Obedience of a Christian Man,” p. 40. 
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idolatry, the notion of wealth as an idol is lost).  While replacing Tyndale’s nomenclature, the 
compilers of the King James Bible were sufficiently beholden to Tyndale’s translation as 
primary source that  the clause still appears a gratuitous interjection: “the covetous man, who is 
an idolator. . .”  The question of the image enters the genealogy of English Protestant agitation at 
its beginning. 
 An episode from Foxe’s Acts and Monuments of the English Martyrs explores, both 
overtly and in its suppressed tensions, the perplex among the many strains of Protestant 
hagiography, iconoclasm, image, text, tradition, miracle and providence.  The only extant source 
for these events, Foxe receives this story “ex epistola Roberti Gardneri,”7 from the written 
testimony of one of the perpetrators.  To Englishmen on the ground, the 1530s must have seemed 
a watershed for the reformist position.  1532 saw the promulgation of the Act of Submission of 
the Clergy and the resignation of Thomas More.  To some radical Protestants, it must have 
seemed that the time had come to take matters in hand.  Four Protestants from the town of 
Dedham in Essex, Robert King, Robert Debnam, Nicholas Marsh, and Robert Gardner, traveled 
the ten-odd miles to the coastal town of Dovercourt in that year to strike decisively against what 
they must have perceived as a idolatrous blasphemy8: 
In the same year of our lord 1532, there was an idol named the Rood of Dovercourt, 
whereunto was much and great resort of the people.  For at that time there was a great 
rumor blown abroad amongst the ignorant sort, that the power of the Idol of Dovercourt 
was so great, that no man had the power to shut the door where he stood, and therefore 
they let the church door both night and day continually stand open, for the more credit 
unto their blind rumor.9 
                                                 
7 John Foxe. Acts and Monuments […] (1563 edition), [online] (hriOnline, Sheffield), p. 499. Available from: 
http://www.hrionline.shef.ac.uk/foxe/.  For purposes of consistency, all citations from Foxe will be referred to the 
Sheffield variorum edition. 
8 Margaret Aston has pointed to the possible connection between this and other instances of iconoclasm in East 
Anglia and the iconoclastic tincture of the ministries of Thomas Rose, a Suffolk clergyman, and Thomas Bilney, 
who was burned in Norwich in August of 1531, and whose death may have been a precipitating incident.  Margaret 
Aston, Faith and Fire: Popular and Unpopular Religion, 1350-1600 (London: The Hambledon Press, 1993), pp. 264-
6. 
9 Foxe (1563), pp. 499-500. 
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The Dovercourt rood is not merely an icon, a tangible representation of Christ, but one to which 
miraculous qualities are ascribed.  Its physical nature carries an excess in the supernatural 
register (to those who credit such things), as well as being at the focus of a tradition and a set of 
practices.  That the rood was a source of civic pride and identity may be in play in this incident, 
since it is not local Protestants who destroy it but iconoclasts from a neighboring town. 
In a distinctly Protestant joke, the tradition of the miraculous qualities of the rood abets 
the iconoclasts in its destruction.  On the night that the party arrives, the church door stands 
open,  
For there durst no vnfaithfull body shut it, which happened wel for their purpose, for they 
found the Idoll whiche had as much power to kepe the dore shut, as to kepe him open. 
And for profe therof, they toke the Idol from his shrine, and caried him a quarter of a mile 
frō the place wher he stode, without any resistance of the said Idol.10 
 
The miraculous icon is revealed to be impotent in its own defense, and the divine countenance is 
revealed not through miraculous intervention, but through fortuitous circumstances.  The party 
removed the rood, along with its coat, shoes, and some altar candles, to a field, where they 
burned the “idol.”  Within six months, three of the iconoclasts, King, Debnam and Marsh, were 
indicted of felony and hung in chains.   
Foxe as historian, recovering the evanescent record of Gardiner’s epistle, functions 
always within an apocalyptic framework in which events refer ultimately to the struggle of the 
true church of the saved against the false church of antichrist.  This project is expedited by an 
omnivorous providentialism that can make a meal of whatever is set before it.  Circumstance 
favors the reformist cabal at every turn, their expedition taking place on “a wondrous goodly 
night, both hard frost and fair mone shyne, although the night before, and the nyght after were 
                                                 
10 ibid., p. 500. 
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exceading foule and rainye.”11 While his abettors are hanged, Gardiner escapes that fate, “Albeit 
that he was cruellye sought for, to haue had the like deathe, but the liuing Lord preserued him, to 
whome be al ho- nor and glory world without ende.”12  Providence smooths the way of the 
iconoclastic party, demonstrating the election of the three who are martyred for their pious act, 
while being articulated also in the escape of their surviving comrade. 
The problem for the narrative, the dissonance that must be brought into harmony, is the 
secular nature of the indictment and punishment of the rest of the company.  It is not for 
doctrinal error per se that King, Debnam and Marsh are hung, but for the theft of the rood (which 
appears to have been of significant value in its material construction) and other sundries.  The 
stigma of a crass civil theft is developed in the text, where it is reported that “there went a great 
talke abrode that they shoulde haue greate richesse in that place.”13 This the text explicitly 
denies, claiming on the basis of the confessions of the accused that, “they had neyther peny, 
halfe peny, gold, grote nor iewell.”14  For Foxe, theft is a question of profit, and the act of the 
reformist cabal needs to be understood in another way. 
The account of the Dovercourt rood incident is headed by a woodcut image15 that 
assembles many of the narrative’s disparate elements into a temporally immediate whole.  The 
executions of the three conspirators are brought together with the burning of the rood.  What is 
startling about this illustration, particularly in what could be fairly described as an iconoclastic 
text, is that it strikingly resembles certain representations of the crucifixion, those that depict 
Christ crucified in the company of Dismas and Gestas.  The woodcut is authorized and made 
                                                 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 An image of the woodcut illustration can be seen in the online variorum edition of Foxe’s Acts and Monuments 
http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/johnfoxe/main/3_1563_0500.jsp 
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legible by a tradition of crucifixion imagery, while woodcut and narrative together defend the 
destruction of the rood, another product of that same tradition of representation. 
 The configuration of the three gallows is perfectly conventional.  Only the central figure 
is so positioned to look in the direction of the viewer; his head is inclined slightly to the left (to 
his right).  In traditional depictions of the crucifixion like that of Duccio di Buoninsegna 
(~1310),16 Christ looks with favor on the blessed at his right hand.  Perhaps the central figure in 
the Dovercourt rood illustration is looking with analogous approval on the destruction of the 
rood.  The appropriation of crucifixion motifs permits the reinscription of the civil punishment of 
the iconoclasts as a religious persecution in the same manner that the civil and the sacred were 
conflated in Christ’s execution.  If Christ was hung unjustly with thieves, the Essex iconoclasts 
were hung unjustly as thieves, the covert religious motive for their persecution emblematized by 
the officiating cleric in the foreground.  The extra-textual device of the clergyman as an agent of  
the persecution of the just unites this woodcut with various others in the Acts and Monuments, 
notably the depiction of the burning of the Oxford martyrs.  The burning rood, surrounded by 
curls of smoke, is a further visual component connecting the Essex iconoclasts to Protestants 
burned for heresy.  The Roman soldiers of a traditional crucifixion scene have become the 
henchmen of a “Romish” church.  This illustration is resonant with the frontispiece of the Acts 
and Monuments, where the veneration due to martyrs on their pyres is misdirected by the Roman 
church toward another “idol,” and another instance of the body of Christ : the Eucharist.  The 
Dovercourt Rood illustration is a Protestant lesson on the subject of licit and illicit images, on 
bodies to be venerated and others to be rejected and destroyed.  Historically, it emblematizes a 
transfer of legitimacy from traditional to reformed representations. 
                                                 
16 An image of the Duccio di Buoninsegna crucifixion can be seen at Olga’s Online Gallery 
http://www.abcgallery.com/D/duccio/duccio78.JPG 
 70 
 
 Foxe is by no means an initiate in the theology of religious representation.  In the Acts 
and Monuments, he functions more as a plasterer, covering up the cracks in an edifice built from 
unwieldy historical materials and reformist theologies that were by no means all of a piece.  We 
should, nevertheless, consider the problem of how Protestants accepted their own printed visual 
representations in the context of iconoclasm.  This phenomenon was by no means restricted to 
English Protestantism: an Italian commentator roughly contemporary with Foxe commented that 
the Lutherans of Padua shunned images “except those printed in paper.”17 
 Walter Benjamin’s critical category of “aura” can help us understand the distinction 
Protestant writers were able to make between their own printed religious pictures and the “idols” 
that they anathematized.  In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Production.”  Benjamin 
observes, 
Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its 
presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be.  This 
unique existence of the work of art determined by the history to which it subject 
throughout the time of existence.18  
 
Aura is not conferred in an instant by the hand of the maker, but is instead an accretion through 
the haphazard accumulation of tradition and use.  As moderns, we tend to think of aura as 
connecting art to its author, but this is because we exist on one side of a historical divide.  At a 
moment in which all art is religious art, aura connects us to the ineffable, to God, or the saints.  
Of course, Benjamin is well aware of this: 
 . . .The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric 
of a tradition. . . .In other words, the unique value of the “authentic” work of art has its 
basis in ritual, the location of its original use value.19  
 
                                                 
17 Eugenio Battisti, “Reformation and Counter-Reformation,” Encyclopedia of World Art (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1966), v. 11, col. 902, quoted in Ernest B. Gilman, Iconoclasm and Poetry in the English Reformation: Down Went 
Dagon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press1986), p. 36. 
18 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Shocken Books, 1968), 220. 
19 ibid., pp. 223-4. 
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How, then, are Protestant images, of which the illustration in Foxe is an example, exempt from 
the Protestant rejection of religious imagery?  It is clear that Protestants understood the vehicle 
of printing as something special.  In his excursus on “The benefite and inuention of Printyng,” 
Foxe observes, “Notwithstandyng, what man so euer was the instrumēt, without all doubt God 
him self was the ordainer and disposer therof, no otherwise, thē he was of the gift of tongues, & 
that for a singular purpose.”20  Printing was so intimately identified with the reformist cause that, 
“. . . either the Pope must abolish knowledge & printyng, or printyng at length will roote him 
out”21   The notion that the suppression of printing is a counter-Reformation strategy will appear 
again in Foxe’s Augustine Packington anecdote. 
 Ernest Gilman has argued that it is the vehicle of printing that makes the religious image 
acceptable to Protestant eyes: “Produced by the same technology as the printed book and, in the 
case of text illustrations, contained within it, the reformation image is absorbed into the verbal 
world and in a sense redeemed from the taint of idolatry by its verbal context.”22  While the 
argument from context is unobjectionable, it does not seem to fully account for images like that 
accompanying the Dovercourt rood narrative.  Once again, we appeal to Benjamin.  If the rood 
as a physical object imbedded in the old tradition claims a certain singularity (found in a certain 
place, with its own specific transcendent properties), the illustration in the martyrology does no 
such thing.  In an important sense, a given impression of a woodcut is not a copy.  Like the 
mirror-reversed form of a letter in movable type, the carved block is not something complete in 
itself, but a sort of instrumentality to be completed through inking and impressing on paper.  The 
duplications of such an image are not subordinated to some original, but realize their nature 
though repeated reproduction, no instance of which enjoys a special privilege, or lays claim to 
                                                 
20 Foxe (1570), p. 837. 
21 ibid., p. 838. 
22 Gilman, p. 36. 
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Benjamin’s “aura.”  Extracted from its context in traditional piety, the visual tropes of the 
crucifixion scene are like Foxe’s rather generic representations of individual martyrs:23 semiotic 
objects to be assembled in configurations to suit the author’s purpose, just as the historical time 
in which these disparate events took place is collapsed into one concentrated moment. 
 Whatever their similarities viewed from afar, the illustration in Foxe and the rood of 
Dovercourt are distinct sorts of religious imagery.  The historical and traditional context from 
which the Dovercourt rood has been sundered returns, in Foxe’s narrative, as an ironical 
attribution of agency to the rood itself.  The rood is removed from the church “without any 
resistance of the said Idol.”24  Set afire, the figure burns so brightly that “he lighted them 
homewarde one good mile.”25  The iconoclastic act reveals what the reformist sees as the 
subterfuge of the icon.  Joseph Leo Koerner has argued that the religious image raises the 
problem of a problematic transaction between inner and outer, between substance and 
semblance.26  In this way, it is the nature of the image of the crucifixion to show what it is not: a 
death that is no death, a defeat that is actually a victory.  For the reformist, this quality of 
representation debases the image beyond the possibility that other qualities might redeem it.  To 
such a perception, the Dovercourt Rood is no different than those images revealed by iconoclasts 
to be puppets animated by hidden operators,  
. . .as the Images of Walsingham, Ipswich, Worcester, the lady of Wilsdon, Tho. Becket, 
with many moe, hauing engines to make their eies to open and role about, and other parts 
of theyr body to styrre, and many other false iugglings, as the bloud of hayles, & such 
like, wherewith the simple people a long time had bene deceiued.27 
 
                                                 
23 That martyr images were often considered interchangeable is demonstrated by the manner in which Foxe and his 
collaborators used the same illustrations to represent different historical persons.  The same woodcut, for instance, is 
used to represent William White,  Richard Hoveden, and John Goose in the 1570 Acts and Monuments.  
24 Foxe (1563). p. 500. 
25 ibid. 
26 Joseph Leo Koerner, The Reformation of the Image (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 125-132. 
27 Foxe (1588), p. 1100. 
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To the Protestant iconoclast, these automata and other devices are not exceptional by any means, 
but are patent examples of the nature of all religious images and the feigned transactions in 
which they ensnare the faithful, or at least the credulous.  If the rood of Dovercourt did not 
conceal a hidden mechanism of wires, it was similarly implicated in a different artifice, a 
tradition calculated to dupe the humble parishioner.  The theft and destruction of the rood 
demonstrated the emptiness of the tradition that attributed to it such agency; consumed on an 
iconoclastic pyre, the image seems both impotent and somewhat miffed.  The men who burn the 
Dovercourt rood reveal it to be merely material.  The cross that was the object of visual  
adoration and a failure of spiritual sight—a tradition attributed to the “blind talk of ignorant 
people”28—becomes the real if mundane visual illumination that helps its breakers make their 
escape. 
Benjamin’s “aura,” the accumulation of social meaning around the material object that 
this work argues illuminates the problem of licit Protestant images, is a quality that English 
Protestantism is inclined to deny in many different contexts.  It is just this sort of embeddedness 
in practice that Thomas More invokes when he claims that Protestants only know the Bible itself 
because the church has given it to them: 
. . .god hath vnto this chyrche geuen his gyfte of dyscernynge the very scrypture of god 
from the counterfete. . . .those heretykes lyke as they came out of this whole chyrche, and 
theyr authours and beginners were onys a parte therof, and then of this chyrche receyued 
the scrypture byfore they departed oute therof. . .29 
 
For More, the Bible is historically constituted, continuous with the patrimony of the church and 
the myriad practices that locate faith in a historical tradition.  The scripture is not an unmediated 
transmission from the holy spirit to the believer but a document known through the erudition of 
                                                 
28 Foxe (1563), p. 500. 
29 Tomas More, “The Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer, Book VII,”  The Complete Works of Thomas More (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), vol. 8 part II, p. 707. 
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those, like Saint Jerome, whom the church has invested with the authority to make that judgment, 
and it is thus that it comes into the hands of the reformists, deny it though they may.  The 
integrity and meaning of the bible, like the qualities of the Dovercourt rood, derive from history, 
practice, and tradition. 
 Word and image as printed artifacts enjoy a place of privilege in English Protestantism.  
Protestant controversialists enjoyed close relations with working printers, both in England and 
abroad.  Tyndale’s continental travels were punctuated by his relationships with printers: Peter 
Schoeffer in Worms, printer of the Worms New Testament, Martin de Keyser  in Antwerp, who 
used the pseudonym “Hans Luft” (the name of a Wittenberg printer who had collaborated with 
Luther).  In another generation, both John Bale and John Foxe worked for and were published by 
the prosperous Basel printer Johannes Oporinus.  The Protestants’ enthusiasm for the printing 
press as a vehicle of truth is articulated in an anecdote concerning the printing of Tyndale’s 1529 
New Testament that appears in Foxe’s Actes and Monuments.  Thinking to forestall the 
distribution of Tyndale’s translation, the Bishop of London contracts with one Augustine 
Packington, a mercer in Antwerp, a man who “fauoured Tyndall, but shewed the contrary vnto 
the bishop.”30  Claiming to have intimate knowledge of the “Dutchmen and strangers” who are 
retailing Tyndale’s book, Packington receives funds from the bishop, who shares with him his 
intention of burning the entire edition.  Packington thus follows the letter of his contract with the 
bishop: 
This Augustine Packington, went vnto William Tyndall and declared the whole matter, 
and so vpon compact made betwene them, the byshop of London hadde the bookes, 
Packington had the thankes, and Tyndall hadde the monye. After this, Tyndall corrected 
the same newe testaments againe, and caused them to be newly imprynted, so that they 
came thicke and threfolde ouer into Englande..31 
 
                                                 
30 Foxe, (1563), p. 443. 
31 ibid. 
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Taken aback that the burning of the Bibles at St. Paul’s has not sufficed to halt the distribution of 
Tyndale’s translation, the bishop once again summons Packington: 
howe come this that there are so many newe Testamentes abroade? you promysed me that 
you hadde bought al. Then aunswered Packington, surely I bought all that was to be had, 
but I perceaue they haue prynted more synce, I see it wyl neuer be better, so longe as they 
haue letters and stampe, wherfore you were best to bye the stampes to, and so you shalbe 
sure: at which aunswere the byshop smyled and so the matter ended..32 
 
The printing press is a vehicle for the endless duplication of the word, “thick and threefold,” 
springing up it would appear from the very ground on which it was burned.  In Foxe’s narrative, 
sly, sympathetic Packington offers a veiled taunt to the bishop: the very fact that printing exists 
will guarantee the dissemination of the English Bible.  The bishop’s smile—contemplating the 
eradication of reformist presses or a wry response to Packington’s faux-naif posture—rounds out 
the story neatly.  Such neatness or clarity of narrative is a quality of Foxe’s polemical mode.  The 
evidence of the providential nature of this history is apparent in the ease with which the bishop is 
duped, in the peripetaia by which his efforts to destroy Tyndale’s work in fact promote it.  
Elided is the fact that among the profusion of English Bibles were pirated editions of Tyndale’s 
original, often filled with errors. 
Some said it was not possible to translate the scripture into English; some said it was not 
lawful for the lay people to have it in their mother tongue; some that it would make them 
all heretics.  To reduce the temporal rulers unto their purpose they said it would make the 
people rise against the king.33 
 
That religious reform, or the bible itself, might be a recipe for secular revolution is a possibility 
that reformist polemic is always attempting to contain.  The widely accepted position that the 
1381 Peasants’ Revolt was associated with Wyclif’s teachings was echoed by the more 
immediate sixteenth-century events, notably in France and the Netherlands.  Indeed, the events 
                                                 
32 ibid. 
33 John Foxe, Foxe’s Book of Martyrs ed. G. A. Williamson (London: Secker and Warburg, 1965), p. 124. 
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culminating in the establishment of the “Calvinist Republics” of Flanders and Brabant were 
unfolding even as Foxe’s Acts and Monuments went through its first editions. 
It was one thing for Luther, from a comfortable distance, to declare Wyclif “the Morning 
Star of the Reformation,” but, in England, his legacy was a matter of dispute.  William Tyndale 
wished to recover Wyclif as an exemplar of that true English church that had ever opposed the 
false church of Rome, a would-be preserver of both the faith and the realm:  
Wickliffe preached repentance unto our fathers not long since: they repented not, for their 
hearts were indurate, and their eyes blinded with their own pope-holy righteousness. . . . 
But what followed?  They slew their true and right king, and set up three wrong kings a 
row, under which all the noble blood was slain up and half the commons thereto. . .34  
 
In Thomas More’s apology, the followers of Wyclif are a subversive and revolutionary force: 
. . .in the time of ye said famouse prince kyng Henry the fyfth, they conspired amonge 
them, not onely the abolycyon of the faith , & spoylyng of the spyrytualtye, but also the 
destruccyon of the kyng & all hys nobylyte, with a playne subuersyon & ouerturnyng of 
ye state of his hole realme.35 
 
The question of Wyclif and his followers as ancestors of the sixteenth-century Reformation turns 
upon questions of temporal governments and, in particular, the legitimacy of the Lancastrian 
succession.  Tyndale’s position on the legitimacy of the Lancastrian kings becomes an 
uncomfortable one for English Protestants because pro-Tudor36 documents like Edward Hall’s 
Union of the Two Noble and Illustrious Families of Lancaster and York would claim that the 
first Tudor monarch, Henry VII, had his crown by inheritance from the house of Lancaster.  The 
problem for Tudor Protestants would be to reclaim both Wyclif and Lancaster.  
 
 
                                                 
34 Tyndale, “The Prophet Jonas,” The Works of the English Reformers: William Tyndale and John Frith, ed. Thomas 
Russell, v. I, (printed for Ebenezer Palmer: London, 1831), pp 64-5. 
35 Thomas More, The Apology, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1973), vol. 9, p. 162. 
36 As well as emphatically Protestant. 
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B. RESSURECTING OLDCASTLE 
 
Written in continental exile during the reign of Henry Tudor, John Bale's A Brief Chronicle 
Concerning the Examination and Death of Sir John Oldcastle is an effort to imagine the 
Wycliffite martyr as the harbinger of a Reformation that, at that moment in Bale's own life, 
seemed far from complete.  A lapsed Carmelite and quondam Catholic hagiographer, Bale 
intervened at this moment with a new, Protestant history, retrieving a man executed for heresy 
and treason as a type for the loyal English Protestant: persecuted, yes, but without compromising 
his allegiance to his monarch.  Bale’s martyrology becomes the core of the compendious and 
growing collection of Oldcastle documents published by his collaborator John Foxe in successive 
editions of his Acts and Monuments.   The texts produced by this first rank of Protestant 
controversialists would have to confront or carefully elide issues of religious heterodoxy, power 
politics, the legitimacy of the Lancastrian monarchy and its heirs, in order to see the past as 
figuring the Reformation moment.  Notwithstanding his reputation as the bellwether of a new 
liberal historiography, Bale’s apocalyptic historical paradigm is in a crucial manner anachronistic 
and uncritical, homogenizing historical moments and collapsing distinctions.  His notion of 
reform as in all ages the same project would put forth “Protestantism” as self-evident thing rather 
than what it manifestly was—a normative category—eliding doctrinal divisions between 
reformists of different stripes.  If the English church of the 1540s varied with Bale’s notions of 
what it should be, it could only be because the process of Reformation was not complete. 
 Bale saw the fifteenth-century events surrounding Oldcastle’s trial and execution as 
continuous with the process of reform in which he was embroiled, and did justice to them insofar 
as he was able, a judgment that is often offered with more than a hint of critical smugness.  In 
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treating of reformist figures from Luther to Oldcastle, Ritchie Kendall informs us that "to their 
divergent theological outlooks, temperaments, and qualities of mind, Bale was oblivious."37  For 
all of this imputed lack of subtlety, Bale's narrative of Oldcastle's eclipse would shape 
representations of these events for centuries, as well as providing a paradigm text for his 
associate John Foxe, who would generate a veritable martyrology industry.  It's clear that Bale 
saw his own work as a foray into a new sort of chronicle; "I would wish some learned 
Englishman . . .to set forth the English Chronicles in their right shape, all affections set apart."38  
While we might well desire a gloss on this often-quoted passage, it may be that Bale is calling 
for a "secular" history of a sixteenth-century kind, produced from without the institution of the 
church.  Certainly, Bale is no empiricist, but rather a Protestant illuminated by grace.  As Leslie 
Fairfield writes, "he never. . .approached historical research or writing in a spirit of calm 
disinterest.  Antiquary he was, but one passionately engaged in demonstrating the truth which he 
knew before he began."39  Bale's Chronicle is a synthesis drawn primarily from two sources: a 
Protestant pamphlet published in Antwerp, possibly by Tyndale, entitled The Examinacion of 
Syr Iohn Oldcastel, and Thomas Netter of Walden's Fasciculi Zizaniorum Wiclevi,  the work of 
one of Bale's one-time Carmelite brothers.40  More broadly, Bale draws upon various clerical 
sources, notably Polydore Vergil, the target of much reformist invective.  An important feature 
of Bale's method is to indict glozing Papists with their own words (and some of their own 
methods).  This hodgepodge of sources with their very different ideological positions demands a 
                                                 
37 Ritchie D. Kendall,  The Drama of Dissent: The Radical Poetics of Nonconformity, 1380-1590  (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 90. 
38 John Bale,  Select Works of John Bale, D. D  (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968), 8. 
39Leslie P. Fairfield,  John Bale: Mythmaker of the English Reformation (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 1976), 27. 
40 On Bale's sources, ibid. p. 124-5.   
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rigid textual discipline organizing the whole, with the ubiquitous glosses hovering like a bribed 
umpire at the edge of the fray. 
As Peter Happé reports, for Bale the English faithful are heirs to a primordial Christianity 
transmitted directly from Christ's disciples by the legendary Joseph of Arimathea, arriving well 
before the Roman church of St. Augustine of Canterbury.41  Thus, for Bale, "Reformation” 
constitutes an effort to return to practices followed by the “primative churche” immediately after 
the apostolic age."42  Bale produces Oldcastle as the champion of a native and popular English 
belief against the incursions of a Romish heresy.  Bale would recover Oldcastle as the most 
prominent Lollard of his day, at the center of the effort to reform the English church.  In this 
effort, Oldcastle becomes the author of the late-14th-century “Lollard” bills put before 
parliament: 
In the year of our Lord 1391 this noble lord Cobham, with certain other more, motioned 
the King at Westminster. . .that it were very commodious to England if the Romish 
Bishop’s authority extended no further than the ocean sea or haven of Calais. . . . 
Whereupon the king made this act by consent of his lords, that no man from thenceforth 
should sue the pope in any matter. . .43  
 
It is central to Bale’s production of Oldcastle that, while he is militant in the service of God, his 
agenda is advanced through parliamentary means, possibly even in collaboration with his king. 
The potential problem of Oldcastle as central agency of fifteenth-century Lollardy is that it tends 
to draw him to the center of “Lollard” events both flattering and possibly damning to sixteenth-
century Protestant interests.  It is the edge of this precipice that the Protestant martyrologists 
must carefully navigate. 
                                                 
41 Peter Happe and John N. King.  The Vocacyon of Johan Bale  (Binghamton: Renaissance English Text Society, 
1990), p. 15. 
42 ibid., p. 13. 
43 Bale, p. 11. 
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 Many workers have commented upon Oldcastle’s self-dramatization in the midst of his 
difficulties, as well as the manner in which his Protestant hagiographers have enhanced his 
history with dramatic or theatrical effects.  Such theatricality, John Knott has argued, is the 
template for the dramatic quality which can be discerned in a tradition of Protestant martyr 
narratives and “would not have been seen as undermining the integrity of acts of witnessing, 
rather increasing their efficacy.”44  Sarah Beckwith has recognized the opposition between the 
martyr’s self-representation and the depiction of the holy in religious images in Oldcastle's trial 
as some of the most densely coded and potentially subversive material in Bale.  Asked by a friar 
if he would worship the cross of Christ, Oldcastle spreads his arms: "'This is a very cross, yea, 
and so much better than your cross of wood, in that it was created of God.  Yet will not I seek to 
have it worshipped.'"  For Beckwith, "the dramatic reinscription of crucifixion on his own body, 
effected by the simple gesture of spreading his arms wide, emotively capitalizes on the full 
potentiality of the image of the crucifixion whilst simultaneously abjuring the dissimulative 
mediation of an actual image."45  Stephen Greenblatt understands Oldcastle as seizing the 
symbolic initiative by this “brilliant piece of histrionic improvisation.”46  In a trope that Murray 
Roston has called “postfiguration,” the Protestant (in this case, the Lollard) sees himself “in 
biblical terms, re-enacting or ‘postfiguring’ in his life leading incidents from the lives of 
scriptural heroes.”47  There is a sort of shocking audacity to the subversive identification in 
which the reformist, while rejecting the images of Christ or the saints, lays claim to such a 
                                                 
44 John R. Knott, Discourses of Martyrdom in English Literature: 1563 – 1694 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), p. 52. 
45 Sarah Beckwith, Christ’s Body: Identity, Culture, and Society in Late Medieval Writings (London: Routledge, 
1996), p. 72. 
46 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 78-9.  What 
critics have been reluctant to do is to question the “improvisational” nature of Oldcastle’s gesture, but it is entirely 
possible that this was a Lollard commonplace, in the same manner that Oldcastle rings the changes on the subject of 
the “material” after the manner of other Lollards in their examinations. 
47 Murray Roston, Biblical Drama in England from the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Faber and Faber, 
1968), p. 71. 
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connection in her person.  In much the same manner as Oldcastle, Anne Askewe is reported, in 
Bale and Foxe, to respond to her examiner’s question on the Eucharist, wondering “wherefore St. 
Stephen was stoned to death . . .”48  Again, a means by which the reader can accept this gesture 
is that the martyr never explicitly claims to be the image of Christ or Stephen, although for th
reader that connection is unavoidable.  Reproduced in Bale’s martyrology, Oldcastle’s gesture, 
the claim of a dissident identification with Christ in his suffering, takes on a more complicated 
dimension, for here Oldcastle has been put forward, first by Bale, later by Foxe and his 
successors, as an object of our veneration.  In English Protestant representational theology, this is 
always a complex situation, calling upon certain kinds of denial or erasure that these martyr 
narratives must make.  Around the question of the dramatic, in anticipating their own martyrdom 
in the manner of Oldcastle or Askew, martyrs demonstrate their relationship with divine 
providence while displacing the authorship of their dramatic acts from themselves.  The 
persecutors, who may be the mechanism of the unfolding of an apocalyptic providence, set the 
scene.  If a martyr is etymologically a “witness,” it is a set of external circumstances that create 
the necessity of the act of witnessing. 
e 
                                                
 An aspect of the dramatization of Oldcastle’s inquisition that has elicited critical 
comment is Bale’s emphasis various kinds of audience to his inquisition.49   The dynamic 
between Oldcastle and his persecutors is inflected by the presence of (potentially unbiased) 
observers.  Oldcastle’s appeals directly to this audience: “Lo, good people, lo: for the breaking of 
God’s law and his great commandments they never yet cursed me”50 That it takes place before 
onlookers locates the drama of his trial, his imputed rhetorical points and the discomfiture of his 
judges in a public forum.  It is to Arundel himself that Bale attributes this observation: 
 
48 Foxe (1583), p. 1234. 
49 e.g., Knott, p. 45. 
50 Knott, p. 53; Bale, p. 29 
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Sir John, ye have spoken here many wonderful words to the slanderous rebuke of the 
whole spiritualty, giving a great ill example unto the common sort here, to have us in the 
more disdain.51  
 
Oldcastle’s response characteristically displaces responsibility onto his inquisitors:  “Much more 
have you offended me than ever I offended you, in thus troubling me before this multitude”52 His 
clerical judges have staged their own very public embarrassment.  The question of publicness 
extends into matters theological.  Challenged on the manner and matter of the altar bread, 
Oldcastle replies, “if God be upon my side (as I trust he is) but that there is Christ’s body in form 
of bread, as the common belief is.”53  Through unnamed compatriots, Oldcastle has a bill copied 
and posted around London declaring his sacramental belief.  Once again, the martyr’s public 
openness causes the embarrassment of his persecutors: “After this the bishops and priests were 
much in obloquy both of the nobility and commons. . .partly. . .because his opinion. . .was 
perfect concerning the sacrament.”54  In the context of Bale’s production of Oldcastle, we must 
resist the inclination to understand Oldcastle’s profession of faith as a careful Lollard statement, 
sufficiently vague as to be unobjectionable.  Bale certainly uses “perfect” here in its two senses 
of “without flaw” and “complete.”  The ratification of his sacramental theology by the “nobility 
and commons” locates his belief in the true English church – his opponents are, by extension, an 
alien influence, attempting to impose theological novelties. 
 There has been a certain amount of critical-historical discussion of Tudor representations 
of publicness, of critical public discourses, and the relevance of Habermas’ category of the 
“bourgeois public sphere” to this historical moment.  Thomas Betteridge is interested in the way 
that pro-Tudor histories rhetorically produce a public sphere of sorts in which the reader is 
                                                 
51 Bale, p. 40; Foxe (1563), p. 271. 
52 ibid. 
53 Bale, p. 37; Foxe (1563), p. 270 
54 ibid., p. 45. 
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invited to join with a sort of polity to condemn “papist” acts or institutions and “spontaneously” 
endorse those flattering to the Tudor settlement.  The diabolical nature of Romish machinations 
is revealed by their clandestine nature.  In his discussion of the tract A litel treatise ageynste the 
mutterynge of some papists in corners, Betteridge explores the way in which the Protestant tract 
constructs itself as public and open in contradistinction to Catholic textual practices, “to oppose a 
form of reading/writing, ‘muttering’, that is inherently disruptive, disordered and private.”55  
Bale works in a similar vein in his martyrology, producing  Oldcastle as a representative of the 
people56 and a popular religious practice.  In contrast, when confronted with Oldcastle’s public 
document, the clerical panel “drew their heads together,”57 composing surreptitiously a 
counterfeited abjuration in Oldcastle’s name.  In a practice that articulates this populist openness, 
Bale’s chronicle reproduces the feigned recantation, as it does any number of documents critical 
of Oldcastle.  Bale’s history is a sort of archive—this is even more the case in Foxe—inviting the 
reader to examine the evidence and render judgment.  The reader is strongly identified with the 
audience to Oldcastle’s trial, witnesses to an event that is not remote and historically specific but 
continuous with our own experience of Reformation. 
 The question of the empirical existence of something like a public sphere is not supported 
by the literature of religious controversy.  In continental exile, Bale composes a paradigm 
martyrology too radically Protestant to be tolerated in the England of Henry VIII.  In it, he 
deploys a populist discourse of representation, openness, the public, imaginatively attributed to 
the Lancastrian England.  What may be most interesting is the way in which populist discourses 
proliferate in a political situation not much characterized by representative political practices, 
freedom of debate, or an intellectual sector dedicated to a principle of rational deliberation.  Jesse 
                                                 
55 Thomas Betteridge,  Tudor Histories of the English Reformations, 1530-83 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 47. 
56 Knott, p. 53. 
57 Bale, p. 45. 
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M. Lander has argued that it precisely around the question of religion that Habermas’ 
formulation of Offentlichkiet fails to account for sixteenth-century political life.  As much as we 
might be inclined to find proto-liberal social institutions in early-modern England, the religious 
controversies that were the content of much of political discourse in this period have little in 
common with the “ideal and idealized vision of Augustan reason engaged in unconstrained 
debate” that Lander would attribute to Habermas.58  The nature of political representation in this 
period is characterized by the antagonism of the polemical texts.  Public “debate,” if it is fairly so 
characterized, served not to constitute a national intellectual community, but to foster increasing 
division and to delegitimize oppositional voices. 
 In Bale’s account of Oldcastle’s examination and death, the agency of the people as 
reservoir of the true faith is opposed to the malign agency of the English clergy.  This opposition 
leaves out the sovereign, the fulcrum of right religious action for both Bale and Wyclif.  While it 
is difficult to construct the intersection of Henry V with these events in a flattering light, Bale’s 
representation of the king differs markedly from Tyndale’s characterization of the house of 
Lancaster as a usurper dynasty.  Bale’s approach to characterization is not that of a humanist; 
there is no attempt at what we would think of as psychological realism.  In Bale’s narrative, 
Henry V is a complex character, his motivations occasionally crass, sometimes sympathetic, 
often as mysterious as providence itself.  Bale claims that Archbishop Arundel and the bishops of 
England had made Henry “fit for their hand”—possibly a consequence of his inexperience as 
king.59   While Bale does not shrink from all criticism of Henry, any blame in matters of 
religious policy is displaced from the king onto the prelates who surround him with ill counsel.  
                                                 
58 Jesse M. Lander, Inventing Polemic: Religion, Print, and Literary Culture in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 17. 
59 Bale, p. 16. 
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In a diatribe against the chronicler Polydore Vergil, Bale argues that Henry was not the author of 
anti-Lollard policy: 
And whereas he saith in the end, that the king thereupon made an act that they from 
thenceforward should be taken as traitors against his own person, which were proved to 
follow that sect, he maketh an abominable lie.  For that act was made only at the bishops’ 
complaint and false suit, in the first year of his reign. . .60 
 
The construction of Henry as a king yet green in experience, his regard for Oldcastle alienated by 
parasitic clergymen, is picked up in Foxe: 
Fyrst in the tyme of kyng Henry the fourth, he was sēt ouer to Fraunce to the Duke of 
Orlyance, he did obey. Afterward king Henry the fift, comming to the crown, he was of 
hym lykewyse well lyked and fauoured, vntil the tyme þt Thomas Arundel with his 
Clergy, cōplayning to the king, made bate betwene them.61  
 
It must be said that even where Bale is superficially critical of Henry, in the text the king’s 
inclination appears to have been to approach the question of Oldcastle’s Lollard activism with 
the greatest delicacy.  The king’s signal failure, as Bale has construed it, is his abandonment of 
his loyal subject, in leaving him “so utterly”62 to the mercy of the clergymen.  If Henry 
sanctioned anti-Lollard policies, it is because his acquiescence was purchased by churchmen 
with the support of his dynastic ambitions: “They put the king in remembrance to claim his right 
in France, and granted him thereunto a dime, with other great subsidy of money.”63 
In his 1543 Yet a course at the Romysh Foxe, Bale argues that even in the reign of Henry 
Tudor, the bishops of the Church of England are secretly minions of the pope, and the failures of 
the church (from Bale’s doctrinal perspective) can be explained by this mechanism.  According 
to Rainer Pineas, “Bale maintains the useful fiction that Henry is a good Protestant who is being 
                                                 
60 Bale, p. 10. 
61 Foxe (1570), p. 676 
62 Bale, p. 18. 
63 ibid, p. 50 
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deceived by his popish bishops.”64  Bale’s Actes of the English Votaries forged the myth of 
England as the “beleaguered isle”: essentially a extension of Protestant anti-popery into the 
nation’s past, a history in which an unblemished strain of the primordial church had always 
struggled against the political and spiritual taint of the Roman Antichrist.65  In his Oldcastle 
chronicle, it is not difficult to read Lancastrian history as another moment of Reformation, 
pursued by Oldcastle through parliamentary action and the king as the proper agent of reform: 
He admonished the kings, as Richard the Second, Henry the Fourth, and Henry the Fifth, 
of the clergy’s manifold abuses, and put into the parliament-house certain books 
concerning their just reformation. . .66 
 
The persecution of Oldcastle is in the manner of an escalation of hostilities between the true 
church and her enemy, facilitated by an unfortunate pact between the young king and conniving 
bishops.  The Roman clergy are depicted as having at once two much power and hardly any at 
all, beholden to the king’s power in the absence of popular support, “for they perceived 
themselves very far too weak else to follow against their enemies that they had so largely 
enterprised.”67  In an interview with the king, Oldcastle makes a profession of loyalty that is akin 
to his statements of Christian belief, in which he strongly implies the role of the king in 
correcting religious error.  It is in the abrogation or perversion of this royal authority that Henry 
invites disaster.  Indeed, both the Romish clergy and the Lollard gentleman Oldcastle seem to 
give a nod to a royal authority in matters of religion.68  That the reign of Henry V represents a 
dark interlude in the process of reform is developed in Foxe.  While praising Henry’s “virtues 
                                                 
64 Rainer Pineas, “John Bale’s Non-Dramatic Works of Religious Controversy,” Studies in the Renaissance vol 9 
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65 Fairfield, p. 94. 
66 Bale, p. 11. 
67 Bale, p. 49. 
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. . .& great victories,” Foxe observes that the auguries at the king’s coronation were full of 
foreboding, “an excedyng stormy day, and so tempestuous, that many did wonder at the portent 
therof.”69   This omen is strongly associated with Archbishop Arundel’s convening of a universal 
synod.70  It is important to recognize that, err though the king may in matters of religion, it is the 
king’s error to make. 
 The possibility that the critique of authority in Wyclif’s work might have secular 
consequences is vehemently denied in Bale.  When Archbishop Arundel complains that 
Oldcastle’s rabidly anti-papal talk will "maketh division or. . .dissention among the poor 
commons," Oldcastle replies, "Both Christ and his apostles were accused of sedition-making, yet 
were they the most peaceable of men."71  Leveled at reformist martyrs, the accusation of civil 
crime is almost inevitably a slander by interested chroniclers and bad clerics.  Foxe provides 
historical context for this argument: 
Nemesion the Egyptian and true martyr of Christ, was he not first accused to bee a felon? 
And when that could not be proued, he was condēned at the same iudgement for a 
Christian: & therfore beyng cast into bandes, was scourged, by the commanndement of 
the president, double to the other felones: and at length was burned with the theeues, 
although he neuer was found thief nor felon.72  
 
If Oldcastle were guilty of complicity in the 1414 uprising, his crime would be the greatest 
imaginable, short of regicide, and seemingly compassing it.  The answer for Bale and Foxe is 
that the St. Giles’ Fields incident never happened, at least in the violent construction that had 
later been created around it.  Turning Lancastrian histories on their heads, the king prepares for 
the confrontation with a Lollard host with some fanfare: 
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The complaint was made unto the king of them that they had made a great assemble in S. 
Giles field at London, purposing the destruction of the land, and the subversion of the 
commonwealth. As the king was thus informed, he erected a banner (saith Walden) with 
a cross thereupon, (as the Pope doth commonly by his legates, when he pretendeth to war 
against the Turk) and with a great number of men entered the same field, where as he 
found no such company.73  
 
Bale attacks Henry on the field of his greatest pretensions, as a military leader.  The king 
vaingloriously enters the field to find. . .apparently nothing.  The “uprising” is constituted after 
the fact in the work of propagandistic chroniclers in the service of the church.  Bale claims this 
on the authority of Thomas Netter of Walden against other chroniclers.74  Oldcastle’s escape, 
according to Bale, is purely coincidental.  Bale sets the example for Foxe’s extensive defense of 
Oldcastle against the claims of Alanus Copus, attacking inconvenient chronicle reports through 
petty fault-finding.  The only echo of possible Lollard militancy is Bale’s claim that Roger 
Acton, John Brown and John Beverlay were arrested (no doubt also coincidentally) for 
“quarrelling with certain priests.”75   
 If Oldcastle is not the author of the events in St. Giles’ fields, if his escape is only 
coincidentally “in the mean season,” if finally there was no “Oldcastle’s rising,” then the period 
of his flight is an anomalous intermission, an attempt to evade what we—in our after-
knowledge—know Oldcastle to be.  In this sense, he recalls Slavoj Žižek’s discussion of a figure 
in the dialectical process of history being “between two deaths”:  
. . .an entity “becomes what it is” by realizing its own inherent negativity – in other 
words, by taking cognizance of its own death.  What is “absolute knowledge” but a name 
for the final moment of this process, when “consciousness” purifies itself of every 
presupposition of a positive being – the moment paid for by radical loss, the moment 
which coincides with pure nothingness?76 
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Such an entity persists because, in a strange sense, he doesn’t know that he’s dead.  Oldcastle’s 
flight into the Welsh borderlands is a one of the narrative’s lacunae, a hole that refuses to be 
filled with positive action.  While Oldcastle is the most notorious fugitive of his age, supposed 
author of every intrigue, in Bale his flight is a mysterious pilgrimage with only one possible 
objective.  It recalls Jesus’ temptation in the wilderness, a place where radical possibility might 
have been realized, but was not. 
 A critical problem of the literature of religious controversy is its unrelentingly polemical 
nature, nuanced as if with a sledgehammer, battering down all positions except those privileged 
by the text.  Foxe himself seems to acknowledge the relentlessness of such a document, that 
eschews pleasure and serves “not so much to delight the eare, as to garnish the lyfe. . . and to 
encourage men to all kinde of Christian godlynes. . .”77  It is not advertised as an Epicurian 
delight but a sort of exercise through which we attend while the text works itself out in 
overdetermined ways that the reader assimilates as her own, unconstructed conclusions.  By 
reading itself in a strict manner, the text attempts to exhaust its own meaning, and yet there are 
many important points at which historical contingency refuses to be shaped to Bale’s container.  
At an early point in Oldcastle’s conflict with the religious authorities is this interview with the 
king: 
Then said the Lord Cobham to the king, that he had appealed from the archbishop to the 
pope of Rome, and therefore he ought (he said) in no case to be his judge.  And having 
his appeal there at hand ready written, he shewed it with all reverence to the king.  
Wherewith the king was then much more displeased than afore, and said angerly unto 
him, that he should not pursue his appeal: but rather he should tarry in hold, till such time 
as it were of the pope allowed; and then, would he or nilde he, the archbishop should be 
his judge.78  
 
                                                 
77 Foxe (1570), p. 11. 
78 Bale, p. 23; Foxe (1563), p. 264. 
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This is a moment where Bale’s polemical apparatus fails us.  In a text in which the reader is so 
carefully and continuously positioned, it is difficult to say how this passage is to be read.  
Oldcastle, who has been developed as an aristocrat of stature who has, with the king, pursued 
legislation to limit the jurisdiction of the pope, has appealed to the very authority that the 
Protestant reader (perhaps any reader of Bale) would expect him to reject.  If the gloss on this 
passage claims that “The king here worshippeth the beast,”79 it functions as a clumsy 
misdirection.  It is Oldcastle here who invokes the authority of the pope, and we can only grasp 
at rationales: that the injustice alluded to is the frustration of the legal act itself, that “there was 
nothing allowed that the good Lord Cobham had lawfully afore required”;80 that the king resents 
the attack on the authority of his archbishop to hear the action (doubly problematic).  The 
episode is, finally, a sort of historical anomaly that is present in Bale but imperfectly assimilated. 
The textual imperative to give Oldcastle the advantage over his interlocutors in every 
instance similarly stumbles at points.  In an exchange on the subject of whether it is possible to 
know who is among the saved, Thomas Netter of Walden challenges Oldcastle on the texts he 
cites in defense of his position:  
Then said Doctor Walden unto him: "Ye make here no difference of judgments: ye put no 
diversity between the ill judgments, which Christ hath forbidden, and the good 
judgments, which he hath commanded us to have.  Rash judgment and right judgment, all 
is one with you.  So is judgment presumed and judgment of office."81 
 
Netter has made an effort to engage with Oldcastle by citing a verse from Matthew, but even in 
matters of the textual, there is little common ground between Lollard and cleric.  For Netter, the 
meaning of a biblical text is to be examined with all of the analytical tools of scholasticism and 
arranged in careful taxonomies.  For Oldcastle, meaning is transparent, and argument consists of 
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an accumulation of biblical texts of varying relevance.  His exchange with Netter ends in an ad 
hominem attack: “Preposterous are your judgments ever more.”  The narrative addresses any 
anxiety we might have about Oldcastle’s performance:  
They were so amazed with his answers (not all unlike to them which disputed with 
Stephen), that they knew not well how to occupy their time, their wits and their sophistry 
. . .so failed them that day.82 
 
Bale’s Oldcastle narrative ultimately fails to achieve perfect closure, to read itself so seamlessly 
that its cracks cannot be discovered.  Historically, however, the tremendous success of Bale and 
Foxe suggest that any such dissident readings were effectively contained. 
 If a Protestant martyr is a witness to the word, he is also a victim who meets a horrible 
death in a manner reflecting God’s grace.  In the teleological force of Bale’s narrative, Oldcastle 
is always headed toward this end; to confute the Pharisees after the manner of Stephen is die as 
he died.  As presented by Bale, Oldcastle’s death is strangely generic: 
As he was come to the place of execution. . .he fell down devoutly on his knees, desiring 
Almighty God to forgive his enemies.  Then he stood up and beheld the multitude, 
exhorting them in most godly manner to follow the laws of God written in the scriptures, 
and in any wise to beware of such teachers as they see contrary to Christ in their 
conversation and living. . . .Then he was hanged up there by the middle in chains of iron, 
and so consumed alive in the fire, praising the name of God so long as his life lasted.83 
 
Bale does not offer any of Oldcastle’s final oration in first-person speech, though elsewhere he 
does not scruple to so dramatize chronicle record.  Even the horror of burning alive is not 
emphasized.  Instead, “In the end he commended his soul into the hands of God, and so departed 
hence most Christianly, his body resolved into ashes”84 Oldcastle’s final act is one of language, 
almost simultaneous, it would seem, with the utter dissolution of his body.85   Indeed, Bale’s 
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account of the entire event seems to suggest the martyr being purified, in the action of the 
executioner’s flame, to a text.  A discourse of refining surrounds martyrdom in the work of the 
Protestant controversialists.  “As gold in the furnace doth God try his elect, and a most pleasant 
brent offering receiveth he them to rest,” Bale observes.  Foxe has also commented on this figure 
from Cyprian: 
Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saintes. Item, althoughe before men 
they suffered tormentes, yet their hope is ful of immortalitie: and being vexed in small 
thinges, they shall be wel requited in great matters. For the Lord hath tried them as gold 
in the fyre.86 
 
In the Protestant register, fire rids the martyr of the troublesome corporeality, of even the 
possibility of the veneration of relics associated with idolatrous Catholic practices.  Notable in 
Foxe and Bale is the claim of the desirability of martyrdom, “Precious in the sight of the lord.”  
The refining fire rids the martyr of all troublesome historical particularity, makes the apotheosis 
of the martyr—if not a generic thing—a consistent one, an iteration of an apocalyptic moment 
that is always in some sense the same. In a project like this, historical specificity is not a 
foundation for the effort of historical recovery, but functions as a sort of auctoritas, concrete 
instances where an eternal truth is revealed in the finite world.  A figure like Oldcastle is but an 
instance of a recurring type, and for Bale the idiosyncrasies of the man and the events 
surrounding his examinations and execution are an ambivalent legacy, at once bestowing on 
Bale’s account the stamp of the historical and detracting from the transparency of Oldcastle as a 
servant of the word. 
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 The impulse that is often at war with Bale’s antiquarian sensibility is the desire to express 
that apocalyptic moment in its purity.  Nowhere is this better realized than in the martyrdom of 
Evangelium, the allegorical Gospel, in Bale’s A Comedy concerning Three Laws: 
Though yow, for my sake   impryson men cruellye, 
Famysh them, stocke them,   and them with fagotes frye, 
Hurt me, ye shall not,    for I can never dye, 
And they for my sake    shall lyve perpetuallye.87  
 
The character Evangelium is the epitome of the martyr as transparent witness to the word.  The 
Gospel is given a body so that the body may be burned, purified away so that the word only 
remains, through a repeated process of violent martyrdom.  Here the logic of martyrdom has a 
resonance with the logic of “creative” iconoclasm as understood by Ernest B. Gilman, in which 
“the image is made significant through being obliterated.”88  Tested to destruction by 
iconoclastic breakers, the image reveals itself as mere matter.  In Foxe’s production of the scene 
of Protestant martyrdom, repeated successively in apocalyptic time, the trivially factual body of 
the martyr is destroyed, and what we celebrate is an iteration of a durable template or archetype. 
The intersection of the logic of martyrdom and iconoclasm to a certain Protestant sensibility is 
articulated in Bale’s account of Oldcastle’s execution: “This terrible kind of death with gallows, 
chains, and fire, appeareth not very precious in the eyes of men that be carnal, no more than did 
the death of Christ when he was hanged up among thieves.”89  Bale makes evident to the reader 
the deception of the image even as it is invoked.   
In the context of iconoclasm, the strange fact about the image of Oldcastle is that it 
continues to be an image.  Foxe makes no bones about his desire to have martyrs such as 
Oldcastle not only as edifying examples of steadfast faith, but as picures to be circulated: 
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. . .me thinks I haue good cause to wish, that like as other subiectes, euen so also Kings 
and Princes, which commonly delite in heroicall stories, would diligently peruse suche 
monumentes of Martyrs, and lay them alwayes in sight, not alonely to read, but to follow, 
and would paint them vpon their walles, cuppes, ringes, & gates.90 
 
In the manner of much of Protestant religious representation, in making of himself the image of 
the cross, Oldcastle is a figure who denies that he is a figure.  Indeed, in the tradition beginning 
with Bale, images of the martyr accompanied the great Protestant martyrologies, beginning with 
the frontispiece of Bale’s Brief Chronicle.91 
As Margaret Aston and Elizabeth Ingram have observed, problematic though the 
frontispiece image may be under Protestant theories of religious representation, its importance is 
attested to by the manner in which it is echoed by the almost identical woodcut representation of 
Oldcastle in Foxe’s 1559 Rerum in Ecclesia Gestarum.92  The problems are manifold, but reflect 
Oldcastle’s complex legacy.  Here, he is the prototypical Protestant knight, “warrior of Jesus 
Christ,” on the model of both classical heroes93 and traditional Catholic and national figures like 
St. George.  As appealing as such an image might be, it raises the troublesome legacy of the 
1414 uprising.94   When Oldcastle draws his sword in the service of the word, he comes into 
anxious proximity with the traitor described by Catholic writers like More and Harpsfield.  
Further, there is the incongruous crucifix, an image dramatically undermined by Oldcastle in 
Bale’s narrative.95  The shield of the Christian knight has become a representational problem.  In 
his Faerie Queene, Edmund Spenser places in the hands of the Red Crosse Knight a shield 
accommodated to Protestant anxiety about religious imagery, though it bears an eponymous 
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cross.  As Ernest B. Gilman has argued, Spenser frustrates expectations derived from the 
classical model of Aeneas’ shield: that it should be decorated in a manner that invites ekphrasis, 
word-painting on the part of the poet that reflects their significant imagery.  Instead, Red 
Crosse’s shield is “scor’d” with a cross among the scars of battle in a process that Gilman likens 
tellingly to the making of a woodcut.96  
 In the woodcut illustration from Foxe’s 1563 Acts and Monuments, the visual emphasis 
has shifted from Oldcastle the knight to Oldcastle the martyr at the very moment of his 
execution.97  In the midst of a sea of pikes, Oldcastle hangs in chains, his eyes raised toward 
heaven.  While two peripheral figures poke at the fire, a man in the foreground leads the horse 
that pulls the hurdle on which Oldcastle was dragged to the scene.  Heroism in this context is not 
associated with martial virtue but with stoic endurance.  Oldcastle, in the tension between these 
two woodcuts, encounters what John R. Knott has described as the “clash of metaphors”: 
Christians were taught to see themselves both as heroes, following their captain Christ 
into battle, and as victims, sheep to be slaughtered. . . .Being a Christian soldier implied 
not only having the courage to speak the truth boldly but being willing to imitate Christ in 
dying for it.98 
 
These divergent representations of Oldcastle enact different solutions to the problem and 
opportunity posed by the historical Oldcastle.  If, in keeping with the iconography of the Actes 
and Monuments, the woodcut tends to emphasize the horrific aspects of his martyrdom, the text 
that encloses it constrains our reading of that appearance.  Foxe reads the manner of Oldcastle’s 
execution into a classical model: 
Thys is not to be forgotten which is reported by many that he should say that he should 
die here in earth after the sort and manner of Helias, . . . . For lyke as when Helias should 
leaue this mortal life, he was caryed in a fiery charyot into immortality: euen so the order 
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of thys mannes death not beinge muche vnlike, follwed the fygure of his departure. For 
he fyrste of all being lyfted vp vpon the galowes, as into a chariot, and compassed in 
round aboute wyth flamynge fyre, what other thyng I pray you dyd thys most holy martir 
of Christ represent then onlye a fygure of a certayne Helias flying vp into heauen.99 
 
The ignominy and horror of the martyr’s end are reinscribed as a signal honor, the traitor and 
heretic as a sort of demigod, the gallows as the chariot of the sun.  The deception of the image is 
revealed by the martyr’s own (reported) prophetic claim.  While much has been made of the 
polemical gruesomeness of Foxe’s illustrations, the image of the degrading death of Oldcastle is 
problematized by a reading that confounds what is seen by carnal eyes.   
 If Protestant martyr narratives exist in a genealogy with a traditional Catholic devotional 
literature, it is a patrimony they deny.  The defense of the reformist position in the broad 
polemical dispute over religious practice in the sixteenth century stands upon a fundamental (if 
dubious) textual distinction.  In this argument, which can be found as early as Tyndale, the 
Protestant appeals to the transparency of scripture against the practice of the Roman church, 
tainted by comparison to Jewish hermeneutic practice: 
The Jews have set up a book of traditions called the Talmud, to destroy the sense of the 
scripture unto which they give faith, and unto the scripture none at all be it ever so plain; 
even so have ours set up their Dunce, their Thomas, and a thousand like draffe, to 
establish their lies through falsifying the scripture.100 
 
Jesse M. Lander has discussed an illustration in Williamson’s 1613 pamphlet The Sword of the 
Spirit that has a similar valence.  On a pair of scales are balanced the emblematic representations 
of Catholic and Protestant religious practice.  Notable among the beads and candles of Catholic 
practice are a number of books, weighed against the single large volume that is the sole item on 
the Protestant side of the scale, the Bible: “By focusing of the material book, the emblem avoids 
                                                 
99 Foxe (1563), p. 281. 
100 William Tyndale quoted in Thomas More, The Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer, Book II, p. 707. 
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the obvious problems of interpretation that confront all readers of any text.”101  The singularity 
of the Bible is opposed to the plurality of Catholic books.  This Protestant device appears in th
Faerie Queene
e 
, where Spenser’s Red Crosse Knight does battle with the monster Errour: 
 Therewith she spewd out of her filthy maw 
  A floud of poison horrible and blacke, 
  Full of great lumpes of flesh and gobbets raw, 
  Which stunck so vildly, that it forst him slacke, 
  His grasping hold, and from her turne him backe: 
  Her vomit full of bookes and papers was, 
  Which loathly frogs and toades, which eyes did lacke, 
  And creeping sought way in weedy gras: 
 Her filthy parbreake all the place defiled has.102 
 
The strange corollary to the Protestant celebration of printing as the providential instrument of 
reform is the flexibility to which it can be turned to the work of error and heresy.  In the 
frontispiece of the Acts and Monuments, the congregation of the blessed can be seen 
worshipping the word shining on high in the form of the tetragrammaton, a God without a body, 
a divine text without mediation.  The lucid transparency of God’s word, free from the papist 
dross of patristic interpretation, is insisted upon even in the torrent of literature that stabilized 
and guaranteed Protestant reading practices. 
 The sixteenth-century discourses of martyrdom and iconoclasm are the corollary in 
language of real, material violence, society-wide in scope.  Brad S. Gregory, drawing on the 
work of William Monter, estimates the total number of persons, English and continental, 
executed for their adherence to either a reformist or Catholic position in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries at approximately 5,000.103  It would be a mistake to see the execution of 
                                                 
101 Lander, p. 24. 
102 Edmund Spenser, Faerie Queene, I.i 20. 
103 Brad S. Gregory, Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
UP 1999), p. 6; William Monter, “Heresy Executions in Reformation Europe,” in Tolerance and Intolerance in the 
European Reformation, ed. Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
48-65.    To put this figure in perspective, Gregory adds  “The martyrologists’ primary raw material were not 
isolated occurrences, but they pale in comparison to the genocidal slaughters of the twentieth century.  The Nazis on 
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heretics as an aberration of “Catholic” power.  John Calvin was instrumental in the death by 
burning of the heretic Servetus in 1553, which was carried out with the agreement of Bullinger, 
Haller, and ultimately Melanchthon.  Alexandre Ganoczy has written,  
For all these great leaders of the reform camp there existed no freedom of conscience to 
affirm a doctrine that deviated from theirs.  The confession of faith was understood very 
“dogmatically” and as such was considered holy and untouchable.  Its value stood higher 
than a person’s life.104  
 
It is difficult to imagine the subjectivity of those who endorsed the gruesome execution of other 
human beings for religious heterodoxy, and the effort carries the troublesome suggestion that we 
are not guiltless in our own time of endorsing violence against others in projects that will seem, 
in the light of history, to be just as suspect.  To execute heretics was understood as the 
prerogative of Tudor monarchs; Mary Tudor distinguished herself by the number of those killed 
in her reign, Henry VIII by the scope of religious opinions of those so punished.  While Michel 
Foucault has discussed the relationship between the spectacle of execution and sovereign power, 
he only hints at the potential ambivalence of this spectacle: “ . . .the people never felt closer to 
those who paid the penalty than in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the 
invincibility of power.”105  The problem of such a performance of power is that it can actually 
produce solidarity in just those parts of the population that it is intended to impress.  In the case 
of heretic burning, the ascendant religious power is never capable of monopolizing the meaning 
of the martyr’s death.  This is true on both sides of the confessional divide, and it appears that 
sixteenth-century martyr literature thrived on disputes like those surrounding Oldcastle, the 
executed Jesuit Edmund Campion, or Archbishop Thomas Cranmer. 
                                                                                                                                                             
average killed more Jews each day in 1941 and 1942 than there were Christians executed for heterodoxy in the 
entire sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”  
 
104 Alexandre Ganoczy, “Calvin’s Life,” The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p. 18. 
105 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977) , p. 62 
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 It is no easier to sympathize with the reformist zeal that led Protestant England to destroy 
its heritage in medieval art.  The sort of act for which the Essex iconoclasts who destroyed the 
Dovercourt rood were executed in 1532 had become state policy within a decade.  The Royal 
Injunctions of 1538, drafted by Thomas Cromwell, attacked images as idolatrous and mandated 
their removal from places of worship.  It is a bit ironic that a Protestant movement that had 
repudiated the piety of good works as something tainted by the ex opere operato of traditional 
piety should dedicate itself to the work of iconoclasm in such a zealous, even frenzied way.  The 
record keeping of the iconoclast William Dowsing represents an obsessive toting-up, not only in 
a sort of bookkeeping register, but in a distorted reflection of the economies of mass-saying, 
verse-reciting and candle-burning of Catholic practice.  There may be a relationship between 
state-mandated iconoclasm and the act of consecration.  In traditional Catholic practice, the 
official consecration of a church must be preceded by an act involving saintly relics: “On the 
evening preceding the day of consecration, the consecrating bishop places in a reliquary the 
relics of the martyrs, which are to be placed in the altar, three grains of incense, and an 
attestation written on parchment.”106  For the Protestant iconoclast, the destruction of the saints 
and holy family in religious imagery is part of a rejection of the intercessory value of bodies, 
from the Eucharist to Christ’s image on the cross to the cheirotonia whereby ordination in the 
church is conferred by the laying on of hands.  In the English Protestant instance, this is best 
understood as an act of de-consecration: as in the rejection of pilgrimage, it is the bible around 
which Protestant worship coheres,  not a physical place defined by its relationship to the relic of 
a saint. 
                                                 
106 The Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Consecration,” (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04276a.htm). 
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As Andrew Graham-Dixon has observed, “Nothing says more about British culture than 
the holes that have been punched into the fabric of its past.”107  The phenomenon of iconoclasm 
is not the obscure concern of a radical Protestant minority, but pervades the art and intellectual 
work of early-modern England.  The visual piety that was an integral part of traditional religious 
practice had been sanctioned by a  theory elucidated by the Council of Nicea:  
. . .to these [images] should be given due salutation and honorable reverence not indeed 
that true worship of faith which pertains alone to the divine nature. . .For the honor which 
is paid to the image passes on to that which the image represents, and he who reveres the 
image reveres in it the subject represented . . . 
 
For many in the late-sixteenth century, the mechanism by which the reverence done to an image 
was transferred to its right object no longer seemed to be functioning as it should.  In 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Polonius’ pedantic critique of a letter written by Hamlet to his daughter 
seems to articulate this disorder under heaven: “To the celestial, and my soul’s idol, the most 
beautified Ophelia” (2.2.109-10).  The ultimate object of Hamlet’s worship is the remote, 
“celestial” Ophelia.  Hamlet does worship to her image or eidolon in a manner that should 
establish this metaphysical connection, but it runs aground on the “beautified” object of his 
devotions, which, for the Wittenberg-educated prince, is reduced to a mere artifice, a thing 
constructed of crass material stuff, a “juggling” like the Rood of Grace.  As a result, any 
pretension to divinity comes toppling down.  
                                                 
107 Andrew Graham-Dixon, A History of British Art: Dreams and Hammers (BBC, 1996). 
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IV. RUDE MECHANICALS, FRACTURED ELOQUENCE, 
AND THE THEATRICAL ICON 
 
 
 
 
The London stage, one target of the iconoclastic tendencies of Reformation iconoclasm, was a 
complex social phenomenon, at one moment bodying forth the practices that most offended the 
antitheatricalists, at another serving as the platform for Protestant theological positions.  In 
placing bodies in view, bodies that dissimulated their class or gender for the pleasure of 
audiences, the theater transiently licensed the transgression of social boundaries on the part of 
both actors and audience. At the focus of theatrical embodiment, a variety of dramatis personae 
are produced standing in different relations to Reformation theories of representation.  Objects of 
desire themselves, some dramatis personae seem to be imbued with desires of their own, with a 
theatrical consciousness that threatens to escape from the drama. 
Rhetoric too is a site of uneasiness for Reformation Protestantism.  In setting their belief 
apart from the dogma of despised popery, English Protestants demanded that Christ’s reference 
to the bread of communion, “This is my body,” be understood as a metaphor.  In reading the 
scriptures, perhaps the defining act of Protestant piety, the transparent truth of God’s word 
demanded that the metaphorical play of biblical language be significantly curtailed.  Rhetoric is 
also implicated in the debate over the social value of the theater.  While its defenders made 
recourse to the moral-didactic potential of stage plays, its detractors knew it to be a fake: 
dissembling words emerging from false bodies, a commodity of flesh and rhetoric sold for 
pleasure. 
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 A. THE FLESH MADE WORD 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term trope comes into the English language in 
the pamphlet “The Supper of the Lord” long attributed to William Tyndale: “If you be so sworn 
to the literal sense in this matter, . . . you will not in these words of Christ, This is my body etc., 
admit in so plain a speech any trope.”1  In this way, this fundamental rhetorical figure is 
introduced to the speakers of English in an argument against the real presence of Christ in the 
Eucharist and an admonition on how the Protestant is to read John and I Corinthians.  There is 
something almost paradoxical in this, since the relationship of English Protestant biblical 
exegesis to the rhetorical legacy of continental humanism is a troubled one.  For the Catholic 
humanist Erasmus, the Christian faith was everywhere illuminated and propagated through 
rhetoric.  A hermeneutic revealing the rhetoric of divine speech could free the scriptures from an 
impoverished literalism while avoiding the dangers of what Manfred Hoffmann describes as “the 
multiple choices of an arbitrary libertinism.”2  For Erasmus, as it would be for many others, a 
central problem of hermeneutics is the containment of heterodox meaning.  The scripture is 
rescued from its “constricted literal sense” through the mediation of “God’s verbum, Christ, that 
endows the letter with the freedom of the spirit to convey its true meaning.”3 That rhetoric has a 
role in the teaching of this truth is to be expected.  In his Ecclesiastes, Erasmus advocates a 
panoply of rhetorical techniques in preaching, a theater of the word appropriate to a cosmos 
ordered on rhetorical principles. 
                                                 
1 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “trope”: “1533 TINDALE Supper of the Lord Cv, If ye be so sworne to the litteral 
sense in this matter, that ye will not in these wordes of Christe, Thys is my bodye &c, admitte in so playne a speech 
anye troope” I have modernized the spelling in the above. 
2 Manfred Hoffmann, Rhetoric and Theology: The Hermeneutic of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1994), 89. 
3 ibid. 
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  To the English Protestant, the valorization of the literal sense conditions an awkward 
relationship toward humanist rhetoric where it impinges upon the scriptures. For Erasmus and his 
Catholic compatriots, Paul’s injunction, “The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Corinthians 
3:6), has a clear hermeneutic referent, liberating us from a crass and dangerous literalism.   
Hence the Protestant Thomas Swynnerton’s complaint:  
The letter killeth, The letter killeth, The letter killeth, Take heed (say they) the letter 
killeth.  With this pitiful noise, and most miserable refuge, they stop the mouths of the 
simple and unlearned.  With this sword they subdue all dreadful doubts.4   
 
Curiously, Swynnerton’s defense of the transparency of scriptural language appears in a text that 
advertises itself as a rhetoric: his Tropes and Figures of Scripture.  In Swynnerton’s Protestant 
tropology, the scope of sacred rhetoric is radically constrained: “We at this time will hold us 
content, and right well paid, to bestow our diligence, about the bringing to light of those parts, 
which of mere necessity be required to the avoiding of jeopardies in dangerous places.”5  For 
Swynnerton, the rhetorical interpretation of scripture is governed by what has been described as 
the “absurdity criterion.”  As Richard Rex writes, in Swynnerton’s rhetorical exegesis, “The 
literal sense is to be adhered to except when to do so entails absurdity, blasphemy, heresy or 
immorality.”6  Like the author of “The Supper of the Lord,” Swynnerton requires rhetoric to 
rescue the scriptures from doctrinal error on the Eucharist and in other matters, but that rhetoric 
is a court of last resort and not the pervasive hermeneutic championed by Erasmus.    
 In this way, the relationship of Erasmus to English Protestant humanism7 is a genealogy 
that cannot be reduced to a simple binary of agreement and opposition.  This is nowhere more 
evident than around the question of the embodied Christ.  The Council of Constance of 1415 
                                                 
4 Thomas Swynnerton, The Tropes and Figures of Scripture in A Reformation Rhetoric (Cambridge, RTM 
Publications, 1999), 97-8.  I have modernized the spelling in this and the following quotations from Swynnerton. 
5 ibid., 116. 
6 Richard Rex, A Reformation Rhetoric: Thomas Swynnerton (Cambridge, RTM Publications, 1999), 88. 
7 And anti-humanism, for that matter. 
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 made palpable the church’s position on the centrality of Christ’s fleshly embodiment through its 
promulgation of the doctrine of transubstantiation, which invoked Christ’s real presence in the 
Eucharist mediated by a cleric who received his authority bodily, from the hands of those who 
had received that authority from Christ. Peter Womack’s work on the York religious pageant 
suggests that the purpose of the religious drama was to invoke Christ’s bodily and spiritual 
presence in the community. In late-Medieval England, the (not uncontested) understanding of a 
community of the faithful realized through the fleshly body of Christ is articulated through the 
feast of Corpus Christi, whose religious and civic importance grew during the fourteenth century, 
among whose observances were a panoply of theatrical representations of Christ’s life and 
suffering, culminating in the procession of the consecrated Eucharist through the community, 
“[A] total permeation of the town by the divine body, whose originating oneness their very 
multiplicity denotes.”8  In this late-medieval corporal piety, the mundane body of player or priest 
invokes the saving presence of  Christ.  Thus, in Honorius Augustodensis’ often-cited “De 
tragodediis,” quotidian religious observances are explicitly identified with the theater: 
It is known that those who recited tragedies in the theater represented to the people, by 
their gestures, the actions of conflicting forces.  Even so, our tragedian represents to the 
Christian people in the theater of the church, by his gestures, the struggle of Christ, and 
impresses upon them the victory of his redemption.  So when the priest says Pray, he 
expresses Christ placed for us in agony, when he admonished the apostles to pray.  By the 
liturgical silence, he signifies Christ as a lamb without voice being led to the sacrifice. . .9 
 
Representation for Honorius has this quality of doubleness, the cleric present as himself and yet 
representing Christ to the faithful through a theatrical identification, often in the mass, where 
these significations converge upon that moment where the officiating priest repeats Christ’s 
                                                 
8 Peter Womack, “Medieval Drama,” in English Drama: A Cultural History, ed. Simon Shepherd and Peter Womack 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 11. 
9 Honorius Augustodunensis, Eucharisticon, Patrologiae, 172:12543 A-1255,  quoted in Michal Kobialka, This is 
My Body; Representational Practices in the Early Middle Ages (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 
149. 
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 words, “Hoc est corpus meum,” and the quasi-theatrical embodiment of Christ in his vicar 
becomes the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. 
We find Erasmus’ desire for Christ’s textual incarnation in an awkward relationship to 
this corporal piety.  For the Catholic humanist, Christ is more perfectly present in the scriptures 
than ever was he in his fleshly body, the verbum dei completed in a New Testament that 
represents the sum of God’s revelation: the flesh made word.  It is this trajectory that English 
Protestantism would follow, to the extreme of the destruction of its own heritage in religious art 
and drama.  While iconoclastic hammers chipped the faces from figures of saints and patriarchs, 
the regional religious drama first responded to the new Protestant moment through a tactical 
retreat.  If the representation of Christ or the deity was forbidden, this still left significant scope 
for the traditional religious theater associated with East Anglia, the Midlands, and the North of 
England.  Indeed, the historical record does not indicate the wholesale suppression of the cycle 
plays by the sudden fiat of a Protestant state either under Edward VI or after even Elizabeth’s 
accession in 1558.  Instead, in a regionally variable history that has been mapped out by Michael 
O’Connell, there is a period in which ecclesiastical authorities intervened in the religious drama 
in an effort to bring it into accord with Protestant orthodoxy.   
The plays dramatizing the Virgin are a barometer of Protestant intervention, and it is not 
surprising that they should reflect the tides of the Tudor reformations: 
In its first performance after Edward’s accession, in 1548, the city council [of York] 
specified that “certen pagyauntes” were to be omitted, “That is to say/ the deying of our 
Lady / assumpcion of our Lady/ and Coronacion of our Lady.”  The following year the 
same exception was made. . . .[In 1554], however, after Mary Tudor’s accession and the 
return of Catholicism, the plays that had been omitted were again played by the guilds 
that had previously owned them, a state of affairs that continued throughout Mary’s 
reign.  But when the cycle was performed for the first time in Elizabeth’s reign in 1561, 
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 the three plays on the Virgin were again omitted, as they were in subsequent Elizabethan 
performances.10 
 
The historical record from York, Chester and elsewhere suggests that the regional religious 
theater remained a robust and integral part of these communities throughout the reigns of 
successive Tudor monarchs.  The guilds whose responsibility the plays were seem to have done 
what they could to either omit offensive plays or to edit existing plays to conform to reformed 
doctrine11 (the Norwich Paradise play survives in two versions, one of which is explicitly a 
Protestant correction).12 The ultimate failure of the effort to redact the plays points to the 
genuinely intractable problem posed by religious drama under the new orthodoxy.  It might seem 
eminently Protestant that a reformed theologian intervene in the book—in the play as a text—but 
the real problem was the embodiment of religious figures and events in performance, a thing that 
escapes textuality.  For a Calvinist like Edmund Grindal, whose archbishopric of York marked 
the end of that city’s religious drama, the dramatic representation of the holy was of a piece with 
its “idolatrous” representation in art: “Clearly, what was wanted by the ecclesiastical authorities 
at York. . .was not a biblical drama in conformity with reformed theology, but no biblical drama 
at all.”13 
With the waning of the regional religious drama and the emergence of the London 
theater, the concerns of Protestant anti-theatrical iconoclasts are secularized: generalized to apply 
to representations that are not religious but exist for the iconophobe in a continuum from the 
idols of the tainted Roman church to other forms of alluring visual display, and the stage in 
particular.  In a warning against the danger of boy actors portraying women, John Rainoldes 
                                                 
10 Michael O’Connell, The Idolatrous Eye; Iconoclasm and Theater in Early-Modern England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 22. 
11 ibid., p. 23-4 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid., 24. 
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 reminds the reader, “men may be ravished with love of Stones, of dead stuffe, framed by gravers 
to beautifull women’s likeness.”14  The graven image of the idol has become a pornographic one, 
and that image extended to the cross-dressing boy actor, who tempts the viewer to homoerotic 
passion.  The Catholic iconophile doing reverence to an image is not simply analogous to the 
theatergoer titillated by cross-dressing boys, it is the same phenomenon, “men ravished of 
stones” being capable of such excesses.  The danger of the visual is the danger of things that 
misrepresent themselves, that are at once stone and Virgin, actor and character.  For Rainoldes’ 
fellow polemicist Stephen Gosson, the stage is explicitly Catholic; a device of the devil for the 
undoing of Tudor Protestantism.15 
 The cultural prominence of the antitheatrical discourses has been subjected to some 
debate, whose divergent tendencies may be represented on the one hand by Jean Howard, who 
has argued that “the topoi and conventions of antitheatrical discourse provide a language by 
which to render England’s condition intelligible,”16 and on the other by Thomas Postlewait, who 
writes, “the ‘antitheatrical prejudice’ has become, within the context of studies of English 
Renaissance culture, one of those ideas we now accept with little of no reservation.”17  
Postlewait takes particular umbrage at the construction of the theater as an fragile enclave subject 
to monolithic “Protestant” attack.18  Indeed, a construction of broad and undifferentiated 
                                                 
14 John Rainoldes, The Overthrow of Stage-playes (1599), p. 34. 
15 Jean Howard, The Stage and Social Struggle in Early Modern England (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 41. 
16 ibid., 133. 
17 Thomas Postlewait, “Theatricality and antitheatricality in renaissance London,” in Theatricality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 104. 
18 In this view, the antitheatrical tracts have been given underserved critical prominence, and Postlewait quotes with 
approval Stephen Orgel’s claim, “It is necessary to remember that the antitheatrical tracts are pathological.  They 
share assumptions with the culture as a whole, but their conclusions are eccentric” (Stephen Orgel, Impersonations; 
The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare’s England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 35).  It is 
difficult to say what “pathological might signify in this historical sense; it is as if a negative valuation has been 
coupled with the notion that these objects are not properly of their historical moment, a sort of tumor in an otherwise 
healthy historiography.  And, it should be added, Postlewait objects to the use of “theatricality” as a hermeneutic 
category to explore power and representation in the Early Modern period, particularly in the hands of New 
Historicist and Cultural Materialist criticism: “. . .in some of the current scholarship on renaissance theatre and 
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 “Protestant antitheatricalism” does not do justice to the strange affinities and antipathies of a 
reforming England and the dramatic stage.  We should consider the career of Anthony Munday,  
a playwright of sustained popularity19 whose works include Fedele and Fortunio (printed in 
1584), and an antitheatrical writer early into the fray, author of A Second and Third Blast of 
Retrait from Plaies and Theaters (1580).20  Over a period of several decades, Munday wrote 
several pageants celebrating the installation of London’s lords mayor, thus representing a 
relationship between the theater proper and the theatrical staging of civic power.  Munday’s case 
would seem to suggest that the theater and the discourses that would attack it could exist in a 
strange sort of  intimacy, and that both playwright and pundit operated within a complex set of 
affiliations. 
 If criticism should not overestimate the cultural prominence of Protestant 
antitheatricalism, no more can it argue that of the dramatic stage.  As Steven Mullaney has 
argued, “Elizabethan drama is a relatively transient phenomenon.”21  Temporally, the drama 
existed between the suppression by Protestant authorities of its ancestor, the cycle and morality 
drama, and the closing of the theaters by a Puritan government in 1642.  Politically, the theater 
existed between the power of the city and the royal license, while antitheatrical pamphleteers and 
the London authorities called for its repeal or, as we have seen, turned its powers to their own 
ends.  Geographically, the theater existed amongst the stews and animal shows of the “licenses,” 
whence, according to Mullaney, it developed its particular vantage on the social and political 
world: 
                                                                                                                                                             
society the idea of theatricality has become a pseudo-concept; it neither describes nor classifies events in a 
historically specific manner because, in a reified manner, it exists, before the fact, as a framing (tautological) 
condition.”  Postlewait, p. 121. 
19 Munday was still receiving commissions from Philip Henslowe in 1602. 
20 Notoriously, Munday was brutally caricatured as Posthaste in John Marston’s Histriomastix. 
21 Steven Mullaney, The Place of the Stage; License, Play and Power in Renaissance England (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 55. 
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 A social and political distance was. . .established when popular drama took liberties with 
the royal license and thus appropriated the liberties of the city.  In doing so, it gained a 
different sort of license: a liberty that was at once moral, , ideological, and topological, a 
freedom to experiment with a wide range of perspectives on its own times.22 
 
 The very liminality of the drama conditioned its self-understanding, a theatricality whose 
reflexivity was not uncontaminated by the heated cultural conversations about its method.. 
Indeed, it may be that certain aspects of dramatic representation were better theorized by 
those who condemned the theater than by its would-be defenders.  Crucially, the Protestant anti-
humanists could discuss pleasure in a way that the defenders of the stage could not.  In his An 
Apology for Actors, Thomas Heywood praises the theater as a vehicle for moral normativity and 
ideological interpellation:  “Playes are writ in this ayme. . .to teach subjects obedience to their 
King, to shew the untimely ends of such as have moved tumults, commotions, and 
insurrections.”23  We are nevertheless free to doubt that audiences were attracted to plays by 
their homiletics.  For the antitheatrical writers, the appeal of the stage was the magnetism of 
visible bodies, whose class- and gender transvestism signaled the doubleness that was their state, 
as well as the dangerous volatility with which they could infect civil society. 
The morally troublesome understanding of the stage articulated in antitheatrical polemic, 
the conflux of desire, the innate falseness and idolatry of vision, the deception of the body, are 
dramatized in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus (~1592).  For all of his apparently significant 
intellectual accomplishment, Faustus first stumbles in a manner that articulates a characteristic 
Reformation anxiety: he engages in bad biblical exegesis:24 
I do confess it, Faustus, and rejoice: 
'Twas I that, when thou wert i'the way to heaven, 
Damm'd up thy passage; when thou took'st the book 
                                                 
22 ibid., p. 54. 
23 In Howard, op. cit. , p. 5. 
24 Joseph Westlund, “The Orthodox Christian Framework of Marlowe’s Faustus,” Studies in English Literature, 
1500-1900, vol. 3, no. 2 (Spring, 1963), p. 194. 
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 To view the Scriptures, then I turn'd the leaves, 
And led thine eye. (5.2.99-103) 
 
Indeed, it is the repeatedly through the eye that Falstaff is beguiled and beguiles others.  When 
Falstaff demands a wife, Mephistophilis puts him off with the promise of courtesans, “She whom 
thine eye shall like, thy heart shall have” (2.2.156).  Similarly, when his familiar devil produces 
the semblance of Helen of Troy, she is speechless, a phantasm or disguised devil, which 
Mephistophilis has produced “in twinkling of an eye” (5.1.94).  Pleasure, in both the sexual and 
the broader aesthetic sense, is figured as visual, as in the moment when Faustus views the world 
in miniature, “And what might please mine eye, I there beheld” (3.1.76).  The falseness of sight 
is coupled to the falsity of the theatrical imposture in the following line, in which Faustus 
declares, “Then in this show let me an actor be” (3.1.77). 
 The indictment of the visual in Doctor Faustus is related to the dramatic undermining of 
the body.  When Mephistophilis reminds Faustus that he has sold the devil his soul, he replies, 
“Ay, and body too; but what of that?” (2.1.137).  As Joseph Westlund has observed, “Faustus’ 
reply is very characteristic, for the body seems more real to him than the soul.”25   In fact, the 
drama reveals that Faustus’ body is itself a kind of palpable fiction.  This is the stuff of comedy 
in the scene with the cozened Horse-courser.  Having discovered that the “horse” he has bought 
of Faustus is nothing more than a bundle of hay, the Horse-courser returns to call Faustus to 
account: 
I kept ahallowing and whooping in his ears, but all could not wake him.  I seeing that, 
took him by the leg and never rested pulling till I had pulled me his leg quite off, and now 
‘tis at home in my hostry. (4.6.56-60) 
 
The theological rationale for the comic action here is precisely that of those iconoclasts who 
demanded that the images they were about to destroy demonstrate their humanity by speaking or 
                                                 
25 ibid, p. 198. 
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 drinking wine.26  The unusual status of Faustus’ body is further endorsed by the Horse-courser 
keeping the leg as a sort of debased relic.  If Faustus’ body is an idol in the Protestant register, it 
is the idol that he worships, the Vitruvian Man, the locus of his humanistic pretensions.  What is 
comic in his exchanges with the Horse-courser becomes tragic in the play’s final act, where the 
scholars discover what has been left behind when Faustus is dragged down to Hell: “O, help us 
heaven, see, here are Faustus’ limbs / All torn asunder by the hand of death!” (5.3.6-7).  What 
Faustus’ humanist allies find is the dramatic counterpart to the shattered icon: the thing to which 
Faustus attributed a value that did not reside there at all.  Its emptiness, its mere substance is 
revealed by its destruction. 
There is no single theatrical body.  The figure of the dramatis persona can body forth 
qualities that endorse, deny, or complicate the notions of the Protestant antitheatrical polemics.  
The theatrical body is both a place of signification and something more.  Of course, the body is a 
surface on which may be displayed the sartorial signs of status or gender, a sign that may be 
arrayed in more elaborate displays and rhetorics.  We are not so naïve that we would want to 
invoke the body somehow prior to its intersection with culture, and yet there are qualities of the 
body that are not primarily semiotic.  The body is also a presence making certain demands upon 
us.  In pleasure and in pain, the body is an insistent thing before us, calling upon attention, 
desire, revulsion27 (and yes, available to be decked and choreographed according to the codes of 
dress and custom). In thinking the dramatic body, it is useful to think in terms of seduction.  In 
seduction, my body is not some “natural” body prior to cultural codes, but a perfect, a 
dissimulated, a desirable body.  The anti-theatrical polemics recognized this quality of the visual 
availability of bodies decked in sartorial disguise as a characteristic quality of the theatrical 
                                                 
26 Joseph Leo Koerner, The Reformation of the Image (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 131-2 
27 One only need think of those things that mimic the body: we’ve all known the shock of mistaken recognition 
when something (doll, mannequin, etc.) seems for an instant to be a living body before us. 
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 deception on the part of both company and audience.  In this way, it is perfectly fitting that such 
an eminently theatrical creature as hunchbacked Richard III should so twist body and words to 
seduce the lady Anne.  The language of the dramatis persona is generated at the intersection of 
its present body and its action (the kneeling Richard Gloucester offers Anne the blade while 
choreographing subsequent actions: “Take up the sword again, or take up me” 1.2.183).  The 
body—vulnerable, desiring—is the tangible marker that its words are rhetorical in the sense that 
Bakhtin would insist upon: the utterance that implies a speaker.  The words of the character on 
stage emerge from desirous bodies and are heard by other desiring bodies in the audience.  In the 
antitheatrical discourses, this desire can be understood as explicitly sexual.  In Steven Orgel’s 
work,  the anti-humanist tracts understand stage and pit as loci of a markedly amorphous sexual 
desire: “[W]hat the spectator is ‘really’ attracted to is an undifferentiated sexuality.”28  In their 
attacks on the theater, pamphleteers like Rainoldes, Stubbes and Prynne were free to understand 
the theater in terms of pleasure, if only to condemn it.  Marlowe’s play  stages the body of 
Falstaff only to demonstrate that the body, locus of intellectual vanity and corporal pleasure, is 
itself a sort of idol.  
Interestingly, and in the manner of a great deal of Protestant iconoclastic discourse, 
Doctor Faustus makes a clear distinction between images to be shunned, and images to be 
endorsed.  In act three, in Rome, Faustus and Mephistophilis observe as the pope treads on 
Bruno, a rival elected by the Emperor, “as Pope Alexander, our progenitor, / Trod on the neck of 
German Frederick” (3.1.137-8). As Leslie M. Oliver has argued, the Pope’s historical reference 
is one familiar to the readers of the Acts and Monuments, and visually reproduces one of its 
                                                 
28 Orgel, 29. 
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 prominent woodcuts.29  While condemning an iconology, dramatized as both pagan and 
Catholic, one that demands that we attend to the presence of the body, Doctor Faustus is in
to endorse an alternative one, perhaps recuperating the stage as a place of moral/visual 
clined 
instruction. 
 
B. THE LIE OF IDENTIFICATION 
fects 
t 
, 
 
Pestle
 
 
The difficulty that adheres to the criticism of character often emerges from a confusion of ef
or a conflation of critical categories.  A critical genealogy from Aristotle to Colderidge and 
beyond has depended upon a conflation of sympathy and identification through the denial of tha
aspect of theatricality that has come to be known as “perspective.”  In a manner not unrelated
the relationship between dramatic rhetoric and the dramatis persona has been subjected to a 
variety of critical approaches without  illuminating certain necessary qualities of the dramatic
presence.  The drama of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England produces, alongside an 
emerging sort of historical consciousness, a reflection upon the relationship between audience 
and dramatis persona that underscores the problem of identification.  If comedy was the natal 
home of metadramatic reflexivity, no surprise, then, that Beaumont and Fletcher’s 1613 comedy 
The Knight of the Burning  can be read as a meditation on theatrical self-awareness and the 
he 
                                                
question of identification. 
 Transgressing the division between audience and action, hopping up on the stage to 
interrupt the Prologue, the Citizen and his Wife reveal themselves as aficionados of a sort.  T
 
29 Leslie M. Oliver, “Rowley, Foxe, and the Faustus Additions,” Modern Language Notes, LX (1945), pp. 391-4.  
This woodcut image from Foxe’s Actes and Monuments can be seen at the variorum online edition at 
http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/johnfoxe/main/1_1563_0040.jsp 
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 Citizen would advise the boy company on a more fitting repertoire:  “Why could you not be 
contented. . .with ‘The Legend of Whittington,’ or ‘The Life and Death of Sir Thomas Gresham
with the building of the Royal Exchange’. . .” (Knight
 
 1.1).  The relationship between histor
and identity is played out explicitly here: the freeman grocer has put down his money, and 
expects a history consonant with his urban identity and class position.  The relationship between 
the audience and the Citizen is a queasy mixture of alienation and recognition; we might titter at
the pedestrian concerns of the charac
y 
 
ter, but he reminds us that art and the art of history are not 
outside of class and other interests. 
 The Knight of the Burning Pestle is a drama of incongruity, achieving its effects by 
producing in us a sense of unfitness.  The play repeatedly appeals to its audience’s sens
anachronism, identified by Peter Burke as the signal difference between the historical 
consciousness of the Renaissance and that which preceded it.  Burke offers as exemplar of the 
earlier, “med
e of 
ieval” habitus the thirteenth-century author of the Florentine History, Ricordano 
Malesp
n 
r societies had forms of political 
organization different from his own.  But he does know that Catiline came before Christ. . 
 
ini:  
He describes the career of Catiline, who married a woman called Belisea after he had 
killed her husband. Her daughter was taken away by a centurion.  One day, ‘when quee
Belisea was at mass in the church of Fiesole on Easter morning’, the centurion went up 
and spoke to her.  Malespini may or may not have thought that Catiline was a king; he 
probably did not think about the question of whether othe
. .Yet he makes the ‘queen’ go to ‘Mass.” 30 
Exploiting anachronism to comic effect, The Knight produces the assumed historical and 
aesthetic sophistication of its audience through its alienation from certain naïve figures within 
the comedy.  Much of this work is done around the figure of Ralph, the eponymous knight, and
we would do well to note the levels of representation the drama requires we understand in that 
character: he is the Citizen’s boy become actor, the grocer become knight, and these levels of 
 
                                                 
30 Peter Burke, The Renaissance Sense of the Past (New York: St. Martin’s, 1969), 1-2. 
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 imposture foreground the fact that he is a boy company actor beneath all (now acting his own
role as a role).  “I wonder why the kings do not raise an army of fourteen or fifteen hundred
thousand men, as big as the army that the Prince of Portigo brought against Rosicleer, and 
destroy these giants; they do much hurt to wandering damsels, that go in quest of their knights” 
(3.1).  Ralph’s naiveté admits no distinctions either of historical time or between a chivalric m
and the real, the signal expression of which is his belief that an economy based on chivalric 
honor can be recovered in commercial London. Offering to settle his account with a publican b
knighting one of his “squires,” his host replies, “Fair knight, I thank you for your ge
 
 
yth 
y 
ntle offer: 
Therefo
his 
re, gentle knight, Twelve shillings you must pay, or I must cap you” (3.2). 
The signal incongruity embodied in Ralph is produced through his identification with 
favorite chivalric personae: first the Harry Percy of Shakespeare’s 1 Henry IV (Knight, 1.1)
whom he invokes hyperbolically at the prodding of the Citizen, and later the Knight of the 
Burning Pestle himself.  The Knight’s comical inability to see the now is a specifically historical 
confusion: the failure to see the present historical moment and its social world as produced by its
difference from other, remote moments.  Ralph’s reference to Shakespeare’s Hotspur is may be 
in the same vein: the grocer’s boy innocently identifies with the charismatic Percy as an ideal of 
chivalry even as the passage he quotes interrogates Percy’s self-dramatization, even as Henr
, 
 
y IV 
as a whole puts significant pressure on the chivalric economy.  In the friction between The 
Knight of the Burning Pestle and Henry IV, identification itself is drawn into question.  If the 
strutting actor on the stage is a sort of chimera, a common man dressed in the borrowed finery of 
the aristocrat, so our desire to identify with the dramatis persona does a similar violence not only
to distin
 
ctions of  class and historical moment, but to the ultimately illusory nature of the drama 
itself.   
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 This can be appreciated through a parallel development in the Knight’s attack on the 
distinct category of sympathy.  Feminized and delegitimized through its association with the 
Citizen’s wife, sympathy is produced as not only pedestrian, but as a misunderstanding of the 
mechanics of dramatic presence.  Identifying with the trivially spurned Mistress Merrythought in 
censuring Old Merrythought’s apparently harmless excesses, the Wife asks the Citizen her 
husband, “He’s not in earnest, I hope, George, is he?” (3.4).  Earnest is a heavily-laden term 
here, for it encodes the Wife’s collapsing of the comic action into her own world.  In a crucial 
way, Old Merrythought cannot be in earnest, because he is a character in a play, and the Wife 
should know better because it is a play she has helped to re-write.  Under the spell of a sympathy 
for Mistress Merrythought produced by the crudest sort of  resonance (primarily a similarity in 
gender and class-position), the Wife becomes incapable of distinguishing between the play and 
the world, signaled by her transgression of the dramatic space by directly addressing Old 
Merrythought: 
I had not thought, in truth, Master Merrythought, that a man of your age and discretion 
(as I may say) being a gentleman, and therefore known by your gentle conditions, could 
have used so little respect to the weakness of his wife. . . (3.4) 
 
Intensely metadramatic in its reflection on the artifice of drama and the effects it produces in its 
audience, The Knight of the Burning Pestle insists upon our awareness of the double (and more) 
nature of character, producing our experience of our own sophistication through the naïve 
characters of the Citizen, his wife, and Ralph, and thus cozening us in the process, for we should 
know that these characters, too, are part of the fictive world of the play.  As a reflection on the 
intricacies and possibilities of theatrical self-consciousness, The Knight may represent something 
of a cul-de-sac: R. C. Bald recounts that “The publisher in an introductory epistle in the first 
edition stated that the play was ‘in eight daies. . .begot and borne’ and ‘exposed to the wide 
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 world, who. . .utterly rejected it.’”31  Snobbish, exploring the possibilities of stage imposture in 
the service of a sort of connoisseurship, The Knight is very nearly a work of criticism, theorizing 
different modes of audience consumption of character, hence perhaps both its value and its early 
popular failure. 
 
 
C. THE IMAGE OF THE KING 
 
 The first play in Shakespeare’s second Lancatrian cycle, Richard II has been recognized 
as a political play of some importance since Ernst H. Kantorowicz’ The King’s Two Bodies, and 
even before.  Kantorowicz recognized the play’s engagement with the political-theological 
doctrine of the king’s “body natural” and his “body politic,” and Kantorowicz’ work has served 
as a foundational text for Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and others.  This is not to say that 
the play has not been read into the discourse of tragic, affective identification.  Peter Ure 
represents a synthesis of a certain critical genealogy in the understanding of Shakespeare’s 
Richard II.  Aligning himself with Coleridge, Ure claims that the “center of interest” in the play 
will be found in a “‘history of the human mind’”32 developed through the character of Richard.  
The privileged categories here will be interiority and affect:  “[I]t is laid down for [Richard] that 
he must give voice to what is in him. . .must say what he feels all the time about the situation,”33  
“The alternating moods go to make up a man rather than to expose the relativity of a doctrine.”34  
                                                 
31 R. C. Bald, ed., Six Elizabethan Plays (Boston: Riverside, 1963), p. 133. 
32 Peter Ure, “Introduction,” The Arden Shakespeare King Richard II (London: Methuen 1964), p. lxviii. 
33 ibid., p. lxix. 
34 ibid., p. lxxviii. 
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 A characterology of mood and inwardness rests upon certain realist assumptions about 
representation rejects a dramatic reflexivity vested in character, so,  
The gracefulness, the enthusiasm, the loquacity, the taking of the center of the stage and 
the consciousness of onlookers are Shakespeare’s own powers and the means which he 
uses to give us Richard as fully and centrally as he can; they are not attributes of the 
character, for Richard is no more an actor than he is a poet.35 
 
In fairness to Ure’s position, it must be said that this claim is in dialogue with critics who would 
understand poetic or dramatic qualities as quasi-biographical dimensions of Richard’s fictive 
nature, like Mark Van Doren’s claim that Richard loved poetry “more than power and more than 
any other person.”36  That theatrical self-consciousness might be a quality of Richard’s dramatic 
incarnation may be impossible in Ure’s naturalistic paradigm.37  Finally, Ure warns us away 
from political questions: “It is doubtful if we can even ask about this play. . .”What is the precise 
political position taken. . .in the conflict between Richard II and Bolingbroke?”38  The tragic is 
only incidentally historical, the backdrop against which may be dramatized the travail of the 
human. 
 Dramatically, there must be some common ground between the dynamics of character 
mediated by sympathy or perspective effects and the exigencies of historical drama.  Richard II 
is a dramatis persona, and also the king whose deposition led to the long strife between York 
and Lancaster.  Sixteenth-century England was fascinated with the Wars of the Roses which, 
along with the Reformation, were the object of a huge production of textual history in many 
forms, from Samuel Daniel’s verse treatment The Civil Wars Between the Two Houses of 
Lancaster and York, to Edward Hall’s Union, to Holinshed’s Chronicles.  In its novel approach 
                                                 
35 ibid. 
36 Mark Van Doren, Shakespeare (New York, 1939), p. 89, quoted in Ure, p. lxix. 
37 Yet, as we shall see, the influence of this sort of reading extends into the work of critics whose practice examines 
character effects that Ure or Coleridge would never credit. 
38 Van Doren op. cit., p. lxxviii. 
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 to character, Shakespeare’s Richard II has been approached through the critical category of 
perspective but a thorough understanding of the politics of the play will not be possible until we 
understand the relationship between perspective, sympathy, and identification.  
 In the play’s first act, Richard is confronted with the dispute between Henry Bolingbroke, 
Duke of Hereford, and Thomas Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk, ostensibly over Mowbray’s 
complicity in the murder of Thomas of Woodstock.  Adjudicating over his quarrelling subjects, 
the king assures Mowbray, 
. . .impartial are our eyes and ears. 
Were he my brother, nay, my kingdom’s heir, 
As he is but my father’s brother’s son, 
Now by my scepter’s awe I make a vow, 
Such neighbour nearness to our sacred blood 
Should nothing privilege him nor partialize 
The unstooping firmness of my upright soul. (1.1.115-21). 
 
While we cannot assess with certainty the historical knowledge of the play’s audience, in 
emphasizing his blood relationship to Bolingbroke, the king is dissimulating his real loyalty to 
Mowbray, and the question is merely one of whether the audience realizes this immediately, or 
will understand it only in retrospect.  As a representation of the convolutions of Richard’s self-
understanding, it serves as a useful point of departure.  Richard addresses this speech to 
Mowbray, although he cannot help but see that it is disingenuous: Mowbray is, in effect, 
Richard’s champion, and his factor in the murder of Woodstock.  The implication that his blood 
relation to Bolingbroke might incline him toward favoring his cousin can fool none of his 
auditors, and may serve to further alienate the already-dangerous Bolingbroke.  In the balance 
opposite these awkward misrepresentations, Richard places an impartiality guaranteed by his 
“upright soul.”  This raises disturbing possibilities.  Either Richard is willing to knowingly 
deploy the signifiers of his God-anointed royalty in a context that makes sarcasms of them, or he 
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 can dissemble in these circumstances—effectively a legal proceeding of the highest order—
without understanding how this debases them.  As an act of public political rhetoric, it can only 
be judged by its result: the escalation of the dispute to judicial combat. 
 Phylis Rackin would argue for an identification between a cultural investment in trial by 
combat and Richard’s legitimacy: 
Trial by combat is a ritual based on the assumption that right makes might, an assumption 
that underlies the authority of the whole feudal system, including the authority of God’s 
anointed king.  In preventing the symbolic ritual of chivalry, Richard attacks the source 
of the only authority that makes him king.39  
  
In the opposition between Machiavellian and providential theories of history central to her study, 
she aligns judicial combat with the providential and with a presumably waning “feudal system” 
endorsing the hereditary monarch.  The history of this practice suggests a more complicated set 
of relationships.  Trial by combat is an instance of a more general class of “folklaw proof” 
including various forms of oaths and the palpable or “thinglike”40 practices that endorsed their 
veracity: the judicial ordeal (e.g., trial by hot iron), compurgation, and so on.  Trial by combat is 
thus more intimately connected to a folklaw based upon the “truth” of the oath, and displaced by 
a burgeoning written law emphasizing written evidence.41 The combat between Bolingbroke and 
Mowbray must be understood in relation to the oaths sworn by the would be combatants.  “Look 
what I speak, for my life shall prove it true,” Bolingbroke says (1.1.87), asserting that Mowbray 
has misused funds and crucially that Mowbray was involved in the murder of the Duke of 
Gloucester, Thomas of Woodstock (1.1.88-100).  A character able, like Bolingbroke, to give 
voice to a careful oath in a morally equivocal situation, Mowbray gives his own account of 
                                                 
39 Phyllis Rackin, The Stages of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 49 
40 In the sense that Richard Firth Green uses this term: “[T]he early folklaw of Western Europe. . .appears to share 
with African law. . .at least two basic assumptions: that all solemn agreements must partake of the corporeal. . .and 
thus that any failure to honor them is a kind of tort, the breach of duty in rem.” A Crisis of Truth: Literature and Law 
in Ricardian England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 47. 
41 ibid, p. 38-9. 
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 disputed past events, “Which in myself I boldly will defend” (1.1.141), giving a body to his 
truth, his “troth.”42   In an important sense, the dispute between Bolingbroke and Mowbray is a 
dispute over history, over what sort of force might authorize history in a definitive way.  This 
notion of the judicial challenge as substantiating an oath is articulated by Aumerle in a parallel 
scene in which he defends himself against his accuser, Bagot: “There is my gage, the manual seal 
of death, That marks thee out for hell.  I say thou liest, And will maintain what thou hast said is 
false” (4.1.25-7).  Aumerle’s combat will be a “manual seal”: the imprimatur on a figural 
document that would contest the history being written by Bolingbroke’s faction.  
Notwithstanding the careful rhetoric of the pleaders, what the proving of oaths in the trial by 
combat strives for is a truth not contingent and rhetorical but legible to all. . .or failing that, a 
truth constituted by demonstrable force. 
 The confrontation in the first scene sets up an expectation that the judicial combat 
promises to resolve in an entertaining spectacle and a decisive judgment with God and his proxy, 
the king, as arbiters.  What the audience gets is something different: a frustrated or deferred 
expectation, an effect enhanced by the mechanism of having the appellants proceed through all 
of the exciting apparatus of preparation, the taking up of their lances, the announcements of the 
heralds, and indeed the sounding of the charge, at which moment the king intervenes.  The 
audience is positioned, like the combatants, to be surprised and disappointed.  In explanation, 
                                                 
42 The logic of judicial combat is not so much providential as it is sacramental.  The ballad recounts how naughty Sir 
Aldingar is struck down in a judicial duel by a four-year-old opponent.  Like the Eucharist which, in drama, reveals 
its true nature over its accidents (bleeds when pierced with a nail, etc.) Aldingar’s diminutive opponent gives a body 
to divine justice (ibid., p. 80).  The same logic of incarnation is at work in the practice of trial by hot iron, where the 
divine justice is manifest in the cleanness of the burn.  This, of course, is not to suggest that such legal practices 
were exempt from manipulation to produce a desired legal result, any more than are our own contemporary ones.  It 
is interesting that Mowbray, a few lines earlier, mentions that he had confessed that he contemplated an “ambush” 
against Lancaster “ere I last received the sacrament” (1.1.139).  In this speech of  Mowbray’s, we find a conjunction 
of sacrament/civil strife/English blood that recurs throughout the Henriad. 
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 Richard invokes the crucial figure of the English soil as mother, one which informs the second 
Lancastrian cycle: 
For that our kingdom’s earth should not be soil’d  
With that dear blood which it hath fostered, 
And for our eyes do hate the dire aspect 
Of civil wounds ploughed up with neighbor’s sword,   (1.3.125-8) 
 
Richard will instead banish the appellants.  The metaphorical connection between the living flesh 
of the two opponents and the earth that is the nation will be resolved by separating Bolingbroke 
and Mowbray from England.  Repudiating his earlier consent to the juridical process, Richard 
now wishes to identify it with civil war,  
To wake our peace, which in our country’s cradle  
Draws the sweet infant breath of gentle sleep;  
Which so roused up. . . 
Might from our quiet confines fright fair peace, 
And make us wade even in our kindred’s blood. . .(1.3.132-8) 
 
An act of royal fiat is called for by circumstances that cannot allow of a legal process (however 
suspect).43  Neither oath will be publicly validated by combat.  Rather than the hoped-for 
resolution, the problem will be swept out of sight indefinitely lest peace frighten itself.44 
 The variety of means by which the audience is positioned with regard to Richard invites 
the “perspective” approach to character employed by Larry Champion, Imtiaz Habib, and 
others.45  Habib’s work is of particular interest because it brings into relief both the strengths and 
weaknesses of perspective approaches.  For Habib, the Richard of act I is an “emotionally 
opaque” character,46 whose seemingly arbitrary acts are a “deliberate dramatic distancing on 
                                                 
43 Judicial combat was an antiquarian curiosity in Shakespeare’s time, and the abortive judicial combat between 
Bolingbroke and Mowbray may be the last in England’s historical record. 
44 For alternative constructions of these difficult lines, see Ure p. 29. 
45 For analogous treatments of perspective effects, see S. L. Rothell, Shakespeare and the Popular Dramatic 
Tradition (London: Staples Press 1948); A. P. Rossiter, Angel With Horns (London: Longman Press, 1961). 
46 Imtiaz Habib, Shakespeare’s Pluralistic Concepts of Character (London: Associated Universities Press, 1993), p. 
84 
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 Shakespeare’s part.”47 In this reading, perspective is mediated by our limited awareness or 
knowledge, a primary mechanism of the tragic mode, situating the audience in a position 
analogous to that of Bolingbroke. 
 Perspective as Habib understands it exists in some relationship with affect, with the result 
that sympathy is a privileged category: the key to a “real” interiority.  In this way, apropos of 
Bolingbroke’s reflections on his exile in act I scene iii, Habib claims “With the direct access they 
provide to the inside of the character, they invite confidence and suspension of disbelief  in what 
he seems to be.”48  Habib seems to be of two minds when it comes to Bolingbroke.  On the one 
hand, Bolingbroke “must . . .be made to manipulate our sympathy and perception of stage 
events.”49     On the other, “we can see into” Bolingbroke with “relative clarity.”50 There is a 
clear emphasis on the earnest and emotionally revelatory quality of the character’s dramatic 
representations in Habib’s reading of this scene, where “sympathy and attention” are the result of 
“the emotional intensity of his words.”51 Notwithstanding the care with which he qualifies the 
absolute truth of what we hear from Henry, Habib seems quite charmed by him: 
With manly fortitude he refuses to use poetic sentiment to blunt the harshness of his 
immediate fate: “O who can hold a fire in his hand / By thinking on the frosty Caucasus? 
. . .Or wallow naked in December snow, / By thinking on fantastic summer’s heat?”52 
 
The appeal here is to Henry’s pragmatic candor, confronting his tangible situation in a manner 
presumably free from the mediation of a certain suspect sort of language.  Is this a fair appraisal 
of what is taking place here?  In fact, the immediate precedent to the speech quoted is 
Bolingbroke’s claim that his exile has made him a “journeyman to grief” (1.3.274), and that 
                                                 
47 ibid, p. 83. 
48 ibid., p. 85. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
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 speech is followed by the observation, “Fell sorrow’s tooth doth never rankle more / Than when 
he bites, but lanceth not the sore” (1.3.302-3).  In a manner which might be germane to Habib’s 
argument, Bolingbroke is meditating at length upon his own emotional state, as is clear in his 
dialogue with his father, who tells him, “Woe doth the heavier sit / Where it perceives it is but 
faintly borne” (1.3.280-1).53  Bolingbroke is exploring his own grief in comparison with the 
promise of his future happiness through a series of metaphors.54 
It is crucial we note that what we have here is not an unmediated access into Henry’s 
interior state, but an appeal to our emotional involvement couched in a deliberate language, the 
first of many such appeals we will encounter in the play.  That the play tends to align its 
audience with Bolingbroke is circumstantially supported by the fact that any references to his 
own possibly suspect plans or motivation is drawn into question since they issue from characters 
we have some reason to doubt.  Mowbray calls Bolingbroke “traitor” at various points, and 
though he is Bolingbroke’s opponent, his words before his exit from the play have the ring of 
prophecy: “. . .what thou art, God, thou, and I do know / And all too soon, I fear, the king shall 
rue” (1.3.204-5).  King Richard numbers “eagle-winged pride / Of sky-aspiring and ambitious 
thoughts” (1.3.129-30) as a cause for the quarrel between the two dukes, a reprise of the hawking 
metaphor applied to Bolingbroke in act one: “How high a pitch his resolution soars!” (1.1.109).  
Our alignment with Bolingbroke is substantial but imperfect because we already know what his 
enemies’ remarks imply: that he will usurp Richard’s throne.  The first act thus leaves open the 
question of Henry’s intentions. 
                                                 
53 Habib’s understanding of Bolingbroke’s rhetoric situates him in a perennial misreading of this speech: In Hershel 
Baker’s introduction to the play in The Riverside Shakespeare, he writes of those same lines, “Bullingbrook also 
knows the force of language and bends it to his purpose, but he does not confuse his mental constructs, however 
deftly verbalized, with hard, unyielding fact; and he does not permit mere words, however sacrosanct and laden with 
association, to take the place of swift, incisive action (803).  The gender assumptions inherent in these readings 
deserve attention as well: the “manly fortitude” with which Bolingbroke confronts “hard, unyielding fact,” is 
presumably the corollary of the effeminacy of Richard’s more “poetic” worldview. 
54 The auditor may decide whether they are “poetic.” 
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 With his departure comes the first account of a Lancastrian populism that will inform 
every play of the Henriad.  Again, it is mediated through the interested perspective of Richard 
that we learn of it: 
Ourself and Bushy 
Observe’d his courtship to the common people, 
How he did seem to dive into their hearts 
With humble and familiar courtesy; 
What reverence he did throw away on slaves, 
Wooing poor craftsmen with the craft of smiles 
And patient underbearing of his fortune, 
As ‘twere to banish their affects with him. 
Off goes his bonnet to an oyster wench; 
A brace of draymen bid God speed him well, 
And had the tribute of his supple knee, 
With “Thanks, my countrymen, my loving friends”— 
As were our England in reversion his, 
And he our subjects next degree in hope. (1.4.23-36) 
 
Richard understands Bolingbroke as engaging is a sort of low technique, a “craft of smiles” that 
at once debases him and raises him higher than the king, now alienated from the affections of his 
subjects, which follow Henry abroad.  Richard’s revolves his characteristically fractured 
eloquence: he at once envies and disdains Bolingbroke’s possession of the love of the “common 
people,” “slaves” whom Richard would never lower himself to cultivate.55  That Bolingbroke is 
a shrewd manipulator of the people and his fellow magnates seems to be borne out consistently 
in the Henriad; Harry Percy will recall Henry on his return from exile as a “king of smiles” and 
“vile poltician.” (1 Henry IV
a 
 1.3.245, 240).  Richard seems disinclined to think of government in 
the populist categories of his Lancastrian cousins.  It is John of Gaunt who admonishes him, 
 
Now He that made me knows I see thee ill. 
Ill in myself to see, and in thee, seeing ill. 
Thy death-bed is no lesser than thy land 
                                                 
55 However, this is hardly the “subliminal image of practiced subterfuge and deception” that Habib wants to 
characterize it (87), happening, after all, in the sight of the King and Bushy. 
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 Wherin thou liest in reputation sick. . . (2.1.93-6) 
 
But the king is not inclined to examine his reputation, cannot imagine that reputation could be 
uncoupled from his innate royalty, even as he observes his cousin, whose canny political sense 
operates even as he travels into exile.  Developed in the play as a sort of moral measure 
comparable to York, Gaunt can see Richard as Richard cannot see himself.  This lack of critical 
self-understanding makes possible Richard’s continuing excesses, of which the most damning is 
the “farming of the realm,” which Gaunt has lamented in his “sceptered isle” speech (2.1.31-68): 
“this dear, dear land, / Is now leased out—I die pronouncing it--/  Like to a tenement or a pelting 
farm” (2.1.57-9).  This is quickly joined by Gaunt’s explicit denunciation of Richard as author 
the play’s primordial crime: the murder of Woodstock (2.1.128).  Making possible the 
retrospective reassessment of what has gone before, “seeing ill” from the dramatic perspective of 
the upright John of Gaunt rather than his potentially compromised son, this reasonably seems 
Richard’s moral nadir and a punctuated moment of our alienation from his character.56 
 As a mode of audience relationship to character, perspective can be produced through 
various kinds of expectation effects, and the play’s great modulation between Bolingbroke and 
Richard depends crucially on a technique of retrospective reevaluation.  This is as true around 
the character of Bolingbroke as it is of Richard.  The revelations of act two seem to have 
prepared us to identify with Boilingbroke as the moral champion who would cleanse the realm of 
the corruption it has known under Richard.  It is precisely at this point that we learn from 
Northumberland that Bolingbroke’s military force is preparing to land in Wales.  When York 
demands that Bolingbroke give an accounting of his arrival in warlike array, he says, 
                                                 
56 In what seems a rather forced reading, Habib sees this as a shift toward our identification with Richard: “His 
vicious treatment of Gaunt and his requisitioning of his estates is, though horrific, emotionally revealing.  The 
dramatic fascination of kingly wrath shown from close quarters. . .palliates the harshness of Richard’s behavior and 
partially eclipses it” (87). 
127  
 I am denied to sue my livery here, 
And yet my letters patents give me leave. 
My father’s goods are all distrain’d and sold, 
And these, and all, are all amiss employed. 
What would you have me do?  I am a subject, 
And I challenge law; attorneys are denied me, 
And therefore personally I lay my claim 
To my inheritance of free descent. (2.3.128-35) 
 
Prepared to identify with Bolingbroke, and inclined to accept just such an argument, the audience 
must be troubled by the fact that his claim is disingenuous.  His military expedition set in motion 
prior to the seizure of his estate.  Thus are drawn into question his motivations for accusing 
Mowbray and in general his earlier representations of loyalty to Richard.  The frustration of our 
inclination to identify with Henry is abetted by the fact that it is York whom he misleads.  The 
identification between York and John of Gaunt is made explicit by Henry: “You are my father, 
for methinks in you / I see old Gaunt alive” (2.3.116-7).  In dissembling to York, charismatic and 
manipulative Bolingbroke undermines the priority of the perspective that understood him as an 
honest subject wronged by Richard. 
 We have been prepared for Richard’s return to England from his ill-considered Irish 
expedition by a series of perspective shifts that have left the audience once again very nearly 
ambivalent, but This moment is far different from the beginning of the play.  The dispute 
between Bolingbroke and Mowbray  has functioned as a widening crack through which the 
audience can view the state of the kingdom, and the repeated modulations of dramatic 
prespective—from Bolingbroke to Gaunt and finally York, have finally left us with no firm 
ground on which to stand.  The ease with which Bolingbroke assimilates York to his purposes 
represents the capitulation of a certain decency, however weak and vacillating York may be.  If 
the beginning of act one promised the resolution of a conflict between noble opponents in a 
milieu that was equal parts chivalric virtue and the rule of law, act three locates us in a contest 
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 between two morally compromised figures operating in brute politics.  If the recuperation of 
Richard is to occur, it must happen in this context. 
 On Richard’s return to England, knowing that Bolingbroke has returned in force, he 
greets the English earth: 
I weep for Joy 
To stand upon my kingdom once again. 
Dear earth, I do salute thee with my hand, 
As rebels wound thee with their horses’ hoofs. 
As a long-parted mother with her child 
Plays fondly with her tears and smiles in meeting, 
So weeping, smiling, greet I thee, my earth, 
And do thee favours with my royal hands.  (3.2.4-11) 
 
While this speech has received much critical admiration,57 there is more to this passage than 
admirable poetic sentiment.  The earth has been a recurring figure in the play.  John of Gaunt 
laments “This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England/ This nurse, This teeming womb 
of royal kings” (2.1.50-1).  The last words of his son before his exile are, “Then England’s 
ground, farewell; sweet soil, adieu, / My mother and my nurse that bears me yet” (1.3.306-7).58  
Richard reverses the conventional figuration by himself assuming the role of mother to the 
nation.  As Richard understands it, the realm exists through him, a hubristic belief that will be 
tested by the drama in a manner that becomes apparent in the same scene.59 
 If perspective is produced expressions of affect, then Richard gives us as much as we 
could ask, and more, alternating from hyperbolic self-confidence to despair by turns.  Even more 
important, Richard’s immediate actions are constructed by the acts of distant Bolingbroke, 
                                                 
57 Champion, op. cit., p. 81, “Certainly the spectators react sympathetically to Richard’s almost parental concern for 
his native land as he returns from Ireland in III, ii.”  Or Coleridge, “How beautifully the amiable part of Richard’s 
character is brought forward. . .his intense love of his country, yet still as a feminine feeling…”  Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, Shakespeare Criticism (Dutton: New York, 1960), v. 1 p. 139. 
58 Henry’s opening speech in act I of 1 Henry IV also employs this personification. 
59 Here, I’m raher close to Calderwood’s position on Richard, but he located this argument in a broader argument 
about “The fall of kingly speech” and its associated world-view which I don’t endorse.  See James L. Calderwood, 
Metadrama in Shakespeare’s Henriad (Berkely: University of California Press, 1979), p. 13. 
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 collapsing each new resolve.  It is almost as if Richard is vainly trying to intervene in a history 
already written by Bolingbroke, who has become for a time more like a series of events than a 
character.  Sympathy is certainly a relevant category at this moment, but at the same time our 
new orientation toward Richard involves recurrent distancing effects: 
. . .you have mistook me all this while. 
I live with bread like you, feel want,  
Taste grief, need friends: subjected thus, 
How can you say to me that I am a king? (3.2.174-7) 
 
If  Bolingbroke is a politician, Richard is colored by his inability to think politically, to 
understand his own power even as it flows away from him.  His understanding of his nature 
through a parody of the ideology of divine right leads him to egregious political errors.  Reduced 
to his small circle of allies, Richard makes their continuing support of their embattled king a 
symptom of his debasement.  The awareness of the need to produce his own legitimacy through 
the good will of others is a painful one for him; his alienation of faithful York has already 
demonstrated this. 
 Richard’s fitful resolves reveal as much as his lamentations.  Recovering himself from 
the news of the desertion of his Welsh forces, Richard says 
I had forgot myself, am I not king? 
Awake, thou coward majesty!  thou sleepest. 
Is not the king’s name twenty thousand names? 
Arm, arm, my name!  a puny subject strikes 
At thy great glory.  (3.2.83-7) 
 
Richard invites the truth that is enshrined in language to inscribe itself on the real, and 
demonstrate once again that he is king.  It is characteristic of Richard that, faced with a crisis that 
devolves from his stained legitimacy, he nevertheless understands the name of “king” to stand 
aloof of any context.  The irony of this statement is that it does point to a possibility: in strategic 
defeat, Richard could do worse than to play upon the legitimacy that still adheres to his title in an 
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 effort at political recovery.  This he repeatedly refuses to do.  In a play in which Henry 
Bolingbroke can turn York to his own purposes in the space of a few lines, Richard squanders his 
rhetorical agency on pleasure.  While the Bishop of Carlisle admonishes him, “wise men ne’er 
sit and wail their woes, / But presently prevent the ways to wail” (3.2.179-80), Richard embraces 
a despair that does not force him to confront his contingent political situation: “A king, woe’s 
slave, shall kingly woe obey” (3.2.210).  Considered as a self-dramatization, Richard indulges 
himself in “sad stories of the death of kings” (3.2.156), chooses a narrative template for his fall 
as full of narcissistic pleasure as his earlier self-aggrandizement.  The tactical misuse of his 
agency is emphasized in word and action: against Aumerle’s objection, Richard throws his 
remaining military force to the wind (3.2.217) in a dramatic situation in which advantage adheres 
to the smallest of resources. 
 Our potentially tragic alignment with Richard modified through a consistent 
characterization; in Richard appeals to sympathy are consistently problematized by the 
audience’s consciousness of his self-dramatization, though it can only be through his perspective 
that we experience subsequent events.  So begin the strange negotiations through which Richard 
and Henry will determine the fate of England. As has been much noted, Richard seems to guide 
Henry to his usurpation: 
Fair cousin, you debase your princely knee 
To make the base earth proud with kissing it. . . 
Up, cousin, up; your heart is up; I know, 
This high at least, although your knee be low (3.3.190-5). 
 
The ironic nature of Richard’s performance here must be understood.  Richard employs a 
language of royalty previously reserved to himself and is ironic not because that language or the 
state it endorses is drawn into question, but because it is applied to Bolingbroke. 
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 Richard’s dramatic situation from this point forward will articulate the travail of a 
character caught in a sometimes competing set of rhetorical exigencies, performing as he must 
for Bolingbroke and yet indulging in the pleasures of his own self-conceit, employing a language 
that has lost its coherence.60 The opposed self-dramatizations of Bolingbroke and the king 
converge in act 4 scene 1, where Richard surrenders the crown to Henry.  The scene has been set 
by Bolingbroke, who positions himself within his customary legalisms in dispensing with the 
Lords Appellant and having the Bishop of Carlisle arrested for treason.  In Henry’s interest, the 
transfer of sovereignty will be staged as an operation of law for the benefit of the realm.  Friction 
is inevitable since, even in this carefully contrived scene, it is impossible for Richard to step 
down on these terms.  In response to Richard’s tragic mien, Bolingbroke observes, “I thought 
you had been willing to resign” (4.1.190).  Richard answers with a paradox, “Ay, no, no, ay; for I 
must nothing be; / Therefore no no, for I resign to thee.”   
In Ernst Kantorowicz’ influential treatment, the development of the drama stages the 
division of the king’s two bodies: “Bit by bit he deprives his body politic of the symbols of its 
dignity and exposes his poor body natural to the eyes of the spectators. . .”61  For Kantorowicz, 
the fraught process that takes place between Richard and Bullingbrook is successful in the 
register of political theology: “It is the demise of Richard and the and the rise of a new body 
natural.”62  For Richard, the act of his deposition cannot be legitimate, and he rhetorically 
undermines what he trivially affirms: “With mine own hands I give away my crown, / With mine 
own tongue deny my sacred state” (4.1.208-9).  The paradox of royal agency for Richard is this: 
                                                 
60 Again, I want to be specific about the distinction between my position and that of Calderwood, who understands 
the struggle for the crown in terms of the fall of a language of perfect correspondence between things and signifiers.  
My argument, that character in this play is the locus of rhetorical agency, seems borne out in this scene,. 
61 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), p. 36. 
62 Kantorowicz, p. 40. 
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 if his Kingship is enfranchised by God, in abandoning it, he surrenders the self on whose 
“willing” consent such a transfer is made; in alienating a position granted directly by God, aloof 
from any human institution, he surrenders a thing that cannot be legitimately transferred.  In 
uncrowning himself, Richard raises a question that defines a disagreement between Antonio 
Negri and Giorgio Agamben on the nature of sovereignty: does sovereign authority contain 
constituting authority, the primordial sanction that invests the sovereign?63  The clues in Richard 
II are only suggestive, but Richard’s language at his own deposition suggest that the transfer of 
power is incoherent.  Henry’s coronation will not be dramatized, and we will not see a 
“coronation” in the Lancastrian cycle until Hal’s “self-coronation” in 2 Henry IV. 
Never yielding wholly to Bolingbroke’s dramatization of events, Richard performs 
himself as the essential king deposed, the tragic figure whom he seems to be compelled to 
convince everyone –even Bolingbroke – that he is.  While Richard has always considered 
himself identical with the realm, Henry can treat him as superfluous, a sign to announce his new 
regime, the source of an ambiguous rhetoric that serves its purpose nonetheless.  It seems 
characteristic of Richard in these acts that dramatic rhetoric becomes a reflection on agency, and 
can find no agency to inform action or speech.  Irony and impasse are produced because 
language cannot accomplish what we demand of it. 
 Efforts to read Richard II more comfortably into the tragic mode are legion, and this is as 
true of criticism that admits of dramatic perspective as that which insists on dramatic naturalism.  
We would do well to question the judgment of those critics eager to assimilate Richard to the 
“human,” a category that the deposed king would disdain: 
Thus play I in one person many people, 
And none contented. Sometimes am I king; 
                                                 
63 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 
41 
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 Then treasons make me wish myself a beggar, 
And so I am.  Then crushing penury 
Persuades me I was better when a king;  
Then am I king’d again, and by and by 
Think that I am unking’d by Bolingbroke 
And straight am nothing.  But what e’er I be, 
Nor I, nor any man that but man is, till he be eas’d 
With being nothing (5.5.31-41) 
 
The binaries manipulated by Richard are king/beggar and king/nothing, with at least the 
suggestion of an identification between beggar, nothing, and the nothing that is the dissolution of 
the self in death.  One can only force upon this the reading that “This is the ultimate knowledge, 
the existential verity about the void between being and consciousness in king and commoner 
alike.”64  For Richard, the condition of our common humanity is a sort of death, though the critic 
may endeavor to make this belief admirable.65  If insight into one’s own condition is an element 
of the mechanics of tragedy, Richard is notable for his heroic resistance to it.  If John of Gaunt 
challenged Richard with what he would not see, the fallen king’s demand for a mirror in the 
deposition scene seem to promise some self-examination, to “see the very book indeed / Where 
all my sins are writ, and that’s myself” (4.1.274-5).  With an appeal to the unreliability of 
images, Richard rejects the evidence of the “flatt’ring glass” (4.1.279) and instead uses the 
mirror as a locus for more narcissistic rhetoric: “Was this the face / That like the sun did make 
beholders weep?” (4.1.283-4).  While we should not be insensitive to Richard, while we cannot 
be when the dramatic choice offered us is between the afflicted Richard and the cool and laconic 
“silent king” Henry, the drama functions through an alienation that is not a flaw in its tragic 
development but an intentional displacement from Richard’s self-dramatization.  Richard dashes 
the mirror against the floor, asking Henry to “Mark. . .How soon my sorrow hath destroyed my 
                                                 
64 Habib, op. cit., p. 101. 
65 “The leap from the everything (KING) state straight to the no-thing state involves tremendous intellectual courage 
and integrity. . .” ibid., p. 102. 
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 face” (4.1.290-1).  Bolingbroke, with a nod to the same anti-image discourse, replies, “The 
shadow of your sorrow hath destroyed / The shadow of your face” (4.1.292-3).  A dubious 
optical image, distinct from the thing itself, is destroyed by a dramatic, rhetorical image of 
sorrow in a world of figures, but never the promised self-examination. 
 What is it Richard has seen in the glass?  What is interesting is that his image is 
essentially unchanged: 
No deeper wrinkles yet?  Hath sorrow struck 
And made no deeper wounds?  Oh flatt’ring glass, 
Like to my followers in prosperity, 
Thou dost beguile me! (4.1.278-81) 
 
Richard destroys the mirror because it reports that his face, once the face of the sovereign, is 
strangely intact.  He is the image of himself, which he denies in the act of breaking the mirror.  
In the strange calculus of royal bodies, the image of the king is not a neutral thing.  In his 
discussion of the work of Kantorowicz, Agamben discusses a critical choice in the investigation 
of the genealogy of the sovereign body.  Kantorowicz was aware of a potential classical source 
for the doctrine of the double sovereign body: the Roman consecratio in which a wax effigy of 
the dead emperor held court, receiving visitors and the care of physicians.66  Agamben argues 
that the sovereign so understood, the image suspended in fictive life, shares with the sacrificial 
man, he who while living is placed under the sovereign ban, “a zone of indistinction in which 
they can no longer be told apart.”67  Homo sacer, Agamben’s sacrificial man, is the debased 
counterpart of sovereignty: 
He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to 
it, but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which 
life and law, inside and outside, become indistinguishable.68 
 
                                                 
66 Agamben, p. 93. 
67 ibid., p. 96. 
68 ibid., p. 28. 
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 In a manner that Richard would probably be willing to grant, the image of the king thus 
displaced is not simply a man in the juridical or even the theological sense.  He and Henry 
remain in an intimate and potentially unstable relationship.  Image in this sense is not the eidolon 
of iconoclastic rhetoric but a thing constitutive of political reality. 
 In an explicit meditation on visual perspective within the dramatic world of Richard II, 
Bushy tells Richard’s queen, 
Each substance of grief hath twenty shadows, 
Which shows like grief itself, but is not so, 
For sorrow’s eye, glazed with blinding tears, 
Divides one thing entire to many objects, 
Like perspectives, which, rightly gaz’d upon,  
Show nothing but confusion; ey’d awry, 
Distinguish form.  So your sweet majesty, 
Looking awry on your lord’s departure, 
Find shapes of grief more than himself to wail, 
Which, look’d on as it is, is nought but shadows, 
Of what it is not. . . (2.2.14-23) 
 
Bushy’s euphuistic quibble on the perspective trick of anamorphosis locates affect both within 
perspective effects and prior to them, just as vision itself cannot be perfected: true form can be 
distinguished when confusion is “ey’d awry,” but the queen cannot discern that form because she 
is “looking awry.”69  While tragic affect cannot be dispensed with, its production of  tragic depth 
is suspect, depth ultimately being a function of perspective.  Tragedy, after all, is another 
structured language imposed on history.  Larry Champion, who is sanguine about a canonically 
tragic development in Richard II, writes,  
Admittedly Richard has several rhetorical flurries when action is virtually suspended and 
drama suffers despite the poetic eloquence; admittedly Richard never achieves true tragic 
insight.  In his soliloquy in act 5, however, the spectators are compelled to believe that he 
is bordering on such wisdom.  Like Edward II, he is remarkably engaging despite his 
deeply flawed nature. . . . Ultimately, he sacrifices full sympathy through his histrionic 
display of self-pity.70  
                                                 
69 This is also an echo of Gaunt’s reply to Henry’s lamentation of his banishment. 
70 Champion, op. cit, p. 89, 82. 
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Sympathy is limited and privilege displaced, but the critic nevertheless judges it by its approach 
to an idealized tragic form.  We should note Champion’s “histrionic”: the fracture in tragedy is 
located in the histrio, the actor who somehow intrudes upon his own action. 
In the incommensurable characterizations of Richard and Bolingbroke, Richard II 
thematizes the problem of human motive as historical cause.  From the first scenes, the audience 
attempts to fit public political actions to some possibly rational structure of motivation, only to 
have this effort frustrated by the dramatic action.  This is another way in which perspective 
aligns us with Richard, as he attributes motive to his opponent Bolingbroke, while the 
Lancastrian orchestrates events without revealing himself.  Richard seems increasingly available 
to sympathy and identification, but at the springs of his action we find no original intention, but 
figures and shadows, sad stories of the death of kings to be played out in increasingly artificial 
scenes constructed by an arbitrary power. 
On his return from Ireland, threatened by Bolingbroke’s army, Richard at one point says, 
“Proud Bullingbrook, I come, / To change blows with thee for our day of doom” (3.2.188-9).  Is 
this another vain conceit, or is it possible that the promised contest of the first act, of which the 
audience has been so patently cheated, can be recovered, played out with the debauched counters 
left us at this point?  The stakes are significant: the recovery of something like legitimacy from a 
legacy of civil strife.  It is wrong to think of Richard after his return as reduced to no alternative 
save capitulation to the military force of Bolingbroke.  This is revealed in the carefully 
developed contrast between Richard and Henry.  Exiled, and later cut off from his inheritance, 
Henry is, in effect deprived of his own name in the complex sense that Richard attaches to this 
quantity.  “The being of the man resides in the name.  Banishment, dispossession and outlawry 
are intended to reduce Bolingbroke to a penniless nobody, the shadow of a man deprived of 
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 name and legal rights.71” In fact, Henry appears to have an agency without his name, an agency 
that can treat name as a plastic category.  When confronted by York about the violation of his 
exile, he replies, “As I was banish’d, I was banish’d Herford; But as I come, I come for 
Lancaster” (2.3.112-3).  The Henry who has marshaled an ostentation of despised arms is a man 
who can act even though he is between names.  
Richard, disappointed in the power of his name, dismisses his military force and awaits 
the whim of his enemy.  We may wait for him to act in the interest of preserving the possibility 
of legitimacy in the state, but his action is squandered on himself in the perverse pleasure of his 
fall, rhetoric reaching an impasse in perfect narcissism.  For Champion, Richard’s slaying of the 
two assassins before his own murder is an “anomalous moment of physical valor” raising 
Richard “as close to tragic stature as any figure in Shakespeare’s early plays. . .”72 Rather than 
pressing anomaly into the service of our reading, we might consider this occurrence against the 
background of character and action.  In contrast to Calderwood’s claim that “Exton kills a man 
who is, in his namelessness, already dead,”73 it reveals at Richard’s ultimate moment that he 
does possess an unexpected agency, but one that is rendered only potential, save for this 
tantalizing hint.  If, like Phyllis Rackin, we wished to preserve the category of “judicial combat” 
against the play’s attack on its credibility,74 we might read this as an ambiguous hint of divine
sanction.  Defiant against intimidating odds, Richard defends himself as he did not defend his
tottering reign.  When we consider Richard in the unstable position of Agamben’s sacrificial 
 
 
                                                 
71 James Winny, The Player King: A Theme of Shakespeare’s Plays (New York: Norton, 1958), p. 48-9. 
72 Champion, op. cit. p. 82.  Champion deserves significant credit for understanding the ambivalence of Richard’s 
characterization, but his insistence upon the tragic privilege’s affect at the expense of the political.  Contrast this to 
Habib, who reads Richard into unambiguous sympathy and humanistic insight in an uncontaminated tragic form. 
73 Calderwood, op. cit., p. 19. 
74 Rackin, op. cit., pp. 46-55, 79, 163. 
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 man, the one who cannot be sacrificed but whom it is not legal homicide to murder,75 Richard
remains the troublesome image o
 
f the king. 
 
 
D. UNCOMFORTABLE ALIGNMENTS 
 
That dramatic history as a “tragic” high form could drive a wedge between sympathy and 
perspective is nowhere better demonstrated than Shakespeare’s Richard III.76  Richard of 
Gloucester has posed problems of containment both for Tudor historians and for a modern 
criticism that would understand Shakespeare’s play as providential in its theory of history.  
Known to Shakespeare’s sixteenth-century audience largely through histories written by Tudor 
clients—Polydore Virgil’s Historia Anglica and Thomas More’s History of King Richard the 
Third77 -- this  last Yorkist king was constructed as the other of Tudor legitimacy.  This has 
contributed to his unusual incarnation in drama, which will reward a brief discussion. 
In their book Mikhail Bakhtin, Katerina Clark and Micheal Holquist and offer a useful 
gloss on what Bakhtin termed a “politics of quotation.”  Quotation’s particular violence is 
accomplished by an implied censorship, circumscribing the words of another in my own, so that 
“how much of the other’s meaning I will permit to get through when I surround his words with 
my own is a question about the governance of meaning, about who presides over it, and about 
how much of it is shared.”78  In the treatment of Shakespeare’s Richard III, it is a commonplace 
                                                 
75 Agamben, p. 71. 
76 I beg the reader’s indulgence for moving now to a play with such a similar title. 
77 A text plagiarized in Hall’s Union. 
78 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 
236. 
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 of criticism that priority be given to those dramatic voices that condemn Richard.79  In the 
introduction to the play in the Riverside Shakespeare, the malign portrait of the king in Thomas 
More’s history, alongside the testimony of the characters of Lady Anne, Queen Elizabeth, and 
others, prepare our undergraduates for their first meeting with Gloucester.80  If Richard is so 
clearly portrayed as a Machiavel doomed by providence, why must he be contained so carefully? 
 While critical expressions of grudging admiration for Richard’s strange charisma are 
common, few critics are able to account for how it is accomplished.  To this problem Larry 
Champion brings a critical insight conveyed with qualifiers necessary to guarantee our distance 
from this troublesome character.  Richard “dominates the stage, appearing in ten of eighteen 
scenes. . .and delivering more than 32 percent of the total lines. . . .Moreover through twelve 
soliloquies and four asides. . .Richard provides the eye—albeit jaundiced—through which the 
spectator observes the action. . .”81  His soliloquies “reflect the unholy vigor and callous zeal 
which feed Richard’s ambition and provoke in the spectators, if not sympathy, an awed 
appreciation of his boundless energy and vitality.”82  Here, Champion reasons better than he 
knows.  If the audience is prepared for the play by a historiography written by Richard’s Tudor 
opponents, by “their foreknowledge of Richard’s historically appointed doom,”83 then the play 
forces them through its management of perspective into an alignment with a character for whom 
they are unsympathetic.  The drama is designed to produce this perverse identification in spite of 
the extra-dramatic certainty that Richard is condemned by a history already written. 
                                                 
79 In sources quoted above, both Champion and Rakin introduce Richard with a chorus of those who damn him. 
80 Herschel Baker, “Richard III: Introduction,” in The Riverside Shakespeare (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 
708-9. 
81 Champion, op. cit., p. 61. 
82 ibid. 
83 Rackin, op. cit., p. 63. 
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  Whatever Richard’s victories, they can take place only against this antagonistic history.  
In a play replete with prophetic announcements against him, it is easy to forget that it is Richard 
who first mentions prophecy: 
And If King Edward be true and just 
As I am subtle, false, and treacherous, 
This day should Clarence closely be mew’d up 
About a prophecy, which says that G 
Of Edward’s heirs the murderer shall be.  (1.1.35-40) 
 
It would be difficult to imagine a more economical statement of the way that he will operate in 
this drama of history.  The cunning Richard of Gloucester makes use of a history that implicates 
himself to condemn his innocent brother.  If Richard knows himself to be diabolical, the strange 
effect of his actions is to ironize our perception of the play’s other characters: “Simple plain 
Clarence, I do love thee so / That I will shortly send thy soul to heaven”  (1.1.118-9).  If 
Richard’s self-dramatization makes him the author of the evil in the play, our perception of 
characters like Clarence, King Edward, of Buckingham is “jaundiced” because they lend 
themselves so readily to Richard’s will.  Announcing his intentions beforehand, Richard carries 
them out and enlists the agency of other characters, his success amplified by the seeming 
inadequacy of his means.  Willard Farnham’s category of the “grotesque comedian”84 is apposite 
here: Richard choreographs an essentially comic action in which other characters are his gulls. 
 Born with teeth, Richard’s is a grotesque body that announces its conflict with 
“dissembling nature” (1.1.19) and rational historical logic, “Deformed, unfinished, sent before 
my time / Into this breathing world” (1.1.20-1).  Then again, it is a performed body equal to the 
demands of nimble capering.  Thus, in his seduction of Anne, Richard performs a body to rival 
that of  her lost Edward: 
                                                 
84 Willard Farnham, The Shakespearean Grotesque: Its Genesis and Formations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 
41. 
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 I do mistake my person all this while! 
Upon my life, she finds (although I cannot) 
Myself to be a marv’llous proper man. 
I’ll be at charges for a looking-glass, 
And entertain a score or two of tailors 
To study fashions to adorn my body. . . (1.2.252-6) 
 
The fundamentally theatrical nature of this body is demonstrated by the manner in which Richard 
is most himself when he is dissimulating.85  He wears his very deformity as a costume when he 
implores, 
I pray you all, tell me what they deserve 
That do conspire my death with devilish plots 
Of damned witchcraft, and that have prevail’d 
Upon my body with their hellish charms? 
. . . .Look how I am bewitch’d; behold mine arm 
Is like a blasted sapling, wither’d up; 
And this is Edward’s wife; that monstrous witch, 
Consorted with that harlot, strumpet Shore, 
That by their witchcraft thus have marked me. (3.4.59-62, 67-72) 
 
Richard’s self dramatization is a contamination of the tragic mode by an ungovernable body, 
insinuating a comic awareness and sensibility into the high languages of the court, tragedy, and 
the Tudor historical mythos.  The seduction of Lady Anne is a marker of a broader seduction in 
which the audience is wooed into an often uncomfortable identification with a character for 
whom history has denied us sympathy.  If pleasure was the source of our alienation from Richard 
II, it is the means of our identification with Richard of Gloucester. 
                                                 
85 Roland Barthes offers a very resonant account of theatricality in the poetry of Baudelaire: “The actor’s body is 
artificial, but its duplicity is much more profound than the painted sets or the fake furniture of the stage; the grease 
paint, the imitation of gestures or intonations, the accessibility of the exposed body—all this is artificial but not 
factitious. . . .the actor bears in himself the very overprecision of an excessive world. . . .This suggests that 
Baudelaire had an acute sense of the most secret and also the most disturbing theatricality, the kind which puts the 
actor at the center of the theatrical prodigy and constitutes the theater as the site of an ultraincarnation, in which the 
body is double, at once a living body deriving from a trivial nature, and an emphatic, formal body, frozen by its 
function as an artificial object. . .” Roland Barthes, “Baudelaire’s Theater,” in Critical Essays (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 27-8.  Barthes would understand the doubleness of character as 
semiological, but the parallels are interesting, particularly around the question of “incarnation.” 
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  Richard’s comic improvisation within a hostile history allows him an awareness that, 
while not unbounded, owes more to the comic than the tragic mode.  Phyllis Rackin writes 
“Richard thinks he is living in a world governed by Machiavellian Realpolitik, but Shakespeare 
places him in a world governed by providence.”86  Indeed, the fourth act will see a divergence 
between Richard’s will and events, the beginning of his reduction to history, and Richard himself 
observes that “All unavoided is the doom of destiny” (4.4.218).  A difficulty for the providential 
reading of the play is the abruptness and lack of dramatically-developed warrant for the 
installation of Tudor stability under the gleaming Richmond.  For Sigurd Burkhardt, 
. . .it is entirely appropriate that the restorer—Richmond—has no history; he is only the 
restorer, coming into the play by divine dispensation, from a realm beyond time. . . .The 
restoring marriage of Richmond and Elizabeth is made in heaven. . . .no courtship leads 
up to it, nor even negotiations; prior to Richmond’s formal announcement of it, it is 
mentioned once briefly by two secondary characters. . . .It is as though Shakespeare 
refused to take credit for this union—as though he wanted to exempt it also from the evil 
of human design and passion.87 
 
The rationale for the inference of the play’s endorsement of a restorative, providential resolution 
is, paradoxically, the lack of what would seem an appropriate dramatic preparation for it.  In fact, 
the recurrent prophetic interventions into Richard’s action suggest that with the final acts we 
have a return to a history that Richmond represents, and if the playwright hasn’t provided it for 
us, we can read it in Hall’s Union.88  We are approaching an understanding of theatricality in the 
history play that permits us no comfortable moral normativity, that reveals the potential of 
character as a sort of monstrosity operating within the wreckage of history.  If Richard’s 
conspiratorial openness is the vehicle for a type of seduction, how much more suspect our 
seduction through sympathy by a Lady Anne or an Edward, making claims upon innocence and 
yet doing just as the fiend would have them do? 
                                                 
86 Rackin, op. cit., p. 63. 
87 Sigurd Burckhardt, Shakespearean Meanings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 175, 177, 178. 
88 And yet, Richard’s ultimate defeat seems to hang upon the contingency of historical evens: “a horse.” 
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  If the dramatic presence of the character is a suspect and potentially sacrilegious 
incarnation, the fear of the antitheatrical polemicists made flesh, how much more dangerous the 
character that recognizes itself at play in the providential history of the nation?  Some recent 
criticism has argued that in thematizing the anxieties of Protestant anti-humanism, the theater is 
engaged in a fundamentally conservative Protestant enterprise.  Huston Diehl writes that, 
“Thomas Nashe bases his defense of the stage on the very distrust of theatricality that the 
reformers seek to arouse.” 89  Jean Howard has argued that, in Much Ado About Nothing, as in 
the antitheatrical tracts, “a key question turns out to be: whose fiction-making activities are to be 
construed as legitimate?  And, as in those tracts, the answer involves matters of gender and rank 
as much as moral motive.”  Ultimately, Howard’s approach offers the potential for readings that 
resist assigning a normative moral calculus to a Don John or a Richard Gloucester, to understand 
how they operate in their own right in a terrain ruled strategically by superior power. 
In his Defense of Poesy, Sir Philip Sydney produces a lukewarm critique of plays as the 
“unmannerly daughter” of poetry.  For Sydney, it is the motley and impure quality of English 
drama that invites censure: 
But besides these gross absurdities, how all their plays be neither right tragedies nor right 
comedies, mingling kings and clowns, not because the matter so carrieth it, but thrust in 
clowns by head and shoulders, to play a part in majestical matters. . .90 
 
The problem of the English stage is one of contamination, in which things are mingled which in 
the interest of art should be kept apart, and it is of course the intrusion into the high form of the 
comic that invites his particular censure.  The intrusion of the gross body of Sir John Falstaff 
onto the historical stage seems calculated to produce just such a muddying of the clear waters of 
                                                 
89 Huston Diehl, Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage: Protestantism and Popular Theater in Early Modern England 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 72. 
90 Sir Philip Sydney, An Apology for Poetry (or The Defense of Poesy) ed. R. W. Maslen (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1989), p. 112. 
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 art.  Particularly troublesome would be the moment in which Falstaff presumes to play the king.  
As Hal reflects, “Thy state is taken for a joint stool, thy golden scepter for a leaden dagger, and 
thy precious rich crown for a pitiful bald crown” (2.4.302-3).  One ironic register of this 
imposture is embodied in the imposter himself: neither Falstaff’s body nor his self-interest can be 
contained in the role, and he repeatedly emerges from the drama, flaunting mimesis.  The 
transgression of social status and intrinsic gravity is too patent. . .until we recall that “Henry IV” 
is simply an actor, a common player imitating a king, with a richer costume and a better chair.  In 
the play’s depiction of Lancastrian self-understanding, the king himself is a man playing a king, 
who deserves to do so because he plays the part better than his predecessor.  In this way, the 
intrusion of the comic into the “majestic” that so troubled Sydney is a consequence of the 
drama’s reflection on its own method.  The low intrudes on the high because theatricality 
understands that its highness is an interested performance.  Tellingly, the contamination of the 
tragic mode is the corollary in the aesthetic realm of the antitheatricalists’ concern that the 
theater is a incitement for people to move from their assigned social places. 
 An excessive body demanding a host of signifiers, a character who plays at being himself 
with selfish abandon, the actor Will Kempe in a sack full of bombast, the dramatic avatar of John 
Oldcastle, Falstaff is theatricality gone riot.  In Bale and Foxe, the immolation of the body of the 
martyred Oldcastle produces not the corporal relics of the spurned Catholic tradition but a text 
freed from its encumbering body, a text that can give witness to the master text, the Bible.  In the 
dramatic incarnation of Oldcastle, the body returns as a fountain of interested rhetoric, of 
appetite and the promise of pleasure, and always the consciousness of the martyr’s pyre.  Like 
the mandate to strike the name “John Oldcastle” from the production, the critical effort to reduce 
Falstaff to a type—the Vice, the alazon, the miles gloriosus—is a particular form of critical 
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 censorship.  With Henry IV we encounter characters who know themselves to be actors on the 
stage of history, complicating any question of providence.  If England’s crisis of legitimacy 
begins with a king who laments “I have wasted time, and now doth time waste me,” the 
articulation of a new legitimacy will come from a character whose providential self-
dramatization will redeem time itself.   
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V.  OF GRACE AND GROSS BODIES: STRANGE BIRTHS AND 
THE BODY OF THE NATION 
 
 
 
Prince: Sir John stands to his word; the devil shall have his bargain, for he was never yet 
a breaker of proverbs.  He will give the devil his due. 
 
Poins: Then art thou damned for keeping thy word with the devil. 
 
Prince [to Falstaff]: Else he had been damned for cozening the devil. 
      -- Henry IV, 1.2.91-94 
 
 
 
If John Oldcastle’s life is a cipher, at once illuminated and distorted by the writing of chronicle 
history, his afterlife has been a sort of textual explosion, marked at every moment by dispute 
over what his representation in his various avatars could mean to a spectrum of interested parties; 
he is the cause that polemic is in other men.  A follower of Wyclif who appears to have believed 
in the clear sense of the text, his productions and reproductions have ever been the site of 
fundamental debate over meaning.  Oldcastle’s appropriation by Shakespeare was considered 
sufficiently offensive that the playwright was forced to change his character’s name to “Sir John 
Falstaff,” while leaving untouched a plethora of signs suggesting that the fat knight is indeed the 
Protestant martyr.  It is a critical commonplace to approach Shakespeare’s Falstaff with a list of 
those stock figures from which he may have been drawn: the miles gloriosus, the Vice of the 
morality play, the figure of Riot, the “Old Man” of the Protestant literature of reform.  A. R 
Humphreys has described him as “a rich amalgam, a world of comic ingredients.”1  This work 
too approaches him as a thing of parts, and this does a familiar sort of critical violence to the 
                                                 
1 A. R. Humphreys, The Arden Shakespeare King Henry IV Part 1 (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1960), p. xli 
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 apparent wholeness of this character.  Such an approach needs to be balanced by an 
understanding of how these competing tendencies are synthesized. 
That John Falstaff is a dramatic representation of Oldcastle, and that the plays in which 
Falstaff appears insist upon that reference even after the playwright was compelled to change the 
name of the dramatis persona has been demonstrated by Gary Taylor and Alice-Lyle Scoufos 
with divergent critical emphasis.2  Comic references to the character’s original name occur in 2 
Henry IV, including the Lord Chief Justice’s angry rejoinder, “Do you set down your name in 
the scroll of youth, that are written down “old” with all the characters of age?”3  Apparently, the 
association between the fat knight and the Lollard martyr was observed even in the breach.  This 
having been said, this study employs the name “Falstaff” to refer to the dramatis persona not for 
the sake of setting aside the historical problems around that name, but as a signifier of the real 
historical pressures placed upon the text as we have received it. 
A sort of orthodoxy has grown up locating Falstaff-Oldcastle in the role of the “grotesque 
Puritan,” a critical interpretation that presents problems both historical and dramatic, as will 
become apparent.  To Kristen Poole, Sir John’s intimacy with certain modes of Puritan discourse 
is not simply one among many sociolects and registers he can articulate, but “the person of 
Falstaff is in and of himself a parody of the sixteenth-century Puritan.”4  The critical effort of 
reducing Falstaff to a member of the genealogy that includes Tribulation Wholesome and Martin 
Marprelate seems particularly problematic when the plays engage with Puritan theology.  When 
                                                 
2 Gary Taylor, “The Fortunes of Oldcastle,” Shakespeare Survey, vol. 38 (1985), pp. 85-100; Alice-Lyle Scoufos, 
Shakespeare’s Typological Satire: A Study of the Falstaff-Oldcastle Problem (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 
1979). 
3 Taylor, p. 96; The italics are his. 
4 Kristen Poole, “Saints Alive! Falstaff, Martin Marprelate, and the Staging of Puritanism,” Shakespeare Quarterly, 
vol. 46, no. 1 (Spring, 1995), p. 54. 
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 Falstaff returns from his abortive tryst with Mistress Ford in act three of The Merry Wives of 
Windsor, he has this exchange with Mistress Quickly: 
Mistress Quickly: Marry sir, I come to your worship from Mistress Ford. 
 
Falstaff: Mistress Ford?  I have had ford enough.  I was thrown into the ford; I have my 
belly full of ford. 
 
Mistress Quickly: Alas the day!  Good heart, that was not her fault.  She does so take on 
with her men; they mistook their erection. 
 
Falstaff: So did I mine, to build upon a foolish woman’s promise.   
(The Merry Wives of Windsor, 3.4.33-42) 
 
Mistress Quickly may be insensitive to her malapropism on “election,” but Falstaff is not, and he 
continues the sexual quibble on that characteristically Puritan category with a level of self 
consciousness that seems to insist that he knows himself to be among the Preterite.  In fact, this 
play on election may continue the figure of his late-night swim as death from a few lines earlier: 
“you may know from my size that I have a kind of alacrity in sinking; and the bottom were as 
deep as hell, I should drown” (3.4.11-14). 
The argument that Falstaff as an instance of Oldcastle was a recognizably “Puritan” 
figure also hangs upon a rather free reading of the Protestant tradition that produced the 
Oldcastle martyrologies.  John Bale, without doubt the reformist to be credited with Oldcastle’s 
recovery and assimilation to the Protestant cause, was horrified by the Puritan tendency.5  The 
effort to produce the Oldcastle of the martyrologies as an important Anglican figure, appealing to 
royal supremacy when even the king abrogated his responsibility, should complicate the 
“grotesque Puritan” reading.  Finally, the affinity of Falstaff for an array of traditional or 
“Catholic” figures and modes of representation, coupled with the manner in which his 
                                                 
5 “Writing to his friend Thomas Ashley sometime in 1556, Bale bewailed the new ‘Church of the Purytie,’ a group 
of zealots who were trying to establish “a seditious secte in contempte of the Englishe order for their owne 
pharisaycall advancement. . .’” Leslie P. Fairfield, John Bale: Mythmaker for the English Reformation (West 
LaFayette, Indiana: Perdue University Press, 1972), p. 92. 
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 representation articulates radical Protestant positions far more worrisome than those of the stage 
Puritan in the mold of Zeal-of-the-Land Busy, suggests that these reductive categories may be an 
impediment to understanding his characterization.  The received Oldcastle of the late sixteenth 
century was a figure of complex and conflicted potential, debated in a moment when religious 
categories were anything but certain.  The truth in Maitland’s quip that England was “Protestant 
before the Reformation, and Catholic after” points to the complexity of English religious self-
understanding in this period. 
This study argues that the characterization of Falstaff functions through a dramatic 
method more akin to Viktor Shklovsky’s “making strange” rather than by endorsing readily-
available types circulating in sixteenth-century culture.  The religious significance of Falstaff is 
developed in his relationship to the Lancastrian dynasty in the very process of forging itself in 
history and national myth.  Not surprisingly, the representation of Falstaff is intimately related to 
problems raised around the future Henry V with regard to the agency of the figures of the past in 
various kinds of history.  The moral question raised by prince’s proverbial “cozening the devil” 
is a central question of the play: Can good be done in a world that seems morally compromised 
in every element?  Can good acts or a good outcome come from the subject position of the fallen 
knight, or the usurper’s heir?  
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 A. NO MOTHER BUT ENGLAND 
 
 
In The First Part of Henry IV, the competition between characters to represent an English 
identity takes place in terms of embodiment, with significant religious and sacramental 
overtones.  In his first speech in I Henry IV, the new Lancastrian king assures us, 
No more the thirsty entrance of this soil 
Shall daub her lips with her own children’s blood. 
No more shall trenching war channel her fields 
Nor bruise her flowerets with the arméd hoofs 
Of hostile paces. . . . 
   Therefore, friends, 
As far as to the sepulcher of Christ – 
Whose soldier now, under whose blessed cross 
We are impressed and engaged to fight – 
Forthwith a power of English shall we levy, 
Whose arms were molded in their mother’s womb 
To chase these pagans in those holy fields 
Over whose acres walked those blessed feet 
Which fourteen hundred years ago were nailed 
For our advantage on the bitter cross. 
 
Françios  Laroque has commented on the grotesque nature of the maternal image in this passage, 
“an infanticidal and cannibalistic mother, a ghoul that drinks fresh blood.”6  That is as may be, 
but there is quite a bit more to this dense conflux of images.  The English soldier-crusader is 
essentially warlike, his “arms” from before birth the implements of a violence that can either 
cause “intestine strife” – the civil wars that are England’s lot – or be turned to some external 
object.  Politically, this tends to displace responsibility for civil unrest from Henry’s usurped 
throne onto the not-unflatteringly-masculine violence that is the nature of English manhood.  
That the king displaces the image of England from himself, the body royal that at other moments 
he invokes as a figure of religious veneration, is perfectly consistent with this. The “mother” that 
                                                 
6 Françios  Laroque, “Shakespreare’s ‘Battle of Carnival and Lent’: The Falstaff Scenes Reconsidered,” Shakespeare 
and Carnival: After Bakhtin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 91. 
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 is the personification of the English soil is strongly associated with the mother whose womb 
holds her embryonic sons, who are at once already soldiers and even already the dead whose 
blood she drinks.  That the soldiers are to be associated with Christ is suggested by the parallel 
construction in the successive couplets “Christ – / Whose soldier now” and “English. . ./ Whose 
arms were molded. . .” and so on.  To put it plainly, the mother who drinks the blood of her 
sacrificed child is an identification of the realm of England with the mother of Christ.  In this 
register, these lines evoke precisely the sort of inverted filial relationship that appears in Richard 
Crashaw’s poetic commentary on the second chapter of Luke: 
Suppose he had been Tabled at thy Teats. 
Thy hunger feels not what he eats. 
            He'll have his Teat ere long (a bloody one). 
    The Mother then must suck the Son.  
The blood-sucking mother is of course a grotesque image—in Laroque’s reading she is a “harpy” 
– but this is a familiar sacramental horror, analogous to that of Saint Augustine’s observer who 
sees through the semblances of wine and altar bread their real substance, the flesh and blood of 
Christ.  It may be important that Crashaw, though the son of a zealous Protestant divine, was 
himself a convert to Catholicism.  The similar image deployed by the king shares an 
incarnational logic of representation with the vierge ouvrante figures of late-Medieval religion.7  
In such a figure, the Madonna at once embraces the infant Christ and contains within herself 
Christ crucified.  Mary’s womb is symbolically the site of a chain of associations that link the 
milk of the vierge lactans, the nursing Madonna, to Christ’s redemptive blood, which is figured 
again as water and metaphorically, as in Crashaw’s “Luke II,” as milk.  The grotesque quality of 
the relationship of mother and child is articulated through the consumption of bodily fluids, 
through the superposing of maternal organs and their functions on the son (Christ’s wound is 
                                                 
7 A representative image of a vierge ouvrante can be seen at 
http://fits.depauw.edu/aharris/Courses/Gothic/TopicImages/MaryFS.jpg 
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 conventionally associated with a womb).  Mikhail Bakhtin has discussed the grotesque image of 
the earth as the womb, not only of life, but of death.8  In the careful rhetoric of Henry IV, it is 
not sufficient to say that these are “traditional” or “Catholic” figures, for they have been turned 
to a new purpose: they have been nationalized. 9  
The deployment of this mutated image of the virgin in Henry IV must be considered in 
terms of an evolving Reformation history.  In a by now familiar appropriation of the despised 
popish icon, though Protestants displaced Mary from the prominent intercessory role she 
occupied in traditional worship, they were not always keen to discard her symbolic force.  The 
affinity of the Virgin to the figure of the church personified as the immaculate mother of us all 
can be found in these lines from Calvin (in a gloss on Augustine):  
For there is no other way to enter into life unless this mother [the church] conceive us in 
her womb, give is birth, nourish us at her breast, and lastly, unless she keep us under her 
care and guidance until, putting off mortal flesh, we become like the angels.10 
 
With the church our mother, we all potentially share the likeness of Christ.  It is well known that 
Elizabeth Tudor exploited the representation of herself as the image of the virgin, the “virgo 
potens ‘who bore Christ in her heart as a womb.’”11  Perhaps less well known is the mapping of 
                                                 
8 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 21, 91. 
9 In her Politics of Mixed-Genre Drama: The Comic Treatment of Punishment Spectacles in Shakespeare (PhD 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1990), Janet Marie Spencer also discusses this appropriation of holy 
images by Tudor and Stuart monarchs: “. . .to students of Renaissance England, the ‘cult of the virgin’ makes more 
sense in reference to the virgin Queen than to the Blessed Virgin” (p. 179).  Spencer seems to understand the use of 
the image of the virgin as a historically novel appropriation of religious imagery in the Protestant moment.  The 
distinction with this work is important: this writing understands the plays to dramatize a Lancastrian use of religious 
imagery that can be located historically in such things as Henry V’s representations of his relationship with Edward 
the confessor.  The result of this work is that the logic and tropes of religious representation in Shakespeare’s drama 
are surprisingly traditional (as opposed to reformed) with regard both to Falstaff and Lancaster. 
10 John Calvin, Institutes IV.1.1, 3-4 in Joel R. Beeke, “Calvin and Piety,” The Cambridge Companion to Calvin ed. 
Donald K. McKim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 131. 
11 Karl Josef Holtgen, “The Reformation of Images and Some Jacobean Writers on Art,” in Functions of Literature: 
Essays Presented to Erwin Wolff on his Sixtieth Birthday (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1984) p. 143, quoted in 
Julie Crawford, Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation England (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005), n. p. 190. 
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 sacramental onto political bodies in Robert Crowley’s An Epitome of Chronicles.12  In this text, 
the body of Mary Tudor becomes the site in which a sacramental view of the body royal is tested 
and found wanting.  As Thomas Betteridge has observed, Crowley presents an account of Mary’s 
sterile and corrupted womb in her spurious pregnancies as a metaphor for the stillborn Catholic 
revival that she championed.13  It should be noted that Crowley’s discursus on Mary’s womb is 
not somehow outside the traditional logic of sacred representation from which it is drawn, but 
relies on the logic of the vierge ouvrante to undermine the pretensions of a Tudor Catholic 
revival. 
 While Henry’s image of the nation as mother is not uncontested, the drama puts forth a 
number of bodies in relation to that quasi-religious figure.  The opening acts of Henry IV tend to 
situate Harry Percy as the martial child of England: he is a “Mars in swaddling clothes” and 
“infant warrior” (3.2.112-3), and King Henry wishes that his own son had been exchanged with 
Northumberland’s as infants (1.1.85-9).  Percy himself ironically comments on the “candy deal 
of courtesy” with which the king figures him as a child, “ ‘Look, when his infant fortune came to 
age. . .’” (1.3.251).  The Prince of Wales is constructed in opposition to this image of Percy, and 
the comparison is not one flattering to him, at least initially.  That John Falstaff must be 
understood as a carnivalesque body in the context of the play has been brought out by critics 
including Laroque and Janet Marie Spencer, but a thick understanding of how that grotesque 
body functions in the political and spiritual economies of Tudor Protestantism remains to be 
developed.  That Falstaff’s is an excessive body is articulated in Hal’s amplificatio: 
                                                 
12 Robert Crowley, An Epitome of Chronicles. . .continued to the Reign of Queen Elizabeth (London, 1559), STC 
15217.5, quoted in Thomas Betteridge,  Tudor Histories of the English Reformations, 1530-83 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1999), p. 169. 
13 Betteridge,  p. 169.  This trope, like a great deal of Tudor-Protestant propaganda, is picked up in Shekhar 
Kaupur’s 1998 film Elizabeth. 
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 There is  a devil haunts thee in the likeness of an old fat man; a tun of man is thy 
companion.  Why dost thou converse with that trunk of humors, that bolting-hutch of 
beastliness, that swollen parcel of dropsies, that huge bombard of sack, that stuffed cloak-
bag of guts, that roasted Manningtree ox with the pudding in his belly. . . (2.4.356-61) 
 
In this copia,  the body is imagined as an immense digestive tract, the container of a dubious and 
queasy forcemeat.  As a veritable cathedral of digestion, Falstaff locates himself in a particular 
reformist cultural conversation about bodies and eating.  Julie Crawford locates such discourses 
of bodily monstrosity in an emerging Protestant argument about the relationship between bodies 
and souls: “For many Protestants, despite—or perhaps because of—the Protestant doctrinal focus 
on the inscrutability of God’s ways on the much-touted ‘inwardness’ of post-Reformation belief, 
physiognomy took on a kind of predestinarian legibility”14  If the bodies of the humble could be 
read, Falstaff’s body is a marked passage, pre-moralized and instantly recognizable.  For English 
Protestants, there was nothing morally neutral about eating and digestion.  Michael C. 
Schoenfeldt has explored the way in which a particular Protestant concept of dietary temperance 
informs the writing of George Herbert: 
Eating requires one continually to determine the borders of morality: “A man dining eats 
at first lawfully; but proceeding on, comes to do unlawfully, even before he is aware”. . . . 
The consumer must be continually on the lookout for the moment “when the appetites of 
the body . . . [ become] sins of gluttony.”15 
 
Since eating is ever a moral tightrope, Herbert’s “consuming subject” treads a careful line 
between Bakhtin’s carnivalesque excess and the “holy fast” ascribed to traditional ascetic 
practice by Caroline Walker Bynum.16 
                                                 
14 Julie Crawford, Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation England (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005), p. 18. 
15 Michael C. Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
p. 117. 
16 ibid., p. 119. 
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  The moral sanction that attached to excessive food or drink is reproduced throughout 
Tudor-Protestant writing, with some surprising changes rung upon the theme.  The Elizabethan 
Homilie Against Gluttony and Drunkennesse warns, 
[God] so much abhorreth all beastly banquetting, that by his sonne 
our Sauiour Christ in the Gospel, hee declareth his terrible indignation 
against all belly gods, in that hee pronounceth them accursed, saying, 
Wo bee to you that are full, for yee shall hunger.17  
 
Like sumptuary laws, the Homilie can be understood as an attempt to contain social and 
economic mobility, to keep in its place a rising class that has the capacity to eat or drink to the 
degree of their betters.  In a familiar vein, questions of social power are subordinated here to 
different sorts of social conflict.  The curious figure of the “belly gods” is one that appears 
repeatedly in Protestant texts.  Foxe’s Acts and Monuments admonishes against the same forms 
of excess in a similar language: 
. . .for it is better and easier for a thirsty laboring mā to drink, thē for a dronken man to 
tell a sober wise tale. yea, it is a tokē that ye haue earnestly folowed your labor, and not 
kept company with dronkardes, and belly gods. . .18  
 
This passage is evocative of Falstaff’s ambiance, particularly in the opposition of carnival excess 
and labor.  The term “belly god” appears to have been drawn from Paul’s Letter to the 
Philippians, from a description of the enemies of Christ’s cross, “Whose end is destruction, 
whose God is their belly, and whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things.”19  In the 
polemical climate of Protestant England, such enemies were by no means anonymous.  The 
Actes and Monuments records the inquisitor’s indictment of Elizabeth Warne, a Marian 
Protestant martyr: “The chiefest obiection that he vsed. . . was touching the reall and corporall 
                                                 
17 An Homilie Against Gluttony and Drunkennesse, STC 13675, II.5.1.47-50; Michael Davies makes a similar 
connection between the representation of Falstaff and the Homilie Against Gluttony and Drunkennesse, but does not 
examine the wider connection between “belly gods” and Eucharistic controversy in his “Falstaff’s Lateness: 
Calvinism and the Protestant Hero in Henry IV,” The Review of English Studies, New Series vol. 56 no. 255 (2005), 
pp. 351-78. 
18 Foxe 1563, p. 1238. 
19 Authorized Version, Philippians, 3:20. 
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 presence of the body and bloud of Christe in the sacrament of the altar: as the chefest ground and 
profitablest foundation of their belly religion.”20  Paul’s sinners whose God is their belly have 
become the adherents of the Real Presence, with a fleshly God in their bellies but spiritually 
empty.  Thus in Foxe the objection of a reform-minded youth to a learned proponent of 
transubstantiation: 
The same yong manne obiected against the said Broke, that he should say that the thynge 
which the Priest vseth to hold vp ouer his hed at Masse, is not þe natural body of Iesu 
Christ, for if that were so, who so would, might haue their belly full of Goddes, their 
guttes full of Goddes. . .21  
 
The material presence is lampooned as a carnivalesque object of abject digestion and 
regurgitation, “and he that hadde lately receyued the Sacrament before he went to the sea, 
myghte happly vomit God vp againe on shippe borde.”22  The desire for communion with 
Christ’s flesh is re-imagined as both an insatiable gluttony and a debased polytheism.  In 
Elizabethan homiletics and polemic, the gross body of the glutton is figured as a legible sign of 
the sin of intemperance and potentially a signifier of Eucharistic heresy.  Indeed, because the 
body was both the site of possible signs and a hotbed of vice, the fulcrum of appetite and desire, 
it must have seemed to some at the extremity of reformist belief that it might be better to have no 
body at all. 
 This by no means exhausts the problem of Falstaff and consumption.  As Dover Wilson 
observed, “we never see or hear of Falstaff eating, or desiring to eat, anything except Goodwife 
Keech’s dish of prawns and the capon, anchovies and halfpenny worth of bread recorded. . .in 
the bill found upon him when asleep. . .”23  Instead, as Dover Wilson was well aware, the play 
deploys a tremendous amount of language that situates Falstaff himself as something to be 
                                                 
20 Foxe 1563, p. 1250-1. 
21 Foxe 1563, p. 688. 
22 ibid. 
23 Dover Wilson, The Fortunes of Falstaff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), p. 27 
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 eaten.24  He is of course the “roasted Manningtree ox” (1 Henry IV, 2.4.360), a “whoreson little 
tidy Bartholomew boar-pig” (2 Henry IV, 2.4.224-5), “chops” (1 Henry IV, 1.2.131, 2 Henry IV, 
2.4.211), “sweet beef” (1 Henry IV, 3.3.176), and the catalogue could continue in this manner at 
great length.  The trope of Falstaff as cooked flesh is of course related to recurring language in 
which he is figured as rendered fat, or burning in the form of a candle.  His horse stolen, Hal 
observes, 
Falstaff sweats to death, 
And lards the lean earth as he walks along: 
Were 't not for laughing, I should pity him. (Henry IV, 2.2) 
 
There is a disturbing conjunction in these instances between the dramatis persona of Falstaff and 
the Oldcastle of Protestant hagiography, only partially mitigated by the translation of Oldcastle’s 
heretic’s pyre into a feast-day cooking-fire.  The thirsty soil that drank the blood of the national 
martyrs that were her children has become a lean earth basted by the tallow of the fat knight.  In 
this register, Falstaff is a feast in which all may partake, eating or being eaten as the case may be.  
In his treatment of the grotesquely exaggerated feasting surrounding the travail of Gargamelle in 
Rabelais’ Pantagruel, Mikhail Bakhtin makes the apposite comment, 
The limits between animal flesh and the consuming human flesh are dimmed, very nearly 
erased.  The bodies are interwoven and begin to be fused in one grotesque image of a 
devoured and devouring world.25 
 
Associated with the flesh of Christ in the host as understood from the perspective of reformists 
who rejected the Real Presence, Falstaff’s body is the site of a perverse and uninhibited 
communion.  In the flesh, he is a sort of anti-Eucharist. 
                                                 
24 “When. . .Shakespeare promises the audience. . .to continue with the story, with Sir John in it, ‘if you be not too 
much cloyed with fat meat”, the phrase sums up the prevailing image, constant in reference though every varying in 
form, which the physical characteristics of Falstaff presented to his mind’s eye.  Changes in London, and even more, 
changes in the language, have obliterated all this for the modern reader. . .” ibid. 
25 Bakhtin, p. 221. 
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  One of the most difficult references for those who would read him as a fairly transparent 
representation of English Protestantism, either in the register of parody or in a manner 
comfortable to a Protestant self-conception, occurs in the question Poins asks of Falstaff’s page: 
“And how doth the martlemas your master?” (2 Henry IV 2.2.78-9).  Yet another allusion to 
Falstaff as flesh to be consumed in a sort of communal rite, here he is figured as Martlemas or 
Feast of St. Martin, which was observed beginning on the eleventh of November, coinciding 
with the large-scale slaughter of food animals for want of winter fodder.  Françios Laroque has 
written, “Martinmas beef symbolized days of feasting in the popular English imagination, in the 
same way that pork products did for the villagers of mainland Europe.”26 The patron of the feast, 
St. Martin of Tours, enjoys strange affinities with certain representations of Oldcastle and 
emphatically with Falstaff.  A soldier and the son of a Roman military officer, Martin was a 
patron saint of soldiers, as well as an interesting list of others: innkeepers, vintners, the growers 
of grape vines, drunkards, beggars, and shoemakers.  In folk tradition, Martin was associated 
with charity and hospitality, as well as being a carnivalesque figure.  In one anecdote, Martin 
transforms the devil into a donkey and rides him to Rome, goading him on with the sign of the 
cross.27  The French song “Saint Martin boit du vin” details some of Martin’s carnivalesque 
high-jinks: 
Saint Martin drinks some wine, 
In the street of the Capuchins, 
He drank his dram, 
But didn’t pay, 
So, with a slap of the broom, 
They sent him on his way.28 
                                                 
26
 Françios  Laroque, Shakespeare’s Festive World: Elizabethan seasonal entertainment and the professional stage 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 144-5. 
27 Robert Chambers, The Book of Days, a miscellany of popular antiquities in connection with the calendar 
. . . (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1873), p. 568. 
28 This is my rather free translation of 
Saint Martin boit du vin 
Dans la rue des capucins. 
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The associations between Martinmas and inebriation are legion, from Nashe’s Pierce Penilesse, 
to Will Kempe’s Nine Daies Wonder, to Shakespeare.29  The Saint Martin who tore his cloak in 
half to share with a beggar and the one who enjoyed equal billing with the god Bacchus in the 
Hall of the Vintners’ Company in London30 were able to coexist in some fashion in traditional 
piety.  With the coming of Tudor Protestantism, the economies punctuated by feast days were 
drawn into question, associated by reformists like Foxe with a materialized and ultimately 
idolatrous emphasis on eating:  
In þe Synode [of 1413] amōg other weyghty matters & ponderous, was determined: þt the 
day of S. George, & also of S. Dūstane should be double feast, called Duplex festū in 
holy Kitchyng, in holy church I would say.”31  
  
The critique of Martlemas excess is picked up in the parade of the Seven Deadly Sins in 
Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, where Gluttony identifies “Sir Martin Martlemas-beefe” as one of his 
godfathers (2.1.160).  The association of Martinmas with the “belly gods” of the church of Rome 
appears in Barnabe Googe’s translation of The Popish Kingdome or reigne of Antichrist: “To 
belly cheare yet once againe doth Martin more encline, / Whom all the people worshippeth, with 
roasted Geese and wine. . .”32 Strangely, even in the polemic of his detractors, there is something 
appealing about St. Martin.  In a curious historical note, when the monastery of St Martin was 
                                                                                                                                                             
Il a bu la goutte. 
Il l’a pas payee 
On l’a mis à la porte 
Avec un coup d’balai. 
 
29 Martin W. Walsh, Medieval English ‘Martinmesse’: The Archaeology of a Forgotten Festival,” Folklore, vol. 111, 
no. 2 (October, 2000), p. 235.  This is an excellent general treatment of Martinmas, and makes the connection 
between Falstaff and Martlemas celebration, but does not develop this toward important issues of Falstaff’s 
characterization or relationship to Oldcastle. 
30 Chambers, p. 568. 
31 Foxe 1563, p. 663. 
32 Barnabe Googe, The Popish Kingdome or reigne of Antichrist (London: Chiswick Press, 1880), quoted in Walsh, 
p. 236. 
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 dissolved and its buildings destroyed in 1548 during the first wave of Edwardian reform, the 
west wing of the Church of St Martin Le Grand was re-consecrated as a huge tavern.33 
 The affinity of Martin for Falstaff and Oldcastle bridges the divide between the ascetic 
saint and the carnivalesque reveler.  Having been enrolled in the Roman military from the age of 
fifteen, the St. Martin of the traditional martyrology felt he could no longer serve as a soldier 
after his conversion to Christianity, and was imprisoned for cowardice.  Like Oldcastle, he 
occupied the apparently contradictory position of a career soldier who was an adherent to a faith 
that seemed to forbid the taking of life in war.  Complicating the effort to understand Lollard 
knights who were an active part of a military aristocracy, a Lollard position on military service is 
elucidated in the “Twelve Conclusions of the Lollards,” a document with which Oldcastle may 
have been associated:34 “manslaughter by battle or law of righteousness for temporal cause or 
spiritual with out special revelation is express contrary to the New Testament, which is a law of 
grace and full of mercy.”35  As we shall see, the problem of Falstaff and Oldcastle with regard to 
military conduct in the Shakespeare plays is even more complicated than can be discussed fully 
at this point.  It is important to note however that St. Martin, Falstaff and Oldcastle are epitomes 
of military service precisely because their relationships to their martial careers are transected by 
these seeming contradictions.36 
 As a figure circulating in Tudor culture, Oldcastle seems to have resonance with St. 
Martin as a figure of hospitality and in his capacity as the patron of innkeepers.  We find in the 
1604 play The Meeting of Gallants at an Ordinarie the following reference: 
                                                 
33 Walsh, p. 236. 
34 J. G. Waller, “The Lords of Cobham, Their Monuments, and the Church,” Archaeologia Cantiana 11 (1877), p. 
92, quoted in Scoufos, n. 327. 
35 H. S. Cronin, “The Twelve Conclusions of the Lollards,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 22, No. 86 (Apr., 
1907), pp. 292-304. 
36 It may further be noted however that the character whose name comes to replace that of “Sir John Oldcastle” in 1 
Henry IV, Shakespeare’s original “Sir John Falstaff,” is a coward who abandons Lord Talbot on a French battlefield 
in 1 Henry VI (3.2.104-9). 
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 Shuttlecock: Now Signiors how like you mine host?  Did I not tell you he was a madde 
round knave, and a merrie one too: and if you chaunce to talke of fatte Sir John Old-
Castle, he wil tell you, he was his great Grandfather, and not much unlike him in paunch, 
if you mark him well by all descriptions.37  
 
“Oldcastle’s” innkeeper grandson seems to weave together several of the threads of the Falstaff / 
St. Martin comparison, and while the Shakespeare’s Falstaff is not an innkeeper, he is the master 
of revels, the source of the carnival energy that emerges from the Boar’s Head. 
 
 
B. THIEVES AND THE RADICAL UTOPIA 
 
 
It might be that the history play as represented by Richard II or Henry IV, concerned as they are 
with law, legitimacy, insurrection, and civil war, might have something to say to us about our 
own political moment; Ernst Kantorowicz certainly thought so.  On the other hand, perhaps the 
concerns of these plays, properly understood, are so remote from our own historical place that 
they fail to resonate with our experience.  As we have seen, the theological concerns raised by 
Oldcastle’s dramatization do not lie somehow outside of the political.  Richard M. Eastman 
would place significant constraints on the scope of the political concerns the critic can bring to 
the plays.  “What could Henry IV tell us, much as we care to know, about participatory 
democracy or international law?  These concerns do not appear in Henry IV in any operative 
way.”38  This claim is counterpoised to a broad critical effort to understand the Henry plays as 
producing a narrative of the populist education of the Prince of Wales.  If Henry V becomes a 
man of his people, whence the people, and how are they represented? 
                                                 
37 Anonymous, The Meeting of Gallants at an Ordinarie (London: T. C. for Mathew Lawe, 1604), p. 16 in Scoufos, 
p. 37. 
38 Richard M. Eastman, “Political Values in Henry IV, Part One: Liberal Humanism,” College English, vol. 33, no. 8 
(May, 1972), p. 903. 
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  Falstaff himself is a particularly thorny problem when it comes to class origins or class 
analysis.  In the article “Falstaff and his Social Milieu,” the Marxist critic Paul N. Siegel 
describes Falstaff as a “degenerate descendent of the feudal gentry.”39  In doing so, Siegel places 
himself in a critical genealogy tracing back through the British Marxist T. A. Jackson, and 
possibly to Engels himself.40  For Jackson, Falstaff’s class origins are clear:  “Shakespeare, in 
depicting Falstaff and his crew, depicted from life, in vivid truth, the phenomena [sic] of 
decadence, the degeneration and decomposition of an absolute class. . .”41  Jackson’s  flat and 
reductive reading of the carnival elements of Falstaff’s scene should raise some doubt about his 
conclusions, particularly in his misunderstanding of the popular element of carnival.  The 
Russian critic M. Nechkina took a different view, this time claiming Marx as an authority: 
“Fasltaff for Marx was ‘personified capital’ of the epoch of the dawn of capitalism. . .the 
fragments of feudal ideas are merely the building blocks for his new, bourgeois morality.”42 
Though Jackson expressly rejected it,43 Nechkina’s reading is open to seeing Falstaff as a liminal 
character rather than a sort of over-determined send-up of the decrepitude of a class in eclipse. 
 Falstaff’s own account of his background is suggestive, but not definitive.  In an ironic 
observation to the Lord Chief Justice, he says, “I was born about three of the clock in the 
afternoon, with a white head and something a round belly” (2 Henry IV, 1.2.516).  Something 
more is revealed in the amicable resentment between Falstaff and Justice Shallow.  In his 
reminiscences about his youth about the Inns of Court, Shallow says, “Then was Jack Falstaff, 
now Sir John, a boy, and page to Thomas Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk” (2 Henry IV, 3.2.20-1).  It 
                                                 
39 Paul N. Siegel, “Falstaff and his Social Milieu,” Weapons of Criticism: Marxism in America and the Literary 
Tradition (Palo Alto: Ramparts, 1976), p. 164. 
40 ibid., p. 165. 
41 ibid. 
42 M. Nechkina, “Shakespeare in Karl Marx’s Capital,” International Literature, vol. 3 (March, 1935), pp. 75-81, in 
Hugh G. Grady, The Modernist Shakespeare: Critical Texts in a Material World (London: Oxford University Press, 
1994), p. 9-10. 
43 Grady, p. 10. 
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 would seem that Falstaff’s knighthood is not hereditary, but of recent coinage.  For his part, 
Falstaff describes Shallow as a “man made after supper of a cheese paring. . .and now is this 
Vice’s dagger become a squire, and talks as familiarly of John a’ Gaunt as if he had been sworn 
brother to him” (3.2.250-1, 258-60).  By Sir John’s own account, Falstaff and Shallow are both 
“made” men – and made recently—in the sense that, through distinct avenues, they have become 
“squire” on the one hand and “Sir John with all Europe” on the other.  In the John of Gaunt 
anecdote, Falstaff marks himself as a competitor in Shallow’s social climbing, with the status 
anxiety of a similarly rising man. 
 In the foundational article “Falstaff as a Parodist and Perhaps Holy Fool,” Roy 
Battenhouse puts forward an incisive reading of Falstaff as a religiously-informed commentator 
on the Lancastrian state.  Falstaff’s “vocation” in this reading is an elaboration on the role of 
“politic fool” and moral instructor to the prince, but “such a vocation runs the risk of banishment 
at the hands of princes whose morals are those of worldly self-advantage and political 
expediency.”44  Here, Battenhouse plays upon the religious etymology of “vocation” (from the 
latin vocationem or “calling”) in Falstaff’s comment, “’tis no sin for a man to labor in his 
vocation” (Henry IV, 1.2.81-2)   Fair enough, and indeed the secular use of the term “vocation” 
was an innovation of the Tudor historical moment.45  The observation by Hal that prompts 
Falstaff’s defense certainly tends to place this reply in a religious register, albeit an ironic one: “I 
see a good amendment of life in thee – from praying to purse taking” (1.2.79-80). 
 In point of fact, “vocation” is a rare word in Shakespeare, used only twice outside of this 
conversation between Hal and Falstaff, and always in a similar religious-political valence.  In 
                                                 
44 Roy Battenhouse, “Falstaff as a Parodist and Perhaps Holy Fool,” PMLA vol. 90, no. 1 (January, 1975), p. 32. 
45 OED. 
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 The Second Part of Henry VI, we find this exchange between Bevis and John Holland, two 
followers in Jack Cade’s peasant rebellion: 
Bevis: Nay more, the King’s council are no good workmen. 
 
Holland: True; and yet it is said, labor in thy vocation; 
which is as much to say as, let the magistrates be  
laboring men; and therefore should we be magistrates (4.2.15-8) 
 
Holland’s understanding of the old saw is made to appear wonderfully incoherent: he employs 
“vocation” as a rationale for humble men like himself to rise beyond their places and their 
competence.  This “calling” has the specific force of supplanting the law of the realm with a 
grotesque reflection, unlettered and anti-intellectual: the rebels kill a poor clerk for being able to 
sign his own name (4.2.85-110).  Falstaff too imagines a new world in which “old father Antic 
the law” is suspended in favor of some new order (Henry IV, 1.2.47), imagines, like Holland, 
that he will serve as a judge (1.2.50). 
 The Jack Cade rising in Shakespeare is the site of an anachronistic telescoping of separate 
events.  Cade instructs his followers, “Now go some and pull down the Savoy; others to the Inns 
of Court; down with them all” (2 Henry VI, 4.7.1-2).  Shakespeare is not unique among his 
contemporaries in conflating the Cade rising with the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt. In the 1593 Survey 
of the Pretended Holy Discipline Archbishop of Canterbury Richard Bancroft explores the 
connection between radical religious dissent and political revolution.  He claims to find in a 
radical Protestant tract an acknowledgement of a position elucidated by Hooker in the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity: that the rule of the feudal aristocracy had its beginning in the acclamation 
of the people, a popular endorsement that social radicals of the underclass have forgotten: 
They [the ancestors of the current nobility] revenged and delivered the oppressed people 
out of the hands of their governors who abused their authority and wickedly, cruelly, and 
tyrannously ruled over them, the people of a grateful and thankful mind gave them that 
estimation and honor.  We live in a world, you know, that cryeth out: the first institution. 
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 . . .The words be good if they be well applied.  But something was amiss in the priest’s 
application of his text, being such a like saying amongst a multitude of rebels, viz: When 
Adam digged and Eve span, who was then the gentleman.46  
 
Brents Stirling has noted Bancroft’s curious gloss on this passage.  Opposite the text of the rebel 
priest’s sermon is the note, “John Wall, or Ball in the time of Jack Cade’s rebellion, in Rich. 2 
days.”47 Stirling thus situates Shakespeare’s conflation of Cade’s rebellion and the 1381 rising in 
a more general identification of the two events in late-sixteenth-century English culture. For 
Bancroft, Lancastrian era popular radicalism was of a piece with the leveling tendencies of 
Anabaptists like John of Leyden, as well as the similar covert goals attributed to radical 
dissenters in England.48  Bancroft was not inclined to throw Wyclif into the mix, but the cultural 
contest over his influence upon the 1381 rising and the radical aspirations of the commons in 
general was sufficiently well known that Thomas James felt compelled to defend him against the 
charge of Christian communism in his 1608 Apologie for John Wicliffe.49  The stage 
representation of a disciple of Wyclif’s, Falstaff’s use of “vocation” points toward religiously-
inspired social upheaval, the suspension of law, and communism.50  The son of a plasterer who 
defends his humble station by observing “Adam was a gardener” (2 Henry VI, 4.2.134), Jack 
Cade declares, “henceforward all things shall be in common” (2 Henry VI,  4.7.18-9).  Each in a 
distinct way, in voicing their ambition to supplant the place of the judges and magistrates of the 
realm, Cade’s follower John Holland and the Prince’s companion John Falstaff dramatize Tudor 
                                                 
46 Richard Bancroft, A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline (London, 1593), pp. 8-9, quoted in Brents Stirling, 
The Populace in Shakespeare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 135. 
47Bancroft, p. 135. 
48 ibid., pp 97-121. 
49 Stirling, p. 141. 
50 The remaining instance of the use of “vocation” in Shakespeare is on the part of Joan de la Pucelle, who uses the 
term in the context of God’s calling her from her humble station in life to “free my country from calamity” by taking 
up the sword against the English (Henry VI, 1.2).  Note that all three characters are opponents of the Lancastrian 
regime from the lowest social stratum. 
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 Protestant anxieties about the radical content of Protestantism commonly projected on 
contemporary movements like Anabaptism: 
The Anabaptists say that in Christ’s and in the Apostle’s time there was no Christian 
magistrate. . .and what does this differ from the assertion. . .[that] the Church of God was 
perfect in all her regiment before there was any Christian prince?51   
 
For a Tudor apologist like John Bridges, the calling that summons the unwashed out of their 
places threatens every aspect of the edifice of Christian government.  On opposite sides of this 
representational conflict, the law is seen as either the guarantor of social stability or a particular 
goad with which the commons are kept down. 
This having been said, Eastman’s claims about Shakespeare’s liberal legacy are 
interesting even if they have proved untenable: 
To the argument that Shakespeare could not foresee rebellion in its modern, apocalyptic 
dimension, the humanist must assent.  Probably no Elizabethan could take seriously the 
radical dream that men might found a counter-world-order with a new humanity and a 
new legitimacy.”52  
 
That this is not the case, that Shakespeare has depicted in the bleakest palette a threat from 
socially-leveling influences both near at hand and socially remote, is perhaps not as useful here 
as the question of “taking seriously” such things.  In their stark reality, the revolutionary 
tendencies of Cade or Ball appear in Shakespeare as loathsome, but modulated into the comic 
register, they can be accommodated, put in their place, even if the comic moment is a brittle and 
anxious one; perhaps especially so. 
 The projection upon Falstaff of “Anabaptist” or other revolutionary reformist positions, 
often presented from the perspective their detractors, complicates the approach to Falstaff as a 
                                                 
51 John Bridges, A Defence of the Government Established in the Church of Englande for Ecclesiasticall Matters 
(London, 1587), p. 134, quoted in Stirling, p. 108. 
52 Eastman, p. 907. 
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 “holy fool” suggested by Battenhouse.53  His analysis seems to suggest that, if we read closely 
enough through a Christian hermeneutic, we find that the play endorses the moral critique of the 
house of Lancaster by Falstaff.  There is justice to this position, but it runs aground at the 
conjunction of Cade, Oldcastle, and Falstaff.  If we look at the way in which Oldcastle’s 
potentially radical-reformist positions are translated into the comic register, we see how this 
complicates the privileging of Falstaff’s religious-political intervention as suggested by 
Battenhouse. 
 We return to Falstaff’s disclaimer, “’Tis no sin for a man to labor at his vocation.”  In his 
first scene, Falstaff acknowledges that his calling is as a thief and taker of purses.  In the person 
of Falstaff, theft is elevated to an aesthetic undertaking of the first rank.  He imagines a new 
order in which this labor is given its fitting place: 
Marry, then, sweet wag, when thou art king, let us not that are the squires of the night’s 
body be called thieves of the day’s beauty.  Let us be Diana’s54 foresters, gentlemen of 
the shade, minions of the moon; and let men say we be men of good government, being 
governed, as the sea is, by our noble and chaste mistress the moon, under whose 
countenance we steal. (1.2.19-24) 
 
The theft to which an aestheticized moral sanction attaches under Henry IV – “thieves of the 
day’s beauty” – will become something else under his son, or so Falstaff imagines.  There is an 
interesting play upon “countenance” in this passage.  In effect, Falstaff first asks the Prince of 
Wales to countenance theft in his future reign.  By the end of his speech, that countenance has 
been transferred from Hal (who consistently associates himself with the Lancastrian solar 
                                                 
53 Indeed, this is one of the key distinctions between this work and Janet Marie Spencer’s  similar work, The Politics 
of Mixed Genre Drama: The Comic Treatment of Punishment Spectacles in Shakespeare.  While this work discovers 
in Falstaff a strong and consistent identification with the most politically unsettling articulations of reform, Spencer 
discovers in Shakespeare a sort of liberal mediator between religious positions: “By representing both images of 
Oldcastle as a Lollard martyr and heretical traitor only to reject them, the Falstaff scenes undermine the 
polemicization of piety by both Protestants and Catholics, depoliticizing. . .the rhetoric of martyrdom” p. 146. 
54 Among the great number of references that tie Falstaff to the Mass, it should be noted that Foxe attributes to 
Tyndale an association between the idolatry of the Sacrament of the Altar and the worship of the “idol” Diana by the 
inhabitants of Ephesus.  Foxe, 1563, 519. 
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 metaphor) to the moon.  Falstaff’s “men of good government” will not be governed at all, or at 
least not by a king.  Characteristically, Hal draws this back to a normative position: governed 
like the tides by the moon, Falstaff’s utopian thieves will rise, “now in as low an ebb as the foot 
of the ladder and by and by in as high a flow as the ridge of the gallows” (1.2.29-31).  That 
contemporary Englishmen understood a radically-egalitarian referent to Falstaff’s musings upon 
a thieves’ Land of Cockaigne is borne out in the polemic of Samuel Rowlands.  In his Martin 
Mark-all, Beadle of Bridewell, a chorus of rogues makes this defense of their manner of living:   
If there be any in our vocation or calling that live disorderly and out of compass, what 
trade can you name that do not do the like.  If we sometimes lay with our neighbors’ 
wives, is it not usual elsewhere?  (Nay herein by your favor, we do best point out that the 
Family of Love, who do not stick but have all things in common).55 
 
Not only does Rowlands place “all notorious rogues and vagabonds”56 in a genealogy with Jack 
Cade himself, or associate theft and wantonness with the utopian communism and radical 
Protestantism of the Family of Love, he does all this with what appears to be a paraphrase of 
Falstaff’s language in Act 3 of Henry IV: “now I live out of all order, out of all reasonable 
compass” (3.3.14-5).  Once again, through his conjunction with Oldcastle in his ambivalence as 
Protestant saint or Lancastrian traitor, Falstaff finds himself in the proximity of that other 
Shakespearean rebel, Jack Cade.   
The question of the relationship between rebellions of the commons and disruptions of 
property illuminates Shakespeare’s dramatization of Cade.  Critics have noted that the depiction 
of the Jack Cade of 2 Henry VI as crude and illiterate runs counter to the chronicle accounts that 
                                                 
55 Samuel Rowlands, Martin Mark-all, Beadle of Bridewell, His Defence and Answere to the Belman of London 
(London, 1610), sig. B2r, quoted in Stirling, p. 131.  While Stirling remarks cogently upon the similarity between 
Shakespeare and Rowlands in their treatment of scenes of popular uprising, I have found no instance in which he 
makes the connection to Falstaff and Oldcastle. 
56 Strirling, p. 131. 
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 were his likely sources. 57 While in no wise endorsing his rebellion, Holinshed records that Cade 
was  “sober in talk and wise in reasoning”58, and possessed of “right pregnant wit.”59 In treating 
of the death of Cade at the hands of the Kentish gentleman Alexander Iden (or “Eden”), the play 
takes pains to portray the rebel in the least flattering light.  As Lucille King has noted, 
Shakespeare appears to have used Hall’s disparaging account of Cade’s death rather than that 
found in Holinshed.60  In Holinshed, Eden confronts Cade deliberately, with the intention of 
killing him and collecting a reward.  In 2 Henry VI, Cade sneaks into Iden’s garden, driven by 
hunger and the collapse of his revolutionary aspirations: 
. . .now am I so hungry that, if I might have a lease of my life for a thousand years, I 
could stay no longer.  Wherefore, on a brick wall I have climb’d into this garden, to see if 
I can eat grass, or pick a sallet another while. . .(4.10.4-8) 
 
Stephen Greenblatt has pointed out the way in which ideas of property pervade this scene.  As 
the bucolic knight Iden enters, expostulating on the joys of a country life, Cade says, “Here’s the 
lord of the soil come to seize me for a stray, for entering his fee-simple without leave” (4.10.24-
5).  The fault is placed unambiguously on Cade’s side as Iden is confronted by a violent 
trespasser threatening him ill.  The clearly-wronged knight asks, 
. . .why then should I betray thee? 
Is’t not enough to break into my garden 
And like a thief to come to rob my grounds, 
Climbing my walls in spite of me the owner, 
But wilt thou brave me with these saucy terms? (4.10.32-6) 
 
Not knowing that he confronts the notorious leader of the rebel host, Iden is forced to kill Cade.  
As Greenblatt has observed, this is configured not as the putting down of the rebel commons, but 
                                                 
57 See, for instance, Stirling, pp. 23-3, Lucille King, “The Use of Hall’s Chronicles in the Folio and Quarto Texts of 
Henry VI,” Philological Quarterly 13 (October, 1934), pp. 321-332. 
58 Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland (London, 1808), vol. III, p. 220, quoted in Stirling, p. 24. 
59 ibid., p. 224, Stirling p. 24. 
60 King, p. 325. 
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 as the defense of property against theft, specifically “enclosed private property”61 vested in the 
person of a virtuous country knight: “Iden perceives Cade not as a social rebel but as a 
belligerent thief who has tried to steal a salad; theirs is a contest not between an aristocrat and a 
churl but between a well-fed owner of property and a ‘poor famished man.’”62  
This plays out in the religious dimensions that we have examined.  In a refiguring of the 
radical appropriation of Genesis in the familiar “When Adam delved and Eve  
span. . .,” Jack Cade, the heir of Adam, steals into the Garden of Iden to discover that relations of 
property have been inscribed even there.  Of course it is Cade who brings to this idyllic space 
both violence against the peaceful esquire of Kent and, of course, theft.  Revolution is continuous 
with theft, and both of these things with perversions of belief.  In a comic register, but always 
threatening to expand outwards, Falstaff is cousin to Jack Cade, and each of them resonant with 
the dangers of radical Protestantism as a threat to church, king, property, and the entire moral 
order.  In this regard, Hal’s quip about Falstaff’s progression “from praying to purse taking” may 
be causal; Falstaff’s dubious religiosity has led to his criminality. 
 The putative dangers of radical Protestantism were the site of a significant textual 
production, in England and on the continent.  One chronicle account concerning the Anabaptists 
driven out of Constance in 1527 commented upon their moral extremity: “Some hold that all 
Christians should have all things in common, including women; some say that nothing is sinful 
for them, neither whoring, gambling, warfare, homicide, nor anything else, for they are dead to 
the flesh.”63  Falstaff’s social milieu can be understood as a comic realization of this stilted 
                                                 
61 Stephen Greenblatt, “Murdering Peasants: Status, Genre, and the Representation of Rebellion,” Representations, 
no. 1 (Feb., 1983), p. 24. 
62 ibid., p. 25. 
63 Quellen zur Geschichte der Täufer, 4: Baden und Pfalz (Gütersloh, 1951), p. 452, lines 15-17, in Bob Scribner, 
“Practical Utopias: Pre-Modern Communism and the Reformation,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
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 understanding of the social vision of the most radical elements in Protestantism, where “goods in 
common” has become theft, the plural marriage of which John of Leyden was accused has 
become whoremongering, and so on.  In fact, as  a professed thief, Falstaff apprehends himself in 
the very categories in which social power as constituted within the play would understand him.  
This is an area where Battenhouse’s account of Falstaff’s anti-Lancastrian critique must be 
amended.  Falstaff’s representations, emerging from the social mélange of thieves, rebels and 
Anabaptists, are so situated that it is doubly hard for them to make a moral claim on us.  Even the 
language with which he speaks of himself is, in a sense, the language of the enemy.  This is not 
to say that he is incapable of acute indictments of the world in which he finds himself, in part 
because certain “intestine shocks” in that world have placed all of law, property and legitimacy 
in question. 
 
 
C. THE BOAR’S HEAD 
 
 
The tavern in which Sir John Falstaff holds court is a liminal space, an island of comedy amidst 
the serious business of history and national myth.  More important, it is a place that stands 
somehow aloof of history: the site of a particular sort of anachronism.  In the 15th-century 
dramatic world of Henry IV, the inn is a superposition of Lancastrian and Elizabethan elements.  
As the meeting place of the future Henry V and a fictionalized John Oldcastle, the tavern is 
insulated to some extent from the very history of which they are a part.  This having been said, 
that history intrudes itself into this space in the form of discordant reminders. In these 
metadramatic intrusions of events from national myth, the Henry plays keep always before us the 
172  
 prospect that some historical events will impose themselves on the dramatic scene.  When 
Falstaff says, “I’ll be a traitor then, when thou art king” (1.2.133), it is the specter of popular 
rebellion that is raised, of the St. Giles’ Fields rising superimposed upon the militancy of the 
commons both in this moment and in times remote.  In the same manner, when Hal tells Falstaff, 
“thou shalt have the hanging of the thieves, and so become a rare hangman” (1.2.51-2), it 
suggests the younger Henry’s agency in the execution of the historical Oldcastle.  Nowhere is the 
play’s strange relationship with history more patently exhibited than in its taunting evocations of 
events that remain outside of its own narrative.  When we consider the production and 
dissemination of historical discourses that claim either Henry V or Oldcastle or both as the 
templates for our subjectivities as loyal Tudor Protestants, what may be most interesting is our 
unwillingness to consider what might have happened at the conjunction of these two figures.  
Indeed, what instance could better illuminate Slavoj Žižek’s claim, in relation to Althusser’s 
category of “interpellation,” that “identification with community is ultimately always based upon 
some shared guilt or, more precisely, upon the fetishistic disavowal of this guilt”?64  The 
dramatic engagement of these two figures threatens to cause a fracture or, more proprly, to reveal 
the fracture that is already present in such a subjectivity.  Žižek’s reading of Hans Christian 
Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes” is relevant to this argument: just as everyone knows, 
and explicitly denies, that the emperor is naked, everyone knows that Henry V burned Oldcastle, 
just as everyone knows that Oldcastle was a traitor.  To bring these things to explicit 
consciousness is to challenge the ideological underpinning of our existence.  Of course, the 
drama never stages that particular betrayal, but only approaches this point, destabilizing the 
subjectivity of the audience toward the promise of some further reconfiguration. 
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  The highway robbery at Gad’s Hill is the defining comic action of the tavern scenes of 
Henry IV, particularly important in developing the relationship between Falstaff and the Prince 
of Wales.  In the conception of the robbery, it is of dramatic import that neither Hal nor Falstaff 
is its original author.  Ned Poins suggests the occasion and the place, where “there are pilgrims 
going to Canterbury with rich offerings and traders riding to London with fat purses” (1.2.96-7), 
an exploit in contempt of both property and piety.  Falstaff threatens, “Hear ye, Yedward, if I 
tarry at home and go not, I’ll hang you for going” (1.2.102-3).  When Hal expresses his own 
reluctance, he picks up on Falstaff’s language, “Well, come what will, I’ll tarry at home” 
(1.2.112).  The Prince is distanced from responsibility for the most culpable aspect of the deed, 
and his involvement is translated into that area of moral quandary, “cozening the devil.” He and 
Poins rob the thieves less for profit than for the comic theater anticipated by Poins, the 
“incomprehensible lies” Falstaff will be compelled to produce. 
 The initial robbery is played out in a set of grotesque inversions: the disguised Falstaff 
describes his victims as “fat chuffs” and “bacons,” his compatriots and himself as “us youth” 
(2.272, 73, 69).  As Paul N. Siegel has observed, the scene hangs upon certain class concerns: the 
travelers are franklins, commercial farmers profiting from the displacement or feudal agricultural 
labor.65  If Falstaff himself can be described as a sort of social parasite, the franklins are 
“caterpillars” of another sort; if his denouncement of them plays upon a comic irony, it is one 
that cuts both ways.  The class instability inherent in his characterization puts Falstaff at once 
above and below the franklins in the social order.66  His resentment of the new money of the 
franklins is consistent with his general disdain for the current “costermonger’s times” of the 
emerging money economy, vented on another occasion at Puritan city tradesman: 
                                                 
65 Siegel, p. 170. 
66 Understanding Falstaff as a hereditary gentleman, Siegel sees Falstaff’s comments to the travelers as “associating 
himself with Bohemian youth against the fat, comfortable bourgeois” (p. 171). 
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 The whoreson smoothy-pates do now wear nothing but high shoes and bunches of keys at 
their girdles, and if a man is through with them in honest taking up, then they must stand 
upon security. (2 Henry IV, 1.2.28-31)67 
 
A late-feudal figure, Falstaff is adrift in the world of debit and credit, but a place has been 
provided for him, as debtor and thief.  Thief he is without a doubt, but he understands himself as 
functioning in a world of thefts large and small. 
 That the second Lancastrian cycle contains a sustained commentary on theft at all levels 
has been commented upon by Harold Goddard, who observes, “we see that from the moment 
when Henry Bolingbroke usurped a throne, stealing has been a main theme of the tetralogy.”68  
This work has been expanded upon by Robert Hapgood, who has mapped the language of theft 
throughout the second Henriad.  While theft informs many aspects of the play, including the 
king’s relationship with the Percies, who helped him take the throne of Richard II, a crucial 
observation of Hapgood’s is that Hal’s implication in the Gad’s Hill robbery is analogous to his 
moral entanglement in his father’s usurpation: in both cases, he is potentially the beneficiary of a 
theft committed by another.69  In the instance of the Gad’s hill robbery, this is one of any number 
of ways in which Falstaff is constructed as a comment on Hal’s father.  The parallel between the 
robbery at Gad’s Hill and the theft of crown and realm by Henry IV functions as a sort of 
defamiliarization whereby the authority of the Lancastrian state as arbiter of the moral world is 
drawn into question. 
 The comic dispute over the events that follow the initial robbery of the travelers is in a 
sense a struggle over dramatic priority in the tavern world of the play.  The comic irony in play is 
that Poins, who has scripted these events from the first suggestion, has already determined 
Falstaff’s part: 
                                                 
67 An interesting comment, coming from a character described as a “stage Puritan.” 
68 Harold Clarke Goddard, The Meaning of Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 211. 
69 Robert Hapgood, “Falstaff’s Vocation,” Shakespeare Quarterly vol. 16, no. 1 (Winter, 1965), p. 96 
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 The virtue of this jest will be the incomprehensible lies that this same fat rogue will tell 
us when we meet at supper – how thirty at least he fought with, what wards, what blows, 
what extremities he endured; and in the reproof of this lives the jest. (1.2.141-4) 
 
Critically, our understanding of this scene hangs upon the question of what sort of  dramatic 
interiority can be ascribed to Falstaff.  Poins’ framing of the action in advance makes it 
preposterous in the extreme that the audience identify with Falstaff; we are situated in the 
perspective of the Prince and Poins in their privileged knowledge.  The questions raised by 
Falstaff’s response are twofold: is his performance simply a desperate attempt to recover his 
vanity, or is there an element of self-conscious comic play?  Further, is the comic-rhetorical 
victory of the prince as much a forgone conclusion in the tavern as was his martial victory on 
Gad’s Hill, or can Falstaff contrive some sort of rhetorical escape?  Without a doubt vanity – 
perhaps even the capital-v Vanity of the morality play – is at stake in this scene, as some critics 
have suggested.70  In the unremittingly male gender economy of the tavern scenes, it must be 
said, the sort of abject stripping of Falstaff’s pretensions at which Hal and Poins aim might be a 
violence that the drama cannot support.  The audience is spared this at the very moment that it 
seems inevitable, when the prince reveals that he and Poins robbed Falstaff and his companions. 
 The solution Falstaff contrives is of course a wonderful improvisation: 
Why, hear you, my masters, was it for me to kill the heir apparent?  Should I turn upon 
the true prince?  Why, thou knowest I am as valiant as Hercules, but beware instinct.  The 
lion will not touch the true prince. (2.4.213-6) 
 
Picking up on the discourses of legitimacy mobilized around the Lancastrians’ contested claim to 
the throne, Falstaff manages to couple his own martial prowess to Hal’s claim to be the divinely-
                                                 
70 See, for instance, Eben Bass, “Falstaff and the Succession,” College English, vol. 24, no. 7 (April, 1963), pp. 502-
6.  Bass argues that Vanity in the form represented in Skelton’s Magnificence is the signal moral failing in the 
second Lancastrian cycle, being a component of the fall of Richard II, as well as personified in Falstaff, who must in 
turn be rejected by the prince. 
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 ordained successor, sanctioned by the very state of nature.71  This represents an interesting 
escalation on Falstaff’s part when we consider its refutation.  Falstaff’s repeated claim, “Thou art 
essentially made without seeming so” (2.4.394), has the same force: he gives lip service to Hal as 
a prince “instinct,” even if his current entertainments and habitués tend to obscure that fact.  This 
is drawn into an ironic register by the fact that we know Falstaff to have acted the coward in 
some fashion.72  In a comic dispute that could only take place in a play that dramatized the 
dubious credibility of Lancastrian pretensions, Falstaff is threatening Hal with the suggestion 
that he understands the manner in which the prince’s “natural” majesty may be every bit as 
performed as Falstaff’s courage73– an insight that almost seems privy to Hal’s soliloquizing on 
his future “reformation.”  It is no surprise that the “play extempore” that follows should raise the 
same sort of questions. 
 Assuming the role of Henry IV in the play within act 2, scene 4, Falstaff even more 
aligns himself with Hal’s father.  As James Winney has argued,  the props Falstaff uses in his 
travesty of Henry are a pointed satire on Bolingbroke’s illegitimacy.74 The prince comments, 
“Thy state is taken for a joint stool, thy golden scepter for a leaden dagger, and thy precious rich 
crown for a pitiful bald crown” (2.4.303-4).  Battenhouse would read this as an instance of the 
prince’s “damnable iteration”: his inclination to repeat and re-contextualize the statements of 
others.  If Falstaff is “enacting a figure of Henry’s makeshift royalty” with these work-worn 
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 stage properties, Hal makes a point of rejecting the implied comment.75  Falstaff’s euphuistic 
depiction of the elder Henry is not only a critique of the Lancastrian moment on several levels, 
but an example of his command of a variety of rhetorical modes, seasoned always by his 
perverse self-reference.  These tendencies are particularly evident in the mock-king’s reflections 
on his wayward heir: 
That thou art my son I have partly thy mother’s word, partly my own opinion, but chiefly 
a villainous trick of thine eye and a foolish hanging of thy nether lip that doth warrant 
me.  If then thou be son to me, here lies the point: why, being son to me, art thou so 
pointed at? (2.4.321-5) 
 
Falstaff astutely notes the king’s concern with the manner in which appearances impinge on the 
performance of majesty.  This is tied to a seeming non sequitur: the bawdy play on Hal’s 
paternity.  In fact, this is a fugue on a theme we have already heard the king sound in the first act, 
when he wished he could imagine that Harry Percy were his son.  The reference to “thy mother” 
is important here, for in the imagined world of the play Hal has no mother to speak of except in a 
small number of comic references—no mother but the figure of England evoked in the play’s 
first lines.  The legitimacy at stake here is not that implicated in the question of whether Hal is a 
bastard, but once again that of whether he is by grace and (problematically) by birthright to be 
king, the proper child of England.  Falstaff translates that sacramentalized political question into 
his own social world with an ironic self-reference that travesties these grave matters of state. 
 Falstaff’s impersonation of the king, properly understood, is a send-up of the self-
understanding of Henry IV.  In his bombastic speech, Henry (like the Falstaff who plays him) 
seems to reveal himself unknowingly.  Of Hal’s associates, the mock-king says, 
There is a thing, Harry, which thou hast often heard of, and it is known by many in our 
land by the name of pitch.  This pitch, as ancient writers do report, doth defile; so doth 
the company thou keepest (2.4.327-30) 
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 With his citation of “ancient writers,’ the king seems to be ignorant of the biblical provenance to 
this reference to pitch.  Battenhouse refers us to its source in Ecclesiasticus, where he discovers 
that the scripture is concerned not with the evils of vulgar company but with the dangers that 
inhere in the friendship of the proud: 
1. He that toucheth pitch shall be defiled with it: and he that is familiar with the proude 
shall be like unto him. 
2.  The riche dealeth unrighteously, and threateneth with all: but the poore being 
oppressed must intreat: if the riche have done wrong, he must yet be intreated: but if the 
poore have done it. He shal straight way be threatned. . . . 
13. He is unmerciful & kepeth not promises: he will not spare to do thee hurt, and put 
thee in prison.76 
 
Battenhouse reveals incisively that, all unknowing, the play-king’s criticism redounds upon 
himself.  The force of the “ancient writers’” warning goes not to the squalid company that Hal 
keeps at the Boar’s Head, but is a critique of the real Henry, a powerful man who ill requites his 
benefactors.77  Where Battenhouse could go further would be to carry this commentary to the 
general rhetoric of thievery in the play, of which he demonstrates an awareness at other 
moments.78  In this scriptural passage, justice seems to follow, not the law, but wealth.  In class 
terms, Ecclesiasticus is suggesting that normative moral values are determined by social relations 
of power. 
 If the strength of Battenhouse is in unfolding some of the elegance of Falstaff’s criticism 
of Lancaster, his weakness is in understanding how Falstaff’s religious-political commentary is 
situated within the play.  Morally, we are not perfectly free to accept Faltaff’s critique because of 
its source, the compromised ethos of “plump Jack.”  Falstaff himself seems to undermine his 
own moral authority, even when he acts as his own advocate. Defending “Falstaff, that old 
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 white-bearded Satan” (2.4.368-9) while taking the role of the prince before his father, Falstaff 
makes the tautological and finally neutral claim that “to say I know more harm in him than in 
myself were to say more than I know”  (2.4.372-3).  His apologium seems to stumble into 
unintended self-indictment when he says, “That he is old, the more the pity, his white hairs do 
witness it; but that he is, saving your reverence, a whoremaster, that I utterly deny” (2.4.373-5).  
Has Falstaff all unknowing blundered by denying a charge that has not been raised against him, 
or is this a deliberate comic undermining of himself?  The difficulty in answering this question 
points to the problem of claims about Falstaff’s subjectivity, his moral-self knowledge. 
Falstaff’s view of himself is not in some imagined place outside of ideological 
construction.  With his notion of Falstaff as a sort of moral measure, Battenhouse locates Falstaff 
with regard to religious commentary in a position similar to where Hugh Grady would place him 
with regard to the critique of state power.  Grady has described Falstaff as “an experiment in a 
kind of imagined autonomous, autotelic subjectivity”79 who “seems to embody a constant 
resistance to interpellation.”80  That he is a figure of a sort of resistance notwithstanding, in 
crucial ways, Falstaff has been interpellated into dominant ideological modes;  Indeed, the call of 
“Stop, thief!” would doubtless set him quaking in his boots.  In identifying himself in the roles in 
which radical reform has been constructed, as thief or “whoremaster,” Falstaff’s representations 
emerge from a place already de-legitimized, even in his own eyes.  It is from this compromised, 
hybrid subjectivity that his critique emerges, not from without the ideology of  Lancastrian 
England, but from the fractures within. 
As Falstaff operates within Lancastrian ideology, so is he cultivated within Lancastrian 
power.  That he is a client of the prince is clear; he depends upon Hal’s purse-strings to the point 
                                                 
79 Hugh Grady, “Falstaff: Subjectivity Between the Carnival and the Aesthetic,” The Modern Language Review, vol. 
96, no. 3 (July, 2001), p. 610. 
80 ibid., p. 612. 
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 that “were it not here apparent that thou art heir apparent” (1.2.24-5), Falstaff’s creditors could 
not be kept at bay.  The extent to which Falstaff is under the aegis of the prince is developed in 
act 2, scene 4, when the Sheriff and his watch arrive at the tavern immediately after the Gad’s 
Hill robbery.  Greeted by the prince, the Sheriff says, “First, pardon me, my lord.  A Hue and cry 
/ Hath followed certain men unto this house” (2.4.405-6).  In one of those moments revealing a 
precise legal understanding, the Sheriff’s statement is a claim of legal authority.  “Hue and cry” 
is a term of art, denoting the immediacy of accusation when a crime has been committed.  The 
Sheriff is asserting the legal principle that sets aside the necessity of a search warrant when 
“exigent circumstances” require immediate action, known in common-law as the “hot pursuit” 
exception.  That the prince understands this is clear from his response: 
The man, I do assure you, is not here, 
For I, myself, at this time have employed him. 
And, Sheriff, I will engage my word to thee 
That I will, by tomorrow dinnertime, 
Send him to answer thee, or any man, 
For anything he shall be charged withal; 
And so let me entreat you leave this house. (2.4.410-16) 
 
In the little commonwealth that is the tavern, the law confronts its limit and retreats.  In matters 
both commercial and legal, Falstaff functions under the prince’s license.  The prince seems to 
claim the authority of Agamben’s “sovereign exception,” of action outside the law, and in fact he 
succeeds. 
 As a preserve created by the prince’s exercise of sovereign privilege, the inn is the site of 
anachronism and the point of intersection of different modes of time.  Falstaff enters the play the 
query, “Now, Hal, what time of day is it, lad?” (1.2.1).  This provokes from Hal an extended 
comment on the utility of time to such a one as Sir John: 
What a devil hast thou to do with the time of day?  Unless hours were cups of sack, and 
minutes capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials the signs of leaping houses, 
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 and the blessed sun himself a fair hot wench in flame-colored taffeta, I see no reason why 
thou shoudst be so superfluous to demand the time of day. (1.2.2-9) 
 
There is an ongoing banter about time among the flyting company in the tavern.  That there is a 
Puritan inflection to this sort of rhetoric may be a fair claim, and the effort to attach this 
observation to a reductive understanding of Falstaff’s / Oldcastle’s religiosity has led at least one 
critic to attribute these lines of Hal’s to Sir John.81  This much is sure; Falstaff’s soul is 
implicated in his relationship to time.  Hal’s quip on Falstaff’s precarious balance between two 
modes of damnation in act 1, scene 2, is a reference to the proverb “He must rise betimes that 
will cozen the devil”82  Moral action, for Falstaff, seems always to be problematized to 
extinction before it can take place;  salvation seems to have caught him napping before his first 
scene has even begun.  The prince is capable of a profoundly different relationship with time, 
“redeeming time” through patient anticipation and strategic action.  This redemption is 
imbricated in a general language of repentance and reformation that pervades the play cycle.  
“I’ll repent, and suddenly, while I am in some liking” Falstaff says (3.3.3-4), an opportunist even 
with regard to his soul. 
 Hal, of course, is “killing time,”83 cooling his heels while he waits for his moment, and 
possibly the death of his natural father.  In this way, he associates himself with Falstaff’s holiday 
moment.  After the Gad’s Hill robbery, the prince makes the strong claim, “I am now of all 
humors that have showed themselves humors since the old days of Goodman Adam to the pupil 
age of this present twelve o’clock at midnight” (2.4.78-80).  The Prince of Wales is never more 
resonant with the sort of carnival time in which Falstaff exists than at this moment, when he 
                                                 
81 “. . . He [Falstaff] pays mock tribute to the Puritan virtue of earnest hard work.  Likewise his comments on time 
(I.ii.1-12) may very well be a take-off on Puritan views of the proper use of time.” Eben Bass, “Falstaff and the 
Succession,” College English, vol. 24, no. 7 (April, 1963), p. 505. 
82 Morris Palmer Tilley, A Dictionary of the Proverbs in England in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1950). 
83 I borrow this characterization from Laroque, “Shakespeare’s Battle of Carnival and Lent,” p. 84. 
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 appears to have replaced Falstaff as the master of revels.  This is signaled by Hal’s question, 
“What’s o’clock, Francis?” – an echo of Falstaff’s first dramatic line, the suggestion that these 
revels occur in some tangential relationship to pragmatic time; it is of course midnight, an hour 
dramatically associated with Falstaff.  Not only is all of time compressed into one evening, but 
the prince refers to “Goodman Adam” as if he was a farmer of his acquaintance.  Falstaff, like 
the plebian participants in the Cade rebellion, has a special relationship with Adam: “Thou 
knowest in the state of innocency Adam fell; and what should poor Jack Falstaff do in the days 
of villainy?”  (3.3.130-1).  Laroque and others have claimed, fairly enough, that Hal is a “Lenten 
body”84 as he is limned by Falstaff’s images of the prince as an “eel,” a “bull’s pizzle,” or a 
“stockfish,” but he claims for himself the highest place in the commonwealth of the tavern.  Of 
his successes as a man of his people, Hal observes to Poins, “I have sounded the very bass string 
of humility.  Sirrah, I am sworn brother to a leash of drawers; and can call them all by their 
Christian names, as Tom, Dick, and Francis” (2.4.5-7).  Ironically excluding “Harry” from this 
list, the prince keeps rhetorically aloof of his new brothers, and those who wish to find in Hal the 
seeds of a liberal sensibility need to look elsewhere. 
 The contest between Hal and Falstaff is, on one level, a struggle for the hearts and minds 
of the people, and Francis is their exemplar in this dramatic world.  For Francis, there will never 
be enough time, as is demonstrated by his perpetual chorus of “Anon, sir.”  Time and labor are 
united in Francis, who we learn has five years to serve on his indenture.  When the prince taunts 
the drawer with the possibility of breaking his contract, he employs the familiar language theft: 
“Wilt thou rob this leather-jerkin, crystal-button, not-pated, agate ring, puke-stocking, caddis-
garter, smooth tongue, Spanish-pouch –” (2.4.58), that is to say, his master.  As a “revolted 
                                                 
84 For Spencer, Hal is a figure of “Lenten denial” who “cannot reject Falstaff until his own identity and authority 
have been securely validated” (p. 173). 
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 apprentice” in the idiom of the times, Francis would be stealing himself.  Taking place in the 
moments after the robbing of the carriers, Hal draws Francis into the questions of theft and 
intrinsic worth that have been so significant a concern of the play.  In the prince’s conceit, 
Francis is value, commodity, money.  In this sense, he is one of the distorted reflections of the 
prince, who is figured repeatedly as a coin, a “royal,” a lean young man who does what is 
expected of him, or does not.  This is why Hal, while cultivating Francis on one level, takes such 
pains to distinguish himself from the drawer: “His industry is upstairs and downstairs, his 
eloquence the parcel of a reckoning” (2.4.84-5).  Preoccupied as he is with work and the toting-
up of bills, Francis seems to be linked explicitly in the prince’s mind to his rival Harry Percy, 
and on another level to the monetarist notion of royalty he has got second-hand from his father.  
Francis, for his own part, seems well disposed toward the prince, to whom he has given a 
penny’s worth of sugar, meant to represent a certain generosity on the part of the impoverished 
laborer.  As the prince reports, Francis and his fellow drawers 
. . .take it already upon their salvation that, though I be but Prince of Wales, yet I am the 
king of courtesy, and tell me flatly that I am no proud Jack like Falstaff, but a Corinthian, 
a lad of mettle, a good boy. . .” (2.4.7-10) 
 
If the tavern is one site of Hal’s populist education,85 his ironizing of his relationship with that 
people is a product of smug aristocratic superiority.  The drawers’ denouncement of Falstaff as a 
“proud Jack” is a moment of populist victory for Hal.  In the persons of Francis and his laboring 
cohort, the vox populi is almost mute, limited to parrot-like exclamations and, crucially, the 
endorsement of the heir apparent. 
                                                 
85 “Hal retains important, politically valuable, qualities he has learned in association with fat Jack, especially how to 
project a democratic image that will ‘allow him to command all the good lads at Eastcheap’”  William B. Stone, 
“Literature and Class Ideology: Henry IV, part one,” College English, vol. 33, no. 8 (May, 1972), p. 893. 
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  Francis offers neither the troublesome hybridity of class nor the destabilizing political 
perspective realized in Falstaff.  In spite of the fact that he is mocked by Hal and Poins, the play 
seems to insist that there is something pure about Francis.  He is the labor upon which the festive 
world of the inn is supported, and it is real labor.  Falstaff often uses the word “labor,” inevitably 
associating it with theft or cozenage.  “O, I do not like that paying back,” he says of Hal 
returning the proceeds of the Gad’s Hill robbery, “’tis a double labor” (3.3.142).  Falstaff is not 
even a pure sinner, as his occasional dalliance with repentance suggests (no more is he invested 
in the Calvinist or Wycliffite doctrine of election).  His ironic public representations of his moral 
rectitude –“there is virtue in that Falstaff” (2.4.340-1)—are the corollary of his candor about his 
actions in soliloquy – “I have misused the king’s press damnably” (4.2.9-10).  Tellingly, only in 
the most Calvinist register could we consider Falstaff damned.  The Martin Luther who made the 
carnivalesque proposal to give the devil “a fart for a staff” reports of an interview with that 
august personage, 
When I awoke last night, the Devil came and wanted to debate with me; he rebuked and 
reproached me, arguing that I was a sinner. To this I replied: Tell me something new, 
Devil! I already know that perfectly well; I have committed many a solid and real sin. 
Indeed there must be good honest sins – not  fabricated and invented ones – for  God to 
forgive for His beloved Son’s sake. . .86 
 
Falstaff shares more with Luther than their common, sinful humanity or their carnivalesque 
habitus.  In the person of Falstaff, sin is blatant and material.  The prince says of Falstaff, “These 
lies are like their father that begets them; gross as a mountain, open, palpable” (2.4.183-4).  For 
all of his rhetorical sophistication, Falstaff is a strangely innocent sort of sinner, with none of the 
tactical sophistication of a Richard III or, in the comic mode, a Don John.  The role of the 
deliberate and sophisticated internal dramatist is reserved, in these plays, for the Prince of Wales. 
                                                 
86 Quoted in Heiko A. Oberman, Luther: Man Between God and the Devil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989), p. 77. 
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  In contemplating a personal reformation, Falstaff is constructed in some relationship to 
Hal, who says in his well-known soliloquy,  
I know you all, and will a while uphold 
The unyoked humor of your idleness. 
Yet herein will I imitate the sun, 
Who doth permit the base contagious clouds 
To smother up his beauty from the world, 
That when he please again to be himself, 
Being wanted he may be more wondered at 
By breaking through the foul and ugly mists 
Of vapors that did seem to strangle him. (1.3.148-56) 
 
However much some critics would like to warn us away from readings that find in Hal a sort of 
Lancastrian manipulator, his aside is meant to separate him from the popular world of the tavern 
in a manner that is revealing.  In a sense, Falstaff is continuous with his retinue, he generates (in 
a bourgeois-realist sense, he cultivates) the grotesque quality of Bardolph, or of his diminutive 
page in 2 Henry IV, who appears to be at once a child and an adult.  When Hal reflects on his 
future reformation, he asserts a Vetruvian separation between himself and the denizens of the 
Boar’s Head.  Not simply a metadramatic intrusion demonstrating Hal’s special relationship with 
providence, it is his ability to contain, to contextualize the carnival moment in another perception 
of time that is the performance of his own completeness.87  As Joan Rees has observed, 
Falstaff’s repeated flirtations with repentance can only tend to destabilize our perception
eminently Lancastrian management of his own moral-political narrative.
 of Hal’s 
sts: 
                                                
88  The strange quality 
of Hal’s essential majesty is that it requires such careful stage management.  What marks Hal 
with the grace of the future king is a set of contra
If all the year were playing holidays, 
 
87 See, for instance, Harold E. Toliver, “Falstaff, the Prince, and the History Play,” Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 16, 
no. 1 (Winter, 1965), p. 68: “The prince’s control over impulses of the minute comes primarily through his capacity 
to see history as a continuous succession of events linking present to past and future.” 
88 Joan Rees, “Falstaff, St. Paul, and the Hangman,” The Review of English Studies, New Series, vol. 38, no. 149 
(February 1987), p. 15. 
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 To sport would be as tedious as to work; 
But when they seldom come, they wished for come, 
And nothing pleaseth but rare accidents. (1.3.157-60) 
 
By figuring himself as a holiday, Hal understands himself in contrast to the perpetual, excessive 
feast symbolically associated with Falstaff and his carnivalesque time. 
 The drama has put forth a number of competing bodies to claim the place of England’s 
legitimate child, with Harry Percy and the Prince of Wales at the forefront.  Falstaff’s 
relationship to this birth appears to be something in the nature of an alternative parent, the 
parallel to Hal’s father or perhaps his mother, recalling Falstaff’s exclamation “my womb, my 
womb” (2 Henry IV, 4.3).  In either case, Falstaff is figured not as a rival claimant, but as an 
alternative England, whether as the travesty of Henry IV, as the counterpart of the English soil, 
or as a carnivalesque version of communion.  In a manner that cannot but reflect on Hal, Falstaff 
can make no claim to essential qualities that is not undermined by the drama.  “Never call a true 
piece of gold a counterfeit.  Thou art essentially made without seeming so” he enjoins the prince 
(2.4.393-4).  That the prince is “royal,” a good coin, is drawn into question by the drama; that 
Falstaff is “true” seems out of the question.  The drawer Francis appears to be such a good coin, 
a laboring son of England who endorses the heir apparent, and yet occupies the unstable place of 
the potentially revolted apprentice, the urban counterpart of the sort of rebellion figured in the 
followers of Jack Cade.  It remains for the next chapter to explore what will occur when the 
drama emerges from the already-tainted primordial innocence of the tavern. 
 What was humankind in the innocence before the Fall?  Like the Alexander Iden episode 
in 2 Henry VI, the Elizabethan “Homily Against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion” is a 
counter-discourse to the revolutionary slogans of the risen commons,  attempting to legitimize 
contemporary relations of power by inscribing them on the Garden of Eden: 
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 So here appeareth the originalle kingdome of GOD ouer Angels and man, and vniversally 
ouer all things, and of man ouer earthly creatures which GOD had made subiect vnto 
him, and with all the felicity and blessed state, which Angels, man, and all creatures had 
remained in, had they continued in due obedience vnto GOD their king. . . .Thus doe you 
see, that neither heauen nor paradise could suffer any rebellion in them, neither be any 
places for rebels to remaine in.  Thus became rebellion, as you see, both the first and the 
greatest, and the very foot of all other sinnes, and the first and principall cause, both of all 
worldly and bodily miseries, sorrowes, diseases. . .the very cause of death and damnation 
eternall also.89  
 
In the Tudor answer to John Ball’s “When Adam delved and Eve span,” social hierarchy had 
been set in place by the creator, and its circumvention was the beginning of sin.  In this homily, 
the Church of England argues that the Bible, properly understood, insists on social relations of 
power (already contested in the contemporary world).  And yet the homily warns that “religioun 
now of late beginneth to bee a colour of rebellion” (II.21.4-966-7).  Evidently the scriptures are 
vulnerable to dissident readings, generating rude shocks in the edifice of state. Tudor 
Protestantism was threatened by “Catholic” popular resistance in forms like that of the 
Pilgrimage of Grace from one side and the potential of the more horrifying Anabaptist 
antinomianism on the other.  The seemingly magnanimous (if brief) repeal of the heresy statute 
De haeretico comburendo under Edward VI did not extend to Anabaptists.90 
 The possibility that a radical religious consciousness was neither foreign nor novel, that it 
had an English pedigree as legitimate as that of the established church or more so, is the anxiety 
that the homily suggests even as it would deny it.  The dramatization of Oldcastle in Falstaff is a 
comic exploration of that anxiety, an attack on a historicism that sees in the Lollard martyr its 
own reflection.  While a parodist of a legion of discourses, Falstaff as dramatis persona 
functions through a particular mode of alienation, refusing to be recognized as what he ought to 
                                                 
89 “The Homily Against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion,” from Short-Title Catalogue 13675. Renaissance 
Electronic Texts 1.2. © 1994, 1997 Ian Lancashire (ed.) University of Toronto, 
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/utel/ret/homilies/bk2hom21.html, II.21.1.21-26, 55-61. 
90 William Haller, The Elect Nation: The Meaning and Relevance of Foxe’s Book of Martyrs (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1963), p. 43. 
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 be.  This is what displaces him from being a parody in himself: successful parody requires just 
the sort of recognition, of stability within the role that is travestied, that Falstaff repeatedly 
denies us.  What is “made strange” in this dramatic project is the nature of the primordial 
religion.  When the prince, in 2 Henry IV, asks Falstaff’s page about his master’s current 
companions, he describes them as “Ephesians, my lord, of the old church” (2 Henry IV, 2.2.142).  
The steward Harpoole of The First Part of Sir John Oldcastle is a character strongly identified 
with his own master, the eponymous Oldcastle, and in acts such as his assault on the process-
server sent to give his master a summons from the “Romish” archbishop, he is the repository of 
the anger of persecuted reform.  He describes himself in some familiar language: 
I am neither heretic nor Puritan, but of the old church.  I’ll swear, drink ale, kiss a wench, 
go to mass, eat fish all Lent, and fast Fridays with cakes and wine, fruit and spicery, 
shrive me of my old sins afore Easter, and begin new afore Whitsuntide.  (1 Sir John 
Oldcastle,  13.129-33) 
 
This speech is the most ambiguous confession of belief in a play redolent of Protestant 
orthodoxy, and this is what is appealing about Harpoole.  Falstaff’s page, perhaps ironically, 
associates his master’s circle with members of the primitive church of St. Paul’s time, while Hal 
takes him to mean the “pagan[s]” given to sin who are criticized in Ephesians, chapter 5.91  
Harpoole’s gloss on this exchange associates the “old church” with the unblemished English 
church of the “beleaguered isle,” as distinct from both precisians and heretics.  If Falstaff’s 
company represents in some manner the same sort of  English past, seen from the perspective of 
the Prince of Wales, the adherents of the “old church” are no longer recognizably Christians. 
 The radically egalitarian political claims of the genealogy of which Falstaff is the comic 
representative are so situated in the drama that they no longer appear to be political, but have 
been displaced into a moral register where they can only be found wanting, but is there some 
                                                 
91 Rees, p. 22.  Curiously, this is one of the texts in which Tyndale interpolated a reference to idolatrous “images.” 
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 residue?  Do Falstaff’s revels make some political claim on us?   The intuitive answer is that they 
cannot, that the loyal labor represented by the drawer Francis is so valorized even in our own 
experience that it represents the fundamental sacrifice that guarantees the most basic conception 
of the social world.  Both the political right and left tend to revere labor to the extent that its 
alternative can only be named in terms already undermined: laziness, sloth, malingering.  Falstaff 
and his  company are defined both by their distance from productive labor and their pursuit of 
the basest, most carnal forms of pleasure.  In fact, John Bailey’s claim about the relationship 
between Hal and Falstaff’s crew has some justice on its side  : 
The truth is that from first to last he [Hal] is not only a prince among adventurers but a 
man among animals.  Of these animals one has one human gift, that of speech, to a 
degree which has never been surpassed.92 
 
The life that Falstaff is called to represent has been stripped of its political claims, and yet a 
residue remains that has a relationship to the “animal,” just as Falstaff straddles the divide 
between the animal and the human.  In the work of Giorgio Agamben, a distinction is developed 
between bios, the human as the subject of the modern state and Foulcauldian “biopower,” and 
zoē, the excess of human experience not reduced to that subjection, with its linguistic root in the 
zōon or animal.  He relates this to Walter Benjamin’s category of the “bare life”: 
Both Benjamin and Schmidtt. . .point to life (“bare life” in Benjamin and, in Schmidtt, 
the “real life” that “breaks the crust of a mechanism rigidified through repetition”) as the 
element that, in the exception, finds itself in the most intimate relation with 
93sovereignty.   
Zoē in Agamben’s work seems to have a dual quality of both life stripped of the juridical 
trappings that adhere to bios and life as it unfolds itself in the “beautiful day”—a simple and 
seemingly pre-political life: 
                                                
 
 
92 John Bailey, Shakespeare (New York: Longmans, 1929),  p. 132,  in Dover Wilson, p. 38. 
93 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 
p. 67. 
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 Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something 
that is included solely through an exclusion.  How is it possible to “politicize” the 
“natural sweetness” of zoē?  And first of all, does zoē really need to be politicized, or is 
politics already contained in zoē as its most precious center?94 
 
In the affinity between carnival and zoē , many of the qualities of Oldcastle’s characterization in 
Falstaff are interrogated by Agamben’s question.  At the crux is the problem of whether the 
politics that produces the representation of the fat knight can be extracted from the reified 
categories in which he must be apprehended.  The politicization of the zoē has been attempted, 
but with dubious success.  Paul Lafargue’s call for a “Right to be Lazy” ends with this 
invocation: 
If, uprooting from its heart the vice which dominates it and degrades its nature, the 
working class were to arise in its terrible strength, not to demand the Rights of Man, 
which are but the rights of capitalist exploitation, not to demand the Right to Work which 
is but the right to misery, but to forge a brazen law forbidding any man to work more that 
three hours a day, the earth, the old earth, trembling with joy would feel a new universe 
leaping within her.  But how should we ask a proletariat corrupted by capitalist ethics, to 
take a manly resolution. . .?95 
 
From either side of the historical ascendancy of capital, Falstaff and Lafargue call for a seeming 
destruction of the moral world from its foundation, offering in its place a strange birth.  The 
invocation of such a new world seems to demand that we speak in a language constituted by the 
enemy, if indeed we are permitted to speak at all. 
                                                 
94 ibid., p. 11. 
95 Paul Lafargue, The Right to be Lazy (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1989), p. 68. 
191  
  
 
 
 
VI.“BANISH PLUMP JACK”: THE RESSURECTION AND DEATH 
OF SIR JOHN FALSTAFF 
 
 
 
Wherefore he saith, Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall 
give thee light. 
See then that ye walk circumspectly, not as fools, but as wise, 
Redeeming the time, because the days are evil. 
    --Ephesians 5:14-16, The King James Version 
 
 
 
A. CONSTITUTING POWER 
 
 
Shakespeare’s second Lancastrian cycle explores a world in which the ultimate springs of all 
value have been drawn into question by a fundamental sin, the usurpation of the crown by Henry 
Bolingbroke.  Like the medieval “realist” world that John Wyclif wished to recover, this 
dramatic world has been tainted by nominalism, by the possibility that language and other forms 
of signification have been radically sundered from the world and from history. The possibility of 
moral action is significantly problematized in such a world, as dramatis personae act on the basis 
of unreliable information, of “rumor, painted with tongues,” toward selfish ends dressed in the 
best of rhetoric.  The problem of “redeeming time” is very much the problem of “cozening the 
devil,” the effort to build value on these undermined foundations.  The problem of royal 
authority in this dramatic world explores the distinction between “constituting power” and 
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 “sovereign power” discussed by Antonio Negri and others.  For Negri, sovereign power, 
potentially including its juridical and legislative functions, cannot enact itself ex nihilo: 
The truth of constituting power is not the one that can (in any way whatsoever) be 
attributed to the concept of sovereignty.  This is not the truth of constituting power not 
only because constituting power is not (as is obvious) an emanation of constituted power, 
but also because constituting power is not the institution of constituted power: it is the act 
of choice, the punctual determination that opens a horizon, the radical enacting of 
something that didn’t exist before and whose conditions of existence stipulate that the 
creative act cannot lose its characteristics in creating.1 
 
In taking the crown in contempt of right descent, Henry IV lays claim to a power that he does not 
have, a power that may not even inhere in the crown that he is claiming.  The question of 
Henry’s legitimacy poses a vital problem, for the crisis of constitutive authority cannot be simply 
undone,2 for instance, by shuffling Edmund Mortimer onto the throne.   
 Henry’s admonishment to the Prince of Wales cannot be read simply as a lesson in the 
Lancastrian performance of kingly majesty, but reveals the tensions that the king must negotiate.  
Henry’s cultivation of himself is developed in contrast to Richard, “The skipping king,” (3.2.60), 
extending his displacement of Richard as rightful king backward into his predecessor’s  reign: 
By being seldom seen, I could not stir 
But like a comet I was wondered at, 
The men would tell their children, “This is he!” 
Others would say, “Where, which is Bolingbroke?” 
And then I stole all courtesy from heaven, 
And dressed myself in such humility 
That I did pluck allegiance from men’s hearts, 
Loud shouts and salutations from their mouths, 
Even in the presence of the crowned King. 
Thus did I keep my person fresh and new, 
My presence, like a robe pontifical, 
Ne’er seen but wondered at; and so my state, 
Seldom but sumptuous, showed like a feast 
                                                 
1 Antonio Negri, Il potere constituente: Saggio sulle alternative del moderno (Milan: SugarCo, 1992), p 31, quoted 
in Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
p. 43. 
2 The adept critic Sigurd Burkhardt sees the problem raised by Henry’s usurpation as “irreversible,” Shakespearean 
Meanings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 164. 
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 And won by rareness such solemnity. (3.2.46-59). 
 
The king picks up on the holiday trope already employed by the prince in contrasting himself to 
Falstaff; whatever comment is being made on Henry, Hal is implicated in it to some extent.  As 
Sigurd Burckhardt has observed, the copious religious language employed by Henry and his sons 
is always secularized, assimilated to their state.3  Like the play-king portrayed by Falstaff, Henry 
has a tendency to reveal himself even in his most narcissistic reflections.  He imagines that, even 
before his accession, his manner was “a robe pontifical,” surely a loaded phrase in Tudor-
Protestant England.  As vicar of Christ, the Pope is a middle case, his authority having been 
constituted by the original contract with God as represented in the papal keys.  Of course, in a 
manner particularly relevant to English Protestantism, the Pope claimed both a sovereign and a 
constitutive authority, the right to excommunicate and even depose secular monarchs.  In the 
eyes of Protestants of many stripes, both of these claims were false: the Pope was “Bishop of 
Rome” only, and arrogated to himself these singular powers.  Though illegitimate from their 
perspective, the Pope seemed to claim a pure authority, self-authorizing (if we reject the 
supposed contract with God through Peter) and by that nature suspect.   In sundering the English 
church from Rome, Tudor monarchs could not avoid being implicated in the same sort of double-
bind.  Henry remarks that he “stole all courtesy from heaven,” a critical instance of the language 
of theft in Henry IV.4  Henry seems to betray that there is something questionable about his self-
authorized sovereignty, but attempts to dispel this anxiety in the retrospective judgment that he 
bore the marks of the true monarch even before Richard was forced to step down. 
 That Henry couches the distinction between himself and Richard in terms of performance 
is undeniable, and demonstrates his disdain for Richard’s brand of populism, the king who 
                                                 
3 ibid, p. 154. 
4 Robert Hapgood, “Falstaff’s Vocation,” Shakespeare Quarterly vol. 16, no. 1 (Winter, 1965), p. 95. 
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 “Grew a companion to the common streets,” and “Enfoeffed himself to popularity”5 (3.2.68-9).  
His situation compared to that of Richard, the prince promises, “I shall hereafter, my thrice-
gracious lord, / Be more myself” (3.2.92-3).  Stephen Greenblatt has commented on this 
exchange, 
“To be oneself” here means to perform one’s part in the scheme of power rather than to 
manifest one’s natural disposition, or what we would normally designate as the very core 
of the self.  Indeed, it is by no means clear that such a thing exists in the play except as a 
theatrical fiction. . .6 
 
As appealing as this claim might be to our critical inclinations as students of the linguistic turn, 
Greenblatt has the tendency to make the very real fact of theatricality as political praxis all-
encompassing, the spring of all value.  Opposed to this broad understanding of power is the way 
in which “To be myself” in the context of the play has been manifestly connected to the prince’s 
promise shortly thereafter to “be bold to tell you that I am your son” (3.2.134), and is a claim 
situated within the play’s conflux of sacramental language and the metaphorical displacement of 
royal legitimacy onto legitimacy of parentage – Falstaff is right again.7  The prince does not 
understand being himself as an instance of a society-wide performance of social roles, but as 
potentially the revelation of an innate nature complete with the stigmata of “a garment all of 
blood” and a “bloody mask” (3.2.135-6), signifiers of his unique position.  Ideological this 
certainly is, but even though we cannot know whether the Lancastrian regime bears the chrism of 
God’s election, both king and prince are invested in the notion that it exists as the final 
endorsement of their authority.  The legitimacy of Henry is both bolstered and undermined by 
                                                 
5 This is often taken to mean that Richard cultivated a popular endorsement for his rule that was later transferred to 
Bolingbroke, and this is a fair reading, but it has another valence: that Richard “enfoeffed” or created new baronies 
for his cronies, a practice for which he was criticized by Bolingbroke, and one that stands in contrast to the more 
centralized monarchy of his Lancastrian successors. 
6 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 46. 
7 It is important to remember that this is a metaphorical relationship; as we shall see, the drama works to de-
emphasize the notion that the crown belongs to Hal by unalloyed lineal descent. 
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 the performance that has become inseparable from it, by the Protagorean notion that the rhetor 
can better perform the discourses of a profession than its own practitioners. 
Both Richard II and Henry IV are implicated in the notion that contemporary political 
power is somehow beholden to the people, to fickle “opinion,” each attributing certain populist 
strategies to his opponent.  Richard describes how he and his cronies  
Observed [Henry’s] courtship to the common people; 
How he did seem to dive into their hearts 
With humble and familiar courtesy, 
What reverence he did throw away on slaves, 
Wooing poor craftsmen with the craft of smiles 
And patient underbearing of his fortune, . . . 
. . . Off goes his bonnet to an oyster-wench; 
A brace of draymen bid God speed him well 
And had the tribute of his supple knee, 
With ‘Thanks, my countrymen, my loving friends’; 
As were our England in reversion his, 
And he our subjects' next degree in hope. (Richard II, 4.1. ) 
 
In describing one another, each projects upon his rival a cultivation of the commons that he is 
inclined to deny in himself.  Henry’s description notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine the 
dramatic Richard II conceding that some aspect of his legitimacy is contingent on the support of 
the commons – it may well be that his political collapse is due in part to his inability to imagine 
this.  Projected by Richard on the person of Bolingbroke, populism has the quality of  
“reverence. . . [thrown] away on slaves,” a distasteful mixing of the dignity that inheres in God’s 
vicar and the abjection of the unwashed masses, with something of the same quality of lèse 
majesté that Henry attributes to the Prince of Wales when he accuses him of “vile participation” 
(Henry IV 3.2.87).  The inflection of the categories such as “participation” and “community” is 
so negative in these passages that, in the words of Graham Holderness, “It is ironical to reflect 
how these very words have become the common currency of political language in democratic 
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 societies.”8  In the ideology of Lancastrian rule, the will of the people is a sort of necessary evil, 
whose pathological manifestations range from disruptions of social position to open revolt. 
 
 
B. “A CONFUSION OF KNAVES AND FOOLS” 
 
The explosion of the insulated time associated with Falstaff and the tavern and the historical time 
to which it is opposed takes place in the context of war.  Bakhtin has identified war as “for a long 
time the central and almost sole theme of historical narrative,” a concern “fundamentally 
historical” and opposed to “private life” with which it seeks an accommodation without success.9  
War is the confrontation of “brittle life” with forces that rend and destroy it.  War is a 
fundamental function of the state; the calling of parliaments, signifying limited monarchy and 
representative government to moderns like ourselves, was often done to secure funding for war.  
Richard II alienated the nation in part by the depths to which he would stoop to fund his martial 
projects.  It can be fairly claimed that the Peasants’ Uprising itself was caused by John of 
Gaunt’s taxing of the commons to bankroll his military campaign on the Iberian peninsula. The 
historical Oldcastle, a Lancastrian client, was defined by war, serving at Shrewsbury, 
suppressing regional political ambitions in the Welsh hinterlands, and serving in the Burgundian 
conflict in support of the Prince of Wales against the political designs of his father, Henry IV.  
Of course, Oldcastle is defined by his presence or absence at the “Lollard” uprising at St. Giles’ 
Fields. 
                                                 
8 Graham Holderness, Shakespeare Recycled: The Making of Historical Drama (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1992), p. 100. 
9 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 217. 
197  
  Whatever else he may be, Falstaff is a soldier, though he may not endorse our favored 
notions of what a soldier should be.  This has led critics like James Black to identify Falstaff as a 
“counterfeit soldier,” opposed to the heroic ideal realized in the Price of Wales.10  The notion of 
the feigned soldier as a source of social instability has a distinctly Elizabethan resonance.  In 
Maitland’s History and Survey of London, we find it reported that social disruptions in the form 
of various “assemblies and routs” are caused by a familiar list of  unsavory types, including 
malcontents “colouring their wandering by the name of soldiers returning from the wars.”11 This 
“feigned soldier” is a construction of an ideology that refused to admit of the social displacement 
of those, like Ralph in Dekker’s Shoemaker’s Holiday, who returned from the wars not ennobled 
but maimed, impoverished, and cast socially adrift.  John W. Draper has recognized the manner 
in which Sir John is an anachronistically Elizabethan military officer, operating in an historically 
transitional economy: 
Army life was on a very low plane, partly because the organization and method of 
recruiting were changing from the feudal to the modern professionalized system, and 
partly because Renaissance society, without the organized capital of modern 
industrialism, could hardly finance this new system that necessity imposed.12 
 
War is the locus of new modes of exchange, and opportunities for those of a pragmatic bent.  
When news of revolt reaches the inn, Falstaff declares, “You may buy land now as cheap as 
stinking mackerel” (2.4.286-7), though it is definitive of Falstaff that he is never understood to 
own land.  Hal, for his part, observes, “we shall buy maidenheads as they buy hobnails, by the 
hundreds” (2.4.289-90).  There are wartime economies, and both Hal and Falstaff are poised to 
                                                 
10 “In accusing Feeble of cowardice. . .[Falstaff] himself speaks as a counterfeit, in this case a counterfeit soldier.” 
James Black, “Counterfeits of Soldiership in Henry IV,” Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 
372-382. 
11 Maitland, History and Survey of London (London, 1756), p. 278, in Frederick Tupper, Jr., “The Shakespearean 
Mob,”  PMLA, vol. 27, no. 4 (1912), p. 491. 
12 John W. Draper, “Sir John Falstaff,” The Review of English Studies, vol. 8, no. 32 (October, 1932), p. 416 
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 exploit them.  The prince anticipates a personal contest with his image, Harry Percy, who Hal 
claims 
. . .is but my factor. . . 
To engross up glorious deeds on my behalf; 
and I will call him to so strict account, 
That he shall render every glory up, 
Yea, even the slightest worship of his time, 
Or I will tear the reckoning from his heart. (3.2.147-52) 
 
In a characteristically Lancastrian manner, Hal understands chivalric endeavor in economic 
terms, only one instance of the way in which Bolingbroke and his sons articulate an 
understanding of the marketplace and a “new, mercantile world of exchange.”13  Falstaff’s 
initiative is monetary less in metaphor than in fact, and reveals the sort of debased 
professionalism that nevertheless marks him as an experienced officer: 
I have misused the king’s press damnably. . . .  I pressed me none but such toasts-and-
butter, with hearts in their bellies no bigger than pins’ heads, and they have bought out 
their services; and now my whole charge consists of ancients, corporals, lieutenants, 
gentlemen of companies – slaves as ragged as Lazarus in the painted cloth. . . (4.3.10, 16-
20). 
 
Confounding the chivalric claims that inform the preparation for the conflict at Shrewsbury, 
Falstaff unflinchingly reveals the methods by which officers were able to exploit their position, 
including padding the muster-rolls, skimping on clothes and equipment, and drawing “dead pay” 
for soldiers killed in action.14  Without doubt, Falstaff’s “command of foot” carries with it 
certain class connotations.  “Chivalry,” by its nature, is cavalry service, the literally elevated 
plane of aristocratic warfare on horseback.  It is as if two battles take place at Shrewsbury: one 
decided more or less by single combat between aristocrats, and another in which infantry are 
                                                 
13 Sandra K. Fischer, “’He Means to Pay’: Value and Metaphor in the Lancastrian Tetralogy,” Shakespeare 
Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer, 1989), p. 152.  Robert Ornstein has also explored the commodification of 
chivalric honor in the play in his A Kingdom for a Stage: The Achievement of Shakespeare’s History Plays 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), particularly pp. 144-9. 
14 Draper, p. 418-9. 
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 decimated by artillery.  Falstaff’s admonition to Westmorland “Tut, tut, good enough to toss; 
food for powder, food for powder” (4.2.49) is endorsed by subsequent events, and what is 
interesting is that Westmorland concedes the point (4.2.51).  If Falstaff is the voice of a cold-
blooded pragmatism, it is one upon which the entire military project depends, and he is not only 
the voice of experience.  In Falstaff, old Westmorland encounters the future of English warfare. 
 The exemplar of the soldier, the most representative example of any category, is not 
necessarily that which is most effectively idealized or assimilated to ideology.  This is 
particularly true in the Christian register.  Paul is an exemplary Christian because he was Saul, 
the persecutor of Christians.  St. Martin of Tours was a patron of soldiers because his military 
record was tainted with the accusation of cowardice.  Transparency is not the logic of religious 
representation; the Christian is she who can see the truth behind the appearance – this is a logic 
endorsed in different ways by both iconophile and iconoclast.  The image of St. Martin of Tours 
as a soldier cutting his cloak in half to share with a beggar is his traditional icon, and is still 
reproduced on Catholic “holy cards.”  The story of St. Martin’s cloak requires that we see the 
episode as the witnesses to the events themselves could not: 
. . .at a certain period, when he had nothing except his arms and his simple military dress, 
in the middle of winter. . . he happened to meet at the gate of the city of Amiens a poor 
man destitute of clothing. He was entreating those that passed by to have compassion 
upon him, but all passed the wretched man without notice, when Martin, that man full of 
God, recognized that a being to whom others showed no pity, was, in that respect, left to 
him. Yet, what should he do? He had nothing except the cloak in which he was clad. . . 
.Taking, therefore, his sword with which he was girt, he divided his cloak into two equal 
parts, and gave one part to the poor man, while he again clothed himself with the 
remainder. Upon this, some of the by-standers laughed, because he was now an unsightly 
object, and stood out as but partly dressed.15 
 
                                                 
15 Sulpitius Severus, “On the Life of St. Martin,” A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the 
Christian Church, Second Series, Volume 11, http://www.users.csbsju.edu/~eknuth/npnf2-11/sulpitiu/lifeofst.html#4 
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 In a dream that night, Martin sees Christ dressed in his torn cloak, telling the heavenly court, 
"Martin, who is still but a catechumen, clothed me with this robe."16  What had appeared 
ridiculous to those who saw this episode in its banal aspect is revealed as something of cosmic 
significance.  In certain versions of the story, Martin later finds the cloak made miraculously 
whole.  The making whole of Martin’s robe is a miracle of plentitude, in the manner of the 
loaves and fishes in the Gospel of Mark.  The sword, an instrument of war, becomes in Martin’s 
hands an instrument of charity.   
Falstaff approaches war as an opportunity, an economy in which he can truly prosper.  
Note that for Sir John, war is not at all about political conflict.  He emphatically refuses to make 
normative judgments about the nature of rebellion.  Instead, he says, “God be thanked for these 
rebels, they offend none but the virtuous; I laud them, I praise them” (3.3.150-1).  It is on the 
campaign against the Percy rebellion that Falstaff shows the greatest affinity for his sainted 
cousins.  One miracle of plentitude in the acts of St. Falstaff’s hinges upon a repeated figure of 
the drama, turning bodies into money: “I have got, in exchange of a hundred and fifty soldiers, 
three hundred and odd pounds” (4.3.11).  Another debauched miracle, one just as relevant to the 
dramatization of the potentially religious figure of Oldcastle in Falstaff, concerns the clothing of 
his motley command:  
There’s not a shirt and a half in all my company, and the half shirt is two napkins tacked 
together and thrown over the shoulders like a herald’s coat without sleeves; and the shirt, 
to say the truth, stolen from my host at Saint Albans. . . (4.3.31-5). 
 
Where St. Martin split his cloak to share with a beggar to later find it miraculously made whole, 
under Falstaff’s command, “a shirt and a half” clothes all of his soldiers, or comically fails to do 
so.  In his candid self-indictment, Falstaff invokes the parable of Lazarus and Dives from the 
gospel of Luke.  In a distorted reflection of the story of St. Martin, the richly-clothed Dives 
                                                 
16 ibid. 
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 spurns Lazarus, the beggar at his gates, to the injury of his own soul.  Falstaff, the consummate 
military man, finds an eminently practical third alternative, and conscripts the near-naked 
beggar.  When Westmoreland comments on the impoverished appearance of Falstaff’s soldiers, 
he replies, “Faith, for their poverty, I know not where they had that, and for their bareness, I am 
sure they never learned that of me” (4.3.53-4).  Though it is he who draws moral theology into 
the fray, it is clear that Falstaff himself is to be morally condemned. Then again, he has already 
stipulated to this, and a social critique can be understood here nevertheless.  While the seeds of 
rebellion are understood to have been planted by magnates like the Earl of Northumberland, 
revolt has a more general, popular aspect.  In parley with Westmoreland, the king responds to his 
account of the rebels’ grievances as follows, 
These things indeed you have articulate, 
Proclaimed at market crosses, read in churches, 
To face the garment of rebellion 
With some fine color that may please the eye 
Of fickle changelings and poor discontents, 
Which gape and rub the elbow at the news 
Of hurly-burly innovation. 
And never yet did insurrection want 
Such water-colors to impaint his cause, 
Nor moody beggars, starving for a time 
Of pell-mell havoc and confusion. (5.1.72-82). 
 
There is a sub-stratum to aristocratic rebellion without which it could not thrive: the “popularity” 
that Henry was able to exploit in his own rise to power, as awkward as his relationship to his 
own populism might be.  The rebel barons have mined this seam of discontent; the political 
agency here, the guiding consciousness, is that of the aristocrats.  Typically, Henry is able to 
disclaim responsibility for grievances on all levels.  In this instance, what is interesting is the 
manner in which the language of a real, material poverty is transformed through metaphor into a 
familiar anti-popular discourse:  “Moody beggars” starve not for want of food, but out of a 
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 hunger for social disruption, “pell-mell havoc and confusion.”  What Falstaff and his company of 
gallows-birds make material and visible is this under-stratum of poverty and discontent.  The 
king’s haughty disclaimer of responsibility for widespread dissatisfaction in his realm is the 
counterpart to Falstaff’s offhanded “Faith, for their poverty, I know not where they had that,” 
and is similarly a denial of the manner in which he is morally implicated.   
The disaffection of the commons is a fact that many note but for which none assume the 
responsibility.  Silent until they erupt in civil broils, they are at once without a will of their own 
and the site of utopian desires better not contemplated.  Is there a locus of subaltern class 
consciousness, of political will in the commons?  In 2 Henry VI, the possibility is both held out 
to us and flaunted.  The rising of the commons has the earmarks of a popular uprising on the 
model of the Peasants’ Rebellion, deploying the familiar radical-egalitarian discourses.  Cade 
declares, 
I thank you, good people: there shall be no money, all shall eat and drink on my score; 
and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers and worship 
me their lord. (4.2.) 
 
Jack Cade expresses the same egalitarian vision as his humble followers, and in the same 
language.  Members of the risen mob, George Bevis observes to his companion John Holland, 
“Jack Cade the clothier means to dress the commonwealth, and turn it, and set a new nap on it” 
(2.2).  This is a dramatic representation of the political discourses of subaltern dissidence, 
recorded in Henry Knighton’s chronicle in the epistle of “Jack Miller”: 
Jack Miller asks for help to turn his mill aright.  He hath ground things small, and small.  
The King’s Son of Heaven shall pay for all.  Take care that your mill turns well. . .let 
might help right, and skill go before will, and right before might, and then our mill will 
go aright.  For if might go before right, and will before skill, then our mill will not go 
well.17 
 
                                                 
17 Henry Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle: 1337-1396 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 223. 
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 Miller’s epistle is not an endorsement of inarticulate force, but a careful statement, a demand for 
social equity grounded in the homespun metaphor that invokes the patient labor at the base of the 
social world.  In the words of Cade, these expressions of a political consciousness on the part of 
the commons are made to sound perfectly incoherent: there will be no money, but “all shall eat 
and drink on my score,” no social hierarchy, but he will be king.  Even this might be acceptable, 
given an understanding that the king, as Vicar of God, might be the guarantor of egalitarian 
utopia, but of course, the audience has known since the third act that the commons really act out 
of the will of Richard of York, who says, 
I have seduced a headstrong Kentishman, 
John Cade of Ashord, 
To make commotion, as full well he can, 
Under the title of John Mortimer. (2 Henry VI, 2.1) 
 
It is definitive of Cade that he is a creature of Richard, not the commons that he claims to 
champion.  Surprisingly, Michael Drayton’s The First Part of Sir John Oldcastle, a play that 
would recover the Lollard martyr from the perceived injustice done him in Shakespeare’s 
Lancastrian cycle, expresses a remarkably consistent attitude toward risings of the commons.  
The agency of the humblest classes in their own political action is never admitted.  Instead, 
subaltern revolt is actually the visible result of the surreptitious acts of their betters, the result of 
mixing the ambitions of the great with the ready disaffection of the humble.  A co-conspirator of 
Lord Scroop and Sir Thomas Gray in their plot to depose Henry V, the Earl of Cambridge 
observes, “The commons likewise, as we hear, pretend / A sudden tumult; we will join with 
them” (1 Sir John Oldcastle, 7.152-3).   
For a Protestant document, Sir John Oldcastle makes the strange choice of dramatizing 
the Lollard uprising at Fickett’s field, rebellion in this case commanded by Sir Roger Acton and 
bankrolled by William Murley, a Dunstable brewer. The characterization of Murley is relevant to 
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 the question of class relations in the play.  Though presumably united by their common Lollardy, 
the relationship of Acton and the Lollard Priest Beverly to Murley is almost purely exploitative.  
A comic figure, Murley is characterized by a sociolect of singsong lines and repeated phatic 
exclamations, “dainty my dear,” “In and out, to and fro,”  that mark him as a bourgeois 
tradesmen. Urging his men forward “for the honor of meal-men, millers and malt men,” (I SJO, 
8.3-4) he has many of the qualities of Simon Eyre, the benevolent master shoemaker of Dekker’s 
Shoemaker’s Holiday.  His initial motivation appears to have been a pure one, drawn to the 
conspiracy as he was because it has the feigned endorsement of a figure he clearly respects, “Sir 
John Oldcastle, that noble alms-giver, housekeeper, virtuous religious gentleman” (5.35-6).  The 
influence of the Lollard knights on Murley appears to be a corrosive one.  In an early meeting to 
cement their conspiracy, Murley politely objects to the title of “Master” ascribed to him by 
Acton:   
No master, good Sir Roger Acton, knight, Master Bourne and Master Beverly, esquires, 
gentlemen and justices of the peace, no master I, but plain William Murley, the brewer of 
Dunstable, your honest neighbor, and your friend, if ye be men of my profession. (I SJO, 
5.4-8) 
 
“Profession” in this context has the familiar double valence of “vocation”: the religious quality 
of shared reformist inclination, coupled with Murley’s powerful identification with his trade and 
the community of labor, into which he would draw his Lollard friends.  It is he who raises the 
problem that attaches to his role as a leader of the insurrection: 
Lord have mercy upon us! What a world is this! Sir Roger Acton, I am but a Dunstable 
man, a plain brewer, ye know.  Will lusty cavaliering captains, gentlemen, come at my 
calling, go at my bidding? (5.22-4) 
 
His co-conspirators have a ready answer: Oldcastle will make Murley a knight, a usurping of 
royal prerogative that hints at the conspirators’ aims.  From the moment of this devil’s compact, 
Murley’s inclination to Christian fellowship gives way to his ambition to rise to nobility.  “Were 
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 you not in election to be shrieve? / Have ye not passed all offices but that?” Master Bourne asks 
Murley (5.29-30).  Murley’s corruption is telegraphed by the incoherence that appears in what 
earlier was an earnest language: “Fellow, Sir Roger Acton, knight, all fellows, I mean in  
arms. . .” (5.41). 
 In Sir John Oldcastle, revolt is heteroclete and incoherent.  Lollards of bad intent foment 
“reformation,” taking the field with bourgeois climbers and “the commons,” represented directly 
in the drama only through Murley’s followers: 
John and Tom, and Dick and Hodge, 
And Rafe and Robin, William and George, 
And all my knaves shall fight like men, 
At Fickett Field, on Friday next.  (5.73-6) 
 
In a specifically Tudor mix, vilified Catholicism may even join hands in treason with extreme 
elements in radical Protestantism.  Lords Scroop and Gray offer to seal their treasonous compact 
with the upright Oldcastle by swearing on the sacrament, a symbolic association of treason, 
hypocrisy and the tainted mass.  In both an unwillingness to be forsworn and a likely reference to 
Oldcastle’s presumed “Protestant” position on the sacrament, he refuses.  While Catholics stray, 
the good Lollard Oldcastle is loyal even at the risk of his life, and bad Lollards are associated 
with precisians and class instability, possibly excusing the king for his sometime hostility toward 
the “new sect.”   
The possibility that Protestantism itself is implicated in political instability, emerging 
historically from Wyclif’s writings on dominion, is both considered and rejected by the play.  
Radical-Protestant revolt must be staged so that it can be defeated, something that would prove 
more tractable on the dramatic than the historical stage.  This having been said, the necessity of 
presenting the dissatisfaction of the commons leads the drama to certain concessions.  The poor 
soldier-beggars at the gate of  Oldcastle’s gate lament, “I’ll with the King into France if I can but 
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 crawl a-ship-board.  I had rather be slain in France than starve in England” (3.17-9), and 
“There’s laws for punishing, But there’s no law for our necessity” (3.2-3).  Harpoole, Oldcastle’s 
cryptic steward, tacitly sympathizes with the plight of the friendless veterans, but expressly 
voices the familiar law-and-order discourses: “Hang you, rogues, hang you.  There’s nothing but 
misery amongst you; you fear no law, you” (3.80-1). 
 The threat of a genuinely radical political vision of the part of the commons is similarly 
staged and rejected in Shakespeare’s 2 Henry VI.  Cade’s follower Bevis announces, “I tell thee, 
Jack Cade the clothier means to dress the commonwealth, and turn it, and set a new nap upon it. . 
.for ‘tis threadbare” (2 Henry VI, 4.2.4-6).  “I will apparel them all in one livery” Cade himself 
declares (4.2.71).  There is of course a leveling, egalitarian quality to these claims: the erasure of 
sumptuary distinction under Cade’s new order.  As Ronald Knowles has pointed out, the 
dissident language of clothing in 2 Henry VI is also a burlesque of the sumptuary exceptions 
granted the retainers of Elizabethan nobility.18  Cade, the spokesperson of the commons, claims 
to be no commoner at all.  “My father was a Mortimer. . . .My mother a Plantagenet,” Cade 
declares (4.2.39, 42), and with a preposterous story about having been stolen from the cradle, 
makes his claim to the throne.  From the discourse of primordial equality, Cade delivers us to the 
extremes of absolute power, outside the restraint of law and legislature: “I have thought upon it, 
it shall be so.  Away, burn all the records of the realm, my mouth shall be the parliament of 
England” (4.7.13-5).  The ambitions of the commons are made to appear preposterous and 
inconsistent in Cade,19 who would at once abolish property and claim the droit du signeur, which 
is easily situated in the context of the purportedly “Anabaptist” practice of having wives in 
                                                 
18 Ronald Knowles, “Miracle, Combat, and Rebellion in 2 Henry VI,”  The Yearbook of English Studies, vol. 21, 
Politics, Patronage, and Literature in England: 1558-1658 Special Number (1991), p. 179. 
19 “As if to surrender subversion to inconsistency, to surrender the social critic to the anarchic clown, Shakespeare. . 
.shows Cade as a feudal monarch manqué,” ibid., p. 181 
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 common (4.7.124-5).  In a medieval “year zero,” history will be erased, and all things either 
granted or denied at the whim of the “stinking” mouth of Cade (4.7.11).  The egalitarian 
pretensions of a preposterous subaltern consciousness are revealed for what they have always 
been, a recipe for a new social hierarchy based on pure force, theft, and ignorance. 
 Annabel Patterson has argued for a reading of 2 Henry VI in which a sort of popular 
political expression is valorized in the person of the Earl of Salisbury.  Intervening on behalf of 
the commons angered at the murder of the “genuinely popular” leader, the duke of Gloucester, 
Salisbury functions as “the people’s spokesman” to the king:20 
Dread lord, the commons sends you word by me, 
Unless false Suffolk straight be done to death, 
Or Banished fair England’s territories, 
They will by violence tear him from your palace 
And torture him with grievous ling’ring death. 
They say, by him the good Duke Humphrey died; 
They say, in him they fear your highness’ death. . . (2.2.241-7) 
 
Patterson’s reading of a legitimated popular political agency hangs upon her reading of the 
mechanism of “ventriloquism”:  “The rhetorical ‘they say’ formula identifies Salisbury as 
ventriloquist, while the dramatic situation ensures his recognition as the people’s sincere 
advocate.”21  A problem with Salisbury’s throne-room intervention as a mode of “popular 
protest” is that it is difficult to imagine as “protest” at all, but is rather an aristocratic mediation 
under the threat of the commons acting “by violence” of their own agency, a mediation terribly 
seductive to liberal notions of political representation.  “Ventriloquism” is used here to connote 
transparency, the selfless fidelity with which Salisbury can speak for the people.  In recent 
critical discourse, in the work of Guyatri Spivak, Susan Ritchie and others, “ventriloquism” is a 
category employed not to simplify but to complicate the notion of mediation.  Ventriloquism in 
                                                 
20 Annabel Patterson, Shakespeare and the Popular Voice (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 48. 
21 ibid. 
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 this sense is the assimilation of discourses by some form of social power that “speaks” on behalf 
of some excluded and subaltern constituency; speaks, it must be said, in its own registers, and 
often to its own concerns.  In the case of the Earl of Salisbury, the relevant axis of power is 
surely social class, and the absence of the actual voices of the commons is not irrelevant.  Donna 
Haraway has argued that, from the perspective of dominant power, the desirable constituent is 
the one who requires that mediation: “Permanently speechless, forever requiring the services of a 
ventriloquist, never forcing a recall vote, in each case the object or ground of representation is 
the realization of the representative's fondest dream.”22  Once again, Francis the drawer, having 
“fewer words than a parrot, and yet the son of woman” (1 Henry IV, 2.4) approaches being the 
ideal subject. 
 What do the commons say when they speak in their own voice?  As Phyllis Rackin has 
observed, there is a significant consistency in the radical-egalitarian language of Cade and that 
his followers.  While Patterson endorses the “natural” quality of the “real popular consciousness” 
in the mouth of John Holland, the ideological position that endorsed Salisbury as voice of the 
commons would have greeted Holland’s pronouncement “Let the magistrates be working men” 
(4.2.17) with the same disdain that was evoked by Cade’s promised abolition of private property.  
Indeed, a common thread in narratives of civil rebellion is the way in which the ambition to 
supplant the officer of law, from magistrate to Lord Chief Justice, appears repeatedly as a trope 
of misrule. 
The social problem realized in Cade is a dramatization of a certain sort of mixing.  Cade 
is an “impostor aristocrat” and a “traitor to his class,”23 to which treason those of his class are 
strangely indifferent.  Apparently, a mixing of this sort is not as damning a fault when viewed 
                                                 
22 Donna Haraway, “Promises of Monsters,” Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge 1992), p. 311. 
23 Patterson, p. 49. 
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 from the bottom of the social hierarchy.24  Dramatically undermined before his own entrance on 
the scene, it is Cade’s strangely familiar ambition to create a mongrel aristocracy to replace a 
legitimate one based on a documented inheritance.  Salisbury represents the legitimacy of blood 
to which Cade cannot even aspire, and his political language is laudably free of the troublesome 
leveling discourses of the risen commons.  William Murley, Jack Cade, and John Falstaff are 
alike in the manner in which they threaten a contamination of the aristocracy with the 
consciousness of alien classes.    After the rout at Fickett’s Field in Sir John Oldcastle, the 
victorious Henry V tells Sir Roger Acton, “Gentry is divine, / But thou has made it more than 
popular” (12.7-8).  Murley, who has had a pair of golden spurs worked up in anticipation of his 
coming knighthood, will be hung with them around his neck as a signifier of his class ambitions.   
What is erased in the persons of Murley and Cade is the possibility that the radical 
consciousness of the commons really aspires to a new, egalitarian society. While the plays are 
concerned with right rule, and even the plight alienated sectors of Lancastrian and Tudor society, 
the discourses of radical egalitarianism are dramatically undermined.  If enclosure as an 
emerging locus of private property is put under scrutiny in the policy of Suffolk in 2 Henry VI, it 
is re-invoked as natural law in the conflict between Jack Cade and Alexander Iden.  As a risen 
man who casts his lot with landed property, Iden is a measure of what landless Falstaff is not, 
perfectly assimilated to property, loyal and satisfied with his humble lot, employing martial 
violence in the service of his king or by instinct in the dispatching of revolted Cade. 
That anti-popular discourse seizes not simply on forms of subalterity but on forbidden 
mixtures can be seen in Sir Thomas Brown’s Vulgar Errors:  
Their individual imperfections being great, they are moreover enlarged by their 
aggregation; and being erroneous in their single numbers, once hudled together, they will 
                                                 
24 This asymmetry in attitudes toward hybridity from different perspectives among social relations of power remains 
true in discourses of miscegenation, or in the language politics of bilingual education. 
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 be Error it self. For being a confusion of knaves and fools, and a farraginous concurrence 
of all conditions, tempers, sexes, and ages; it is but natural if their determinations be 
monstrous, and many waies inconsistent with Truth. And therefore wise men have 
alwaies applauded their own judgment, in the contradiction of that of the People.25 
  
It is not simply the unwashed commons of themselves, but the breakdown of the distinctions 
between classes, sexes and ages that produces the popular monstrosity.  In his problematic class 
affiliation, Falstaff embodies this very mixing.  Falstaff’s comic diatribe over the delivery of his 
satin cloak and breeches (2 Henry IV, 1.2.21-36) functions as a familiar sartorial sign of class 
transgression: the “two-and-twenty yards of satin” withheld by the reviled Puritan tailor are 
needed not simply to clothe the “true knight” Falstaff, but to further his imposture of knighthood   
The early performance history of Shakespeare’s Lancastrian cycle may be relevant to this 
question of class hybridity.  Will Kempe, the actor who with the Lord Chamberlain’s Men first 
portrayed Falstaff, is associated primarily with lower-class characters, notably Dogberry in Much 
Ado About Nothing and Lancelot Gobbo in The Merchant of Venice.   Ronald Knowles makes 
the persuasive argument that Kempe played Cade during his stint with Lord Strange’s men, and 
that this suggests a carnivalesque dimension to his characterization.26  Cade and Falstaff further 
share the function of debased reflections of their aristocratic betters: David Riggs has argued 
persuasively that Cade is intended as a lampoon of the Duke of York.27   
 Is there a conjunction between the historical Oldcastle and the scenes of revolt and 
martial conflict of the Henry plays?  Falstaff’s attitude toward rebellion is a curious one, echoing 
patrician attitudes toward the instability of the commons like a cracked bell.  Greeted in the street 
by a servant of the Lord Chief Justice, Falstaff observes, 
                                                 
25 Thomas Brown, Pseudodoxia Epidemica (London, 1672), Bk. 1, ch. 3, p. 9-10, appears in partial form in 
Frederick Tupper, Jr., “The Shakespearean Mob,”  PMLA, vol. 27, no. 4 (1912), p. 499 
26 Knowles, p. 181. 
27 David Riggs, Shakespeare’s Heroical Histories: Henry VI and Its Literary Tradition (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p. 124, quoted in Knowles, p. 184. 
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 What?  A young knave and begging?  Is there not wars?  Is there not employment?  Doth 
not the king lack subjects?  Do not the rebels need soldiers?  Though it be a shame to be 
on any side but one, it is worse shame to beg than to be on the worst side, were it worse 
than the name of Rebellion can tell how to make it. (2 Henry IV, 1.2.58-62) 
 
Rebellion is a social evil, perhaps, but it is not the worst one, and it may serve a laudable 
purpose.  Falstaff’s observations are perhaps even more interesting because they are intended to 
be overheard by the Lord Chief Justice.  Though ever a Lancastrian loyalist, Falstaff has an 
easygoing relationship with civil strife.  His greatest failures as a subject of Henry IV amount to 
thefts and derelictions of duty, but of course treason is always in the offing.  It has been 
suggested that Falstaff’s command at Shrewsbury is directly related to the historical Oldcastle.  
In this reading, Falstaff’s tattered soldiers are a reference to the mob of petty tradesmen and 
laborers who passed the abbey of St. Albans on their way to join the Oldcastle rebellion as 
recorded in Walsingham.28  The evidence for this is suggestive rather than compelling, but 
interesting nonetheless.  In the heat of the battle, Falstaff says, 
Though I could scape shot-free at London, I fear the shot here; here’s no scoring but upon 
the pate. . . .I have led my ragamuffins where they are peppered.  There’s not three of my 
hundred and fifty left alive, and they are for the town’s end, to beg during life. (1 Henry 
IV, 5.3.30-1, 34-6) 
 
Dramatically, Falstaff is a coward, but a cowardly soldier who puts himself in harms way 
because it is there that opportunity lies.  Like Oldcastle at St. Giles’ Fields, he is both present and 
absent, the leader and the master of the pragmatic escape.  Like St. Martin, he goes forth at the 
head of the host, but doesn’t fight.29  Cowardice, like so many of the elements that make up 
Falstaff’s moral “character,” is a comic accommodation to the anxiety produced by the socially 
hybrid figures whose very embodiment seems to threaten social upheaval. 
                                                 
28 Scoufos, p. 78. 
29 The incident in 1 Henry IV, 5.3, in which the prince asks for Falstaff’s sword only to be handed a bottle of sack 
has the ring of another St. Martin reference: next in popularity in to the image of Martin dividing his cloak to share 
with the beggar is the depiction of Martin renouncing the instruments of war, for example, Simone Martini’s St. 
Martin Renounces Arms (~1315) in the Chapel of St. Martin in Assisi. 
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 C. “THE IMMORTAL PART NEEDS A PHYSICIAN”: FALSTAFF AND 
THE BODY OF THE KING 
 
 
The second Lancastrian cycle is full of a monstrous, grotesque language of the body, most often 
recognized in Falstaff, who says of himself, “Banish plump Jack, and banish all the world” (1 
Henry IV, 2.4.525-6).  Sir John is the world in the carnivalesque register: he is all flesh, “Out of 
all compass,” and he has (to borrow from Thomas Brown) the worldly quality of farrago, the 
mixing of classes, genders and other social tendencies (“farrago” is of course an apt metaphor 
drawn from food: “a mixed fodder for cattle”).30  While Jack Falstaff understandably occludes 
the greater part of our carnival vision, it is characteristic of his monstrosity that it is almost 
impossible to contain; it infects those in his vicinity, and even those at what ought to be a 
hygienic distance.  The primary grotesque identification with Falstaff is not with one of his circle 
either in the tavern world or among his Gloucestershire habitués.  It is Henry IV himself, whom 
his one-time supporter the Earl of Worcester describes on the eve of Shrewsbury in the following 
manner: 
. . .being fed by us, you used us so 
As that ungentle gull, the cuckoo’s bird, 
Useth the sparrow; did oppress our nest, 
Grew by our feeding to so great a bulk 
That even our love durst not come near your sight 
For fear of swallowing.  (1 Henry IV, 5.2.59-64) 
 
The king is figured as a giant creature of insatiable appetite, endangering the most sacred of 
familial relations, and is resonant with Falstaff’s own self-description to his page, “I do walk 
before thee like a sow that hath overwhelmed all her litter but one”(2 Henry IV, 1.2).  Further, as 
an interloper placed in a nest of proper chicks, the cuckoo is a conventional figure of  
illegitimacy, the bastardy in whose terms Fasltaffian discourse repeatedly understands the 
                                                 
30 OED, s.v. “farrago.” 
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 Lancastrian monarchy.  The materialized affinity between Falstaff and the king is developed in 
The Second Part of Henry the Fourth, where it is articulated in figures of illness and death.  
Fretted with poor health and insomnia, the king observes to the Earl of Warwick, 
Then you perceive the body of our kingdom, 
How foul it is, what rank diseases grow 
And what danger near the heart of it. (2 Henry IV, 3.1.37-9) 
 
In this instance, the king is willing to grant the nature of the affliction that unites his own body 
with that of the commonwealth.  Closeted with the loyal Warwick, the king states a position 
usually taken by his political opponents, and one that will be echoed by the rebellious 
Archbishop of York in the next act: 
. . .we are all diseased, 
And with our surfeiting and wanton hours, 
Have brought ourselves into a burning fever, 
And we must bleed for it; of which disease, 
Our late King Richard, being infected, died. (2 Henry IV, 4.1.54-8) 
 
The nation suffers from a common malady because it bears a common shame, the deposition and 
murder of its legitimate ruler.  By the third play in the cycle, even Henry IV can look back on 
Richard’s prophecy and see the manner in which it has been fulfilled in himself and his nation: 
“‘The time will come that foul sin, gathering head, / Shall break into corruption’” (3.1.75-6).  
This contagion has spread through the metaphysic of kingship.  We of course recall that extract 
from Plowden’s Reports, so important to Kantorowicz’ exposition of the juridical concept of the 
two-bodied king: 
For the King has in him two Bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body politic.  His Body 
natural. . .is a Body mortal, subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature or Accident. . . 
.But his Body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and 
Government. . .and this body is utterly void of Infancy,  and old Age, and other natural 
Defects and Imbecilities, which the Body natural is subject to. . .31 
 
                                                 
31 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 7. 
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 In the dramatization of the first Lancastrian king, the juridical distinction makes way for artistic 
necessity.  The commonwealth is infected through Henry’s sin.32  The location of the source of 
this general malaise in the king’s illegitimacy is at work in the comic report of one of Falstaff’s 
recruits, Bullcalf, who arrives for muster before  the “battle” at Gaultree Forest in poor health: 
“A whoreson cold, sir, a cough, sir, which I caught with ringing in the king’s affairs upon his 
coronation day, sir.” (2 Henry IV, 3.2.147).  The anniversary of the king’s self-coronation brings 
not health and wholeness, but continuing civil war and runny noses.  Strangely, it would have to 
be granted that in this metaphysical sense, Henry IV must be the king.  The visiting of his error 
on the kingdom demands this sort of political/theological essentialism.  It is the dramatic 
inversion of the theological argument of “touching for the King’s Evil”:  the very touch of God’s 
anointed in his purity could drive out the taint of scrofula – a belief endorsed by the Anglican 
Book of Common Prayer.33  Shakespeare was aware of this tradition, mentioned in Macbeth, in a 
conversation between Malcolm, MacDuff, and a physician, who stand in the precincts of the 
palace of Edward the Confessor, where a queue of the afflicted await the ministrations of that 
sanctified king: 
‘Tis called the evil; 
A most miraculous work in this good king, 
Which often, since my here-remain in England, 
I have seen him do.  How he solicits heaven, 
Himself best knows; but strangely-visited people, 
All swol’n and ulcerous, pitiful to the eye, 
The mere despair of surgery, he cures, 
. . .and ‘tis spoken, 
To the succeeding royalty he leaves, 
The healing benediction. (Macbeth, 4.3.148-56) 
                                                 
32 This relationship has been critically misunderstood at times.  Edgar Schell has written, “Henry, having 
symbolically gathered the sickness of his newly purged nation into himself, is ready to die.” “Prince Hal’s Second 
‘Reformation’” Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter, 1970), p. 15. 
33 The definitive work on this subject is R. H. P. Crawford’s The King’s Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1911).  For a treatment of the dramatization of the King’s Evil in Shakespeare and its relation to the reign of Charles 
I, see M. R. Toynbee, “Charles I and the King’s Evil,” Folklore, vol. 61, no. 1(March, 1950), pp. 1-14. 
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It is significant that this royal capacity is understood as an inheritance.  The genealogically 
indirect manner in which Henry has taken the crown is a disruption of the miraculous qualities of 
the English king, but something of that metaphysic is nevertheless in play. The commonwealth 
cannot be isolated from the stain on Henry in his royal body.  While royal majesty in the drama 
may have significant theatrical aspects, it remains nevertheless essential and embodied, even in 
its aberrations. 
 The Archbishop of York has associated the national malaise with a sybaritic, Falstaffian 
excess, “our surfeiting and wanton hours.”  The relationship of Falstaff to the worsening 
condition of king and nation develops the metaphoric of royal legitimacy that we have 
encountered already.  Falstaff demands of his tiny page, “Sirrah, you giant, what says the doctor 
to my water?”  The page replies, “He said, sir, that the water itself was a good healthy water, but 
for the party that owned it, he might have moe diseases than he knew for” (1.2.1-3).  If Hal’s 
legitimacy as God’s anointed “true prince” is drawn into question by Falstaff through the 
metaphor of bastardy, the king’s terminal affliction of troubled legitimacy is similarly translated 
into Bakhtin’s lower bodily stratum, materialized in Falstaff as venereal disease. 
 Falstaff raises the issue of the king’s illness in an attempt to divert the Lord Chief Justice 
from a discussion of his own legal troubles (rhetorically, once again a displacement of denied 
crime onto the royal body).  Speaking as an authority, he says, 
This apoplexy, as I take it, is a kind of lethargy, and ’t please your lordship, a kind of 
sleeping in the blood, a whoreson tingling. . . .It hath is original from much grief, from 
study and perturbation of the brain.  I have read the cause of his effects in Galen, it is a 
kind of deafness. (2 Henry IV, 1.2.88-90, 91-3) 
 
As is often the case, Falstaff’s statement conceals an insightful commentary on his grotesque 
double.  On the one hand, it expresses Henry’s self-conception as someone troubled to the point 
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 of illness by the problems of his realm.  On the other, it attributes to Henry a “deafness” familiar 
to his critics: an inability to hear the complaints of those who, however much they may have 
helped him in times past, are aggrieved as subjects of his rule.  The Lord Chief Justice may not 
be inclined to register this critique, but he reasons well when he tells Falstaff, “I think you are 
fallen into the disease, for you hear not what I say to you” (1.2.93-4).  In this case, the 
relationship between Henry and Falstaff works by inversion: Henry will not hear voices from 
below him in social power, Falstaff will not mark the voice of Lord Chief Justice from above.  
Falstaff’s refusal to heed the man whom he hopes to displace will not be without consequences. 
 It would be easy to understand the Prince of Wales as a “Lenten body,” singular and 
closed, constructed in perfect opposition to Falstaffian excess, and there would be a certain 
justice to this characterization.  He is of course associated with Lenten figures, an “eel-skin,” a 
“bull’s pizzle,” a “tailor’s yard,” and the drama understands him as an alternative to the self-
contained, laboring masculinity of Harry Percy.  Michael Bristol has suggested that he plays 
“Jack-a-Lent,” the embodiment of Lent within carnival.34  Existing within the time constituted 
by his seeming opposite as Hal does in Falstaff’s tavern world, Jack-a-Lent is at least a 
potentially grotesque figure.  Given the infectious quality of monstrosity in the drama, it woul
be quite singular if Hal proved exempt.  In fact, the nature of his own monstrosity devolves fr
the relationship between Falstaff and the king: the Prince of Wales is bifurcated at the root, the 
“son” of two fathers.  In addition to his many references to Hal’s metaphorical bastardy,
d 
om 
hn 
 
                                                
35 
Falstaff describes the prince as a “whoreson mad compound of majesty” (2.4.239).  To Sir Jo
the prince is a “compound,” a mixture, a claim in some tension with his assertion that the prince
is “essentially made.”  Of course, as Falstaff’s figurative son, the prince can inherit nothing but 
 
34 Michael Bristol, Carnival and Theater: Plebian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England 
(New York: Methuen, 1985), p. 206 
35 e.g., “A bastard son of the king’s” (2 Henry IV, 2.4.231). 
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 his father’s hybrid nature; as the king’s son, his is the legacy of a disrupted succession.  If the 
prince is implicated in Falstaff’s recurrent invocations of the story of the prodigal son, the dram
puts Hal in the difficult position of choosing between two comparably tainted fath
a 
ers. 
 The sickness of the realm is not wholly contained in the corporal register, for we have 
seen that its symptoms include continuing revolt, and even in the register of military conflict, it 
suggests the moral shortcomings of the house of Lancaster.  In the Second Part of Henry IV, the 
conflict at Gaultree Forest is the debased reiteration of the chivalric conflict at Shrewsbury.  As 
Sigurd Burckhardt has noted, the events at Gaultree Forest are an intentional dramatic frustration 
of the desire to see the new revolt decided through the “plain shock and even play of battle.”36  
The prince’s brother John leads the king’s forces, and he is magnified from his historical source, 
presented in the drama as Duke of Lancaster (4.1.435-6), a title actually held by the Prince of 
Wales.37  That the king has perceived in John the character seemingly lacking in the prince is 
emphasized in part one, where we learn that he has replaced Hal in the king’s council (1 Henry 
IV, 3.2.32-3).  John of Lancaster is dramatized as the heir to certain qualities dramatically 
associated with Lancaster.  In parley with Westmorland and the Archbishop of York, John  
seems inclined to rapprochement, responding in this way to the grievances of the revolted lords: 
I like them all, and do allow them well, 
And swear here by the honour of my blood, 
My father’s purposes have been mistook. . . 
My lord, these griefs shall be with speed redressed, 
Upon my soul they shall. (2 Henry IV,4.1.282-4, 87-8) 
 
When the rebel troops have been disbanded, John shows himself perfectly willing to break a vow 
sworn on “the honour of my blood,” and to do so with a narrowly contractual and commercial 
                                                 
36 Burckhardt, p. 156. 
37 See Richard Dutton, “Shakespeare and Lancaster,” Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 1 (Spring, 1998), p. 19.  
Dutton notes that the play ahistorically puts John of Lancaster in command of the king’s forces; he was actually 15 
at that time. 
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 rejoinder.  When York challenges him, “Will you thus break your faith?” John replies with, “I 
pawned thee none” (4.1.339-40), and some less-than-compelling equivocations about precisely 
what he has sworn.  He has no qualms about dressing his low stratagem in a providential 
language: “Strike up our drums, pursue the scattered stray: / God, and not we, hath safely fought 
today” (4.1.348-9).  
Harry Percy is in an important way the one known quantity in the algebra of male bodies 
as they are calculated in 1 Henry IV.  Put forward as the seemingly legitimate child of mother 
England, his is an almost solipsistically complete, individuated self.  While Hal describes himself 
as a “truant to chivalry” in comparison (1 Henry IV, 5.1.94), he associates Hotspur with 
appropriate, even excessive, aristocratic labor:  “I am not yet of this Percy’s mind. . .he that kills 
me some six of seven dozens of Scots at a breakfast, washes his hands, and says to his wife, ‘Fie 
upon this quiet life, I want work’” (1 Henry IV, 2.4.85-88).  Though a rebel who is disinclined to 
look critically at his own motivations, Percy is quintessentially English, and it is from his 
English body and egoism that he snipes at the claim that Owen Glendower’s supposedly 
“portentous” birth marks him in some way uncanny: 
Diseased nature oftentimes breaks forth 
In strange eruptions; oft the teeming earth 
Is with a kind of colic pinch’d and vex’d 
By the imprisoning of unruly wind 
Within her womb; which, for enlargement striving, 
Shakes the old beldam earth and topples down 
Steeples and moss-grown towers.  At your birth, 
Our grandam earth, having this distemperature, 
In passion shook. (3.1.25-33) 
 
Percy translates Glendower’s birth into the lower bodily stratum, as a fart expelled by our 
common mother.  The comic representation of the emblematic Welsh Nationalist Owain 
Glyndŵr, he is completely subordinated to witty Percy, and with him his dissident claims to the 
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 intrinsic worth of Welsh culture, art, and language.  “Now I perceive the devil understands 
Welsh,” Percy observes (3.1.226).  The Welsh, aspiring to self-determination in Glendower, are 
a monstrosity.  Percy’s body may be singular, but his political program is incoherent.  While 
rhetorically dominating Glendower, he is perfectly willing to see Wales (and Scotland, too) 
sundered from England. 
 
 
D. REPENTANCE AND REFORMATION 
 
 
The positive religious content of the second Lancastrian cycle represents a critical problem that 
does not allow of an answer in comfortably determinate categories.  The representation of 
religion in these plays is thrown into significant relief by its dramatization in Drayton’s The First 
Part of Sir John Oldcastle.  The Oldcastle play is very much a Protestant document, both in its 
polemical ends and in the way that it attempts to read itself out in an overdetermined manner.  
This is articulated in the play’s anachronistic and instantly legible religious categories.  The 
naughty, emphatically Catholic cleric Sir John of Wrotham comments on the followers of 
Wyclif, 
Was ever heard, my lord, the like till now? 
That thieves and rebels—‘sblood, heretics! 
Plain heretics, I’ll stand to’t to their teeth— 
Should have to colour their vile practices 
A title of such worth as Protestant? (1 Sir John Oldcastle, 2.22-6) 
 
The valorization of “Protestant” is emphasized by its source, the tippling, criminal, generally 
amoral Catholic priest.  As Benjamin Griffin has discussed, Wrotham is so dramatized to make 
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 his recognition as a version of Falstaff unavoidable.38  Faced with the problem of responding to 
the perceived slight on Oldcastle in the Henriad, Drayton and his collaborators have attempted to 
keep the comparison between virtuous Lollard and dissipated rogue internal to their drama, 
packaged in categories ready to hand.  Griffin recognizes the manner in which the Protestant 
drama attempts to forestall dissident readings: “The Admiral’s Men’s text alludes to 
Shakespeare’s, preempting the audience’s analogizing, directing and glossing it.”39 
 There is another splitting off in the characterization of the eponymous Oldcastle that 
Griffin has not recognized.  Oldcastle’s steward Rafe Harpoole is a commentator on his master’s 
piety, and is understood in the drama as a sort of reflection of John of  Wrotham, even competing 
with the bawdy cleric for the affections of his “Doll.”40  In his professed adherence to the “old 
church,” he is the single point of doctrinal obscurity that guarantees the play’s black-and-white 
religious categories.  Harpoole is a necessary fission, the repository of the denied anger of 
militant Protestantism, in contrast to the tediously unflappable Oldcastle.  It is Harpoole who 
forces the summoner sent by the Bishop of Rochester to eat the parchment bearing the written 
process intended for Oldcastle: “Feed, feed! ‘tis wholesome, rogue, wholesome!. . .’S’blood, if 
thy seal were as broad as the lead that covers Rochester church, thou shouldst eat it” (4.59, 62-3).  
It is Harpoole who, albeit comically, draws the drama into the sort of apocalyptic historical 
vision associated with  Protestant writers like Bale.  The eating of the summons would appear to 
be a reference to Revelation 10, in which the speaker is ordered by an angel bearing a scroll to 
“Take it, and eat it up;  and it shall make thy belly  bitter, but it shall be in thy mouth sweet as 
                                                 
38 Benjamin Griffin, “Marring and Mending: Treacherous Likeness in Two Renaissance Controversies,” The 
Huntington Library Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 4 (1997), p. 373. 
39 ibid. 
40 One could conjecture that Harpoole or “Half-pole” is related to “False-staff.” 
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 honey.”41  “The purest of the honey!” Harpoole exclaims as he force-feeds the summoner, 
“Tough wax is the purest of the honey” (4.56-7). 
 From his indeterminate position in the “old church,” Harpoole critiques his master’s 
professed faith.  Of the beggars who come to Oldcastle’s gate, Harpoole asks, 
What should I give them?  You are grown so beggarly you have scarce a bite of bread to 
give at your door.  You talk of your religion so long that you have banished charity from 
amongst you; a man may make a flax-shop in your kitchen  for any fire there is stirring. 
(3.60-4) 
 
The steward’s complaint seems to be a straightforward send-up of the Protestant rejection of 
works piety.  Damning, if taken as a fair critique of Oldcastle’s home, but of course this is 
situated in the ongoing banter between Harpoole and his master, each accusing the other of 
encouraging beggary, each demonstrating a rare sympathy toward the wretches at the gate.  An 
old pensioner says, “we are now come to the good Lord Cobham’s, to the best man to the poor 
that is in all Kent” (2.21-2).  Harpoole’s comments are ultimately more a comment on the austere 
life of the godly Lollard than the failure of his charity. 
 Oldcastle’s modest means, bestowed on the commons, are understood in contrast to the 
wealth of the Romish church.  The same bishop of Rochester who persecutes Oldcastle is more 
than willing to hand over “a full thousand angels” to finance the king’s expedition to France 
(2.54), but the Pope’s bishop marshals his angels to a purpose: the suppression of Lollardy.  The 
historical position of English reform or schism in the Oldcastle play is an interesting one.  When 
the king asks, apropos of Rochester’s clergy, whether there is “any new rupture to disquiet them” 
(2.79), the Earl of Suffolk replies, 
No new, my lord; the old is great enough, 
And so increasing as, if not cut down, 
Will breed a scandal to your royal state 
And set your kingdom quickly in an uproar. (2.80-3) 
                                                 
41 KJV. 
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The status of the reformist movement is ambivalent, both an “upstart new religion” and the 
beleaguered faith of England itself.  It is as if, finding new strength under the aegis of the 
sympathetic Lollard knight, the old English faith asserts itself against Rome.  While not an 
adherent to the thread of reform associated with Oldcastle, the king himself consistently asserts a 
position on royal supremacy consistent with the Tudor settlement.42  When the Bishop of 
Rochester asserts that Oldcastle can be tried for heresy exclusively under ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, without recourse to an appeal to the king, Henry V says, 
I took it always that ourself stood on’t 
As a sufficient refuge, unto whom 
Not any but might lawfully appeal; 
But we’ll not argue now upon that point (2.119-22). 
 
Henry seems to defend an established royal supremacy against the imposition of novelties by the 
foreign church, supported as it is by unctuous Catholic magnates like the Earl of Suffolk.  
Similarly, when Acton asserts that his rising sought “reformation of religion,” the king replies, 
Reform religion?  Was it that ye sought? 
I pray who gave you that authority? 
Belike then, we do hold the scepter up 
And sit within the throne but for a cipher. 
Time was, good subjects would make known their grief, 
And pray amendment, not enforce the same (12.17-22) 
 
Mary Grace Muse Adkins has argued that the “Lollard” uprising against the king  reflects a 
moderate Protestant position on the possibly radical consequences of the Presbyterian theological 
understanding of the unalloyed sovereignty of God,43 attributing to radical sixteenth-century 
reform a position inferred by some commentators from Wyclif’s own writings on sovereignty.  
In the same foregrounded manner, Griffin has observed how the Oldcastle play associates the 
                                                 
42 Peter Corbin and Douglas Sedge, eds., The Oldcastle Controversy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1991), n. p. 51) 
43 Mary Grace Muse Adkins, “Sixteenth-century Religious and Political implications in Sir John Oldcastle,” 
University of Texas Studies in English, vol. 22 (1942), pp. 94-5. 
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 revolted Lollards with a “precisian” distaste for traditional feast days44, one that might have 
come from Jonson’s Tribulation Wholesome:  
Nay. . .if you observe such days, 
We make some question of your constancy. 
All days are like to men resolved in right. (5.61-3) 
 
 The rigidly-policed religious categories of Sir John Oldcastle are a useful antidote to 
critics who would seek in the Henriad an uncomplicated inscription of the Tudor-Protestant 
moment on the fifteenth century.  In the two parts of Henry IV, what the “old church” might 
have been is not only unfamiliar but contested in the rhetorical struggle between Falstaff and the 
Prince of Wales.  Do references to positive religious doctrine remain?  One could easily bring the 
question of works piety to a situation like that of Falstaff’s relationship to his beggarly 
command; such a comment seems to speak to the text, but does not necessarily lend itself to a 
reductive categorization in terms of Protestant or Catholic.  In a more interesting critical 
intervention, Alice Lyle Scoufos finds a comment on Lollard sacramental theology in the tavern-
reckoning that the prince discovers in the pocket of Falstaff, who has fallen asleep behind an 
arras.  “Oh, monstrous!” the prince exclaims, “But one halfpennyworth of bread to this 
intolerable deal of sack?” (2.4.436).  Scoufos would read this as consistent with a Lollard 
position on transubstantiation: “The Lollards insisted that the bread remained bread, becoming 
after consecration the symbol of Christ’s body. . . .The Falstaff-Oldcastle figure carries only a 
symbolic amount of bread.”45  This reading, although interesting, hangs upon a 
misunderstanding of the Lollard position on transubstantiation as “symbol.”  Although 
historically associated with the Protestant appropriation of Oldcastle, this misreading claims
theological position that Oldcastle never professed.  What Wyclif and his followers objected to
 a 
 
                                                 
44 Griffin, p. 375. 
45 Scoufos, p. 78. 
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 was the annihilation of the substance of the bread, the doctrine of “accidents without a subject
If a play on Lollard sacramental beliefs is at work here, it is more complex than the one Scoufos
identifies.  As we have seen, Falstaff is repeatedly associated with cooked flesh, flesh to 
devoured in a carnivalesque reflection of communion.  The quibble on the miniscule scrap of 
bread reported by the prince in this scene plays on the trope of not seeing the mountain for the 
great mass of stone.  Falstaff needs no bread because he was made from it; puddings, with
he has been identified, can be a compound of meat and bread, or they may not be.  Similarly, 
Falstaff either contains bread, or he doesn’t, he is all flesh.  The theological question about 
Falstaff’s substance, like a sort of medieval Schrödinger’s cat, cannot be decided objectively.
testimony to his grotesque, subversive incarnation, all we have is the scriptural trace in the bi
which is just grapheme: no subs
.”  
 
be 
 which 
  In 
ll, 
tance there. 
 In substance, Falstaff’s resurrection on the fields of Shrewsbury in act five of 1 Henry IV 
is a dramatic enigma in part because, dramatically, it works.  Critically, it is a bit more difficult 
to understand, though not for want of effort.  Michael Bristol has argued that Sir John’s rising 
from the dead is an instance of the principle of dignitas non moritur, “the king’s mystical 
identity or dignity never dies.”46  This is perfectly consistent with the understanding of Falstaff 
in an embodied identification with the king, though a bit intellectually abstruse for most 
audiences.  In the religious register, Falstaff’s death in fact refers us once again to the prince’s 
comic play on the Paul’s letter to the Ephesians, with its possibly more earnest undercurrent.  
The epigraph to this chapter, drawn from Ephesians (5:14-16), lies at the conjunction of the 
prince’s soliloquy and Falstaff’s resurrection, “redeeming [the] time” in terms of his personal 
“reformation” with God’s admonition to “Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and 
                                                 
46 Bristol, p. 183.  Bristol’s reference here is to Kantorowicz. 
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 Christ shall give thee light.” 47  Here then the meeting place of Hal’s redemption, and Falstaff’s
In the epistle, “light” takes the specific meaning of a potentially omniscient moral vision, mak
all things visible, “For it is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in 
secret, But all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light” (Ephes
.  
ing 
ians 5.12-3). 
                                                
 Looking at the dead on the field of Shrewsbury, it would at first appear that such a vision 
is denied us.  We see two equivalently dead theatrical bodies, Percy and Falstaff, side by side.  
One of them unexpectedly rises.  In Falstaff, the metaphorical, spiritual resurrection appealed to 
in Paul’s epistle, “you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins” (Ephesians 2:1),  
is (typically) materialized.  Sir John manages the feat of rising from death without the promised 
repentance, suggesting for a moment that perhaps one can get to heaven on roller skates, 
cozening God and the devil in one stroke.  Apparently a reader of St. Paul just as the prince is,  
Falstaff is a legalistic, Pharisaical exegete of this text.  Dying as a stratagem, called back to life 
in body if not in spirit, Falstaff is now in a position to take advantage of Percy’s more permanent 
condition.     
 In similar ways, Sigurd Burckhardt, James Calderwood and others have suggested that 
Falstaff’s resurrection is a break in the mimetic fabric of the play, an intrusion of the “reality 
principle.”48 For Calderwood, “With the illusion of heroic life shattered, we are left with the 
trumpery of theater – costumes, actors, props, stage, words issuing from a script instead of from 
men’s mouths.”49  In readings that emphasize the metadramatic quality of this scene, Falstaff’s 
resurrection seems to suggest that anything goes, that Percy might rise too, and help Sir John put 
away the flats.  But of course, Percy does not rise.  Even at what has been put forward as the 
fracture that might presage the collapse of the dramatic illusion, Percy’s body remains as a sort 
 
47 This is the text from which is drawn Bach’s cantata “Wachet auf, ruft uns die stimme” or “Sleepers Awake.” 
48 Burkhardt, p. 149. 
49 James Calderwood, Metadrama in Shakespeare’s Henriad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 79. 
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 of guarantee of the dramatic fiction.  While by no means denying the flexible metadramatic 
registers in which Falstaff moves, let us consider an alternative way of understanding this scene.  
Falstaff’s stage presence has been a sort of evolving metadramatic contract between himself and 
the audience that works in a number of ways.  When first we encounter him in the events leading 
up to the Gad’s Hill robbery, he is enclosed by the dramatic action while we, sharing the 
privileged perspective of Poins and (in particular) Hal, see him improvise his rhetorical defense 
in a situation in which everyone seems to know more than he. 
 As we approach the battle of Shrewsbury, all of this changes.  In a series of soliloquies, 
we are increasingly drawn into Falstaff’s perspective, even if we cannot share the moral/political 
positions he takes; aligning the audience through perspective effects with characters whose moral 
vision they cannot share has been a part of the dramatic method in Shakespeare’s histories since 
Richard III, if not before.  Falstaff asks, 
What is honor? A word.  What is in that word “honor”?  What is that “honor”?  Air.  A 
trim reckoning.  Who hath it?  He that died o’ Wednesday.  Doth he feel it?  No.  Doth he 
hear it?  No.  ‘Tis insensible, then?  Yea, to the dead.  But will it not live with the living?  
No. Why?  Detraction will not suffer it.  Therefore I’ll none of it.  Honor is a mere 
scutcheon.  And so ends my catechism.50 (5.1.132-7) 
 
Falstaff can speak dissident truths, but always from that hybrid body and discourse, already 
undermined by the dominant ideological positions of the play.  The term “scutcheon” is resonant 
with the language of “counterfeit” and “image” in Falstaff’s post-resurrection soliloquy, a set of 
suspect visual categories, icons with no tangible referent.  It is at this point of greatest intimacy 
and perspective alignment with Falstaff that he is “killed” by the termagant Scot, Douglas. 
 When Falstaff rises, the joke is on us.  For the first time, in his most profound 
improvisation, all are fooled, prince and audience alike.  Falstaff cheats his own algebra of 
chivalric honor: he robs Percy of  it through a staged death.  While comically successful, Falstaff 
                                                 
50 I know of no critic who has seized upon this use of “catechism” to claim that Falstaff is Catholic. 
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 at this moment is at his most compromised, cheating at a game he has disdained to play before 
because at the moment of opportunity no one is watching – except the audience, whose 
perspective alignment with Falstaff has undergone a rupture.  Falstaff has attempted to draw all 
visual perception into a broken tautology, “To die is to be a counterfeit, for he is but the 
counterfeit of a man who hath not the life of a man; but to counterfeit dying, when a man thereby 
liveth, is to be no counterfeit but the true and perfect image of life indeed” (5.4.114-7).  In fact, 
our confidence in the visual mode is not utterly defeated: it can be recuperated through a vantage 
point that remains.  Alienated from Falstaff, but not perfectly expelled from the drama, the 
audience is now situated in the sort of privileged moral perspective described by St. Paul.  Of 
particular importance in appreciating this is Falstaff’s comment on the expediency of acts done 
surreptitiously: “Nothing confutes me but eyes, and nobody sees me” he says (5.5.122-3), 
stabbing Percy in the thigh.  Falstaff, an image of the iconoclastic Oldcastle, endorses the notion 
of images as fundamentally deceptive, and it is from this undermined position that the drama 
recovers vision as a privileged mode of moral insight, “for whatsoever doth make manifest is 
light” (Ephesians 5.13). 
 The body of Harry Percy retains a material significance in the immediate aftermath of his 
death, to which the prince attests: 
When that this body did contain a spirit, 
A kingdom for it was too small a bound;  
but now two paces of the vilest earth 
Is room enough.  This earth that bears thee dead 
Bears not alive so stout a gentleman. (5.4.88-92) 
 
This is a development of the king’s vierge ouvrante figure, the Christ-like sons of England 
sacrificed to the martial national character.  The earth that “bears thee dead” once again functions 
as womb and grave of a sort of national saint.  In a play that often holds out the possibility of 
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 expiatory sacrifice, this may be the only instance in which it is unambiguously consummated.  
While the prince treats Percy’s body as something of a relic, Falstaff works upon it a callous act 
of desecration.  C. G. Thayer has understood the wound to Percy’s thigh as a “symbolic 
castration,”51 Gerard H. Cox as a more literal one.52  Even in death, Percy’s body is the source of 
an excess that informs other bodies.  In the moral vision that Ephesians asks of us, Percy is 
recuperated as a quasi-religious national icon at one moment, and in the next debased by 
Falstaff’s mutilation.  We should note that Ephesians has placed particular emphasis on the 
moral import of private acts.  In this case, as in a small set of others, the drama directs our 
attention to omissions or commissions that take place absent any particular public component. 53 
 Hal proves himself perfectly willing to surrender to Falstaff  the “proud titles” he has 
won from Harry Percy, a “commodity of names” for the fat knight to trade upon.  Dover Wilson 
has taken this to be a revelation of the prince’s “selflessness and generosity,” his “native 
magnanimity.”54  Problematically, this hangs upon the notion that Hal has been invested in the 
sort of commodification of chivalric virtue which is now associated with Falstaff.  Textually, this 
is correct: even Percy seems to have endorsed such a notion (5.4.80).  Has the prince really given 
away all of his gains?  He has not.  In the dramatic emphasis placed on his seemingly unobserved 
conduct toward Percy when compared to that of Falstaff a moment later, the prince has been 
given an opportunity to explore his own essential majesty against the measure of dead Percy, his 
                                                 
51 C. G. Thayer, Shakespearean Politics: Government and Misgovernment in the Great Histories (Athens, Ohio: 
Ohio University Press, 1983), p. 114. 
52 Gerard H. Cox, “ ‘Like a Price indeed’: Hal’s Triumph of Honor in 1 Henry IV,” Pageantry in the Shakespearean 
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 sometime altar-ego, his distorted image.  The prince seems willing to keep the results of that 
measurement to himself through most of 2 Henry IV.  Through the prince, the sacrifice of Christ-
like Percy is purified and assimilated:55 “Thy ignominy sleep with thee in thy grave, / But not 
remembered in thy epitaph!” (5.4.100-1).  Unlike the debased figures of subaltern revolt, Percy is 
elevated through sharing an essence with Hal, where even his own father may not. 
 
 
 
 
E. WHIPPING ADAM OUT OF THE GARDEN 
 
 
Once again “between two deaths,” the Falstaff of The Second Part of Henry IV is dramatized as 
emphatically marked for death, the counterpart of the ailing king.  His representation in the play 
is resonant of the calaca tableaux of the Days of the Dead in which skeletal figures, unaware that 
they are already dead, go about their daily activities, plying their trades or flaunting death and 
judgment in adulterous trysts, a New World counterpart to the 15th-century Danse macabre 
nouvelle or Holbein’s 16th-century Les simulacres & historiees faces de la mort.  The 
companions of Falstaff’s country revels, Justices Shallow and Silence are comic allegories of 
impending death. As Rees has observed, “They are the most amiable, silly death’s-heads 
imaginable, but they make an effective momento mori all the same.”56  The dramatic presence of 
the prostitute Doll Tearsheet, the first real evidence of Falstaff’s “lechery,” suggests the ultimate 
sterility of Falstaff’s way of living.  Falstaff is faced not simply with death, but with a sort of 
                                                 
55 Harold E. Toliver makes a similar claim: “As he helps defeat the rebels, he takes over their powers in the manner 
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 extinction through his lack of progeny.  We are reminded of another valence of the expression 
“Martlemas Beef”: preserved meat that, as winter wears on, is no longer desirable. 
 There are two ways in which Falstaff might be redeemed.  One is the promised 
repentance, problematic in Falstaff’s case because to renounce the flesh may literally be to 
renounce himself, to break the original comic contract with the audience.  Failing this, the 
remaining locus of possibility that might recover Falstaff from that oblivion is the Prince of 
Wales, in many ways the most enigmatic figure of the drama.  The dramatic nature of Hal’s 
trajectory through the drama is by no means a settled manner.  Dover Wilson is within a critical 
genealogy that understands the drama as representing a nearly novelistic character development, 
a progressive maturation in Hal:57 “This [the playwright] is at pains to make reasonable and 
human, and he does so by marking it off... into various stages, thereby accustoming the audience 
more and more to the notion of it and giving an impression of a gradual development of 
character.”58 In order to produce this development, Dover Wilson is forced to dismiss Hal’s 
soliloquy as “a piece of dramatic convention, common in the Elizabethan theatre. . . .It’s function 
was to convey information to the audience about the general drift of the play, much as a prologue 
did.”59  Dover Wilson is able to extract Hal’s authority from this statement, though it is perfectly 
consistent with his reply to Falstaff’s “banish plump Jack”: “I do, I will.”  Poised against the 
critical narrative of Hal’s development as future king or simply human being is the remarkable 
consistency of his characterization, his unerring anticipation of his future acts. 
 It has been argued by some critics that the drama eschews the opportunity to develop Hal 
as a character, particularly in 2 Henry IV.  As Burckhardt emphasizes, with regard to matters of 
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58 Dover Wilson, p. 69. 
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 state, and significantly with regard to the comic action, “Hal is quite deliberately being kept out 
of the play.”60 In fact, the prince is held in part 2 in a sort of limbo, even a regression from the 
point at which we might expect to find him after Shrewsbury.  What role for the prince?  
Burckhardt claims,  
Clearly the theory that in Part II Hal proves himself just (as in Part I he proved himself 
valorous), while it has a certain a priori plausibility, is sadly lacking in dramatic 
substance. . . .Hal has one role only – That of heir, of successor.61 
 
This may be where Burckhardt’s reading needs to be complicated.  The drama has done a great 
deal to problematize the notion that Hal will have the crown from Henry in an uncomplicated 
genealogical handover.  This is attested to by Hal’s continuing alienation from his father’s court, 
and by his brother John’s dramatization as a Lancastrian heir, just as it will shortly be figured in 
the manner of his acquisition of the crown. 
 If there is an instability in Hal as a dramatis persona, it may be that between his less than 
candid motives, desires, or intentions and those imputed to him, notably by Falstaff.  Sir John 
appears sincerely to believe that the Prince has long heeded his politic advice concerning the 
government of the realm when he succeeds his father.  This is developed tangibly in part 2 
through Falstaff’s relationship to the Lord Chief Justice.  In their first confrontation, Falstaff 
recalls an extra-dramatic event:  
For the box of th’ear that the prince gave you, he gave it like a rude prince, and you took 
it like a sensible lord.  I have checked him for it, and the young lion repents – marry, not 
in ashes and sackcloth, but in new silk and old sack. (1.2.152-5) 
 
Falstaff relishes the memory of the prince’s most significant flaunting of his father’s law, which 
suggests to him that Hal has taken to heart the notion of a future England in which social power 
is significantly redistributed.  The incident of the prince’s striking the Lord Chief Justice appears 
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 on stage not in Shakespeare’s Henry plays but in one of his sources, the anonymous Famous 
Victories of Henry V.  This Prince of Wales is more directly and willfully involved in theft and 
other sorts of misconduct, and voices a familiar political discourse in anticipation of his 
accession: 
But here’s such ado nowadays, here’s prisoning, here’s hanging, whipping, and the devil 
and all!  But I tell you sirs, when I am king we will have no such things.  But, my lads, if 
the old king, my father, were dead, we would all be kings. . . .But, Ned, so soon as I am 
king, the first thing I will do shall be to put my Lord Chief Justice out of office, and thou 
shalt be my Lord Chief Justice of England (The Famous Victories of Henry V, 5.10-13, 
15-7) 
 
Here it is the prince himself who is the mouthpiece for the sort of leveling, anti-authoritarian 
utopianism that has been associated with Jack Cade, Falstaff, and a gallery of subaltern figures.  
D. B. Landt has argued that, in adapting the materials of The Famous Victories to his own 
purposes, Shakespeare has displaced Hal’s morally suspect or politically unsettling acts and 
attitudes onto Falstaff, who becomes the principal opponent of the Lord Chief Justice.62  The 
characterization of Hal as a rogue and potential radical is modified, while metadramatic echoes 
of incidents like Hal’s imprisonment remain, as does Falstaff’s persistent impression that the 
prince shares his plans for the future.  The prince’s “when I am king” becomes Falstaff’s 
repeated “when thou art king,”63 and Falstaff takes as irony or fails to notice as the prince 
candidly and consistently asserts that in the new order, thieves will be hung and Falstaff 
banished. 
 Compared with the sanguine calculation of the Prince of Wales, there is something 
innocent about Falstaff’s skewed perception of events.  Of course, there is something of 
calculation in his use of Percy’s dead body to promote his own reputation, but there is a sense in 
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 which Falstaff himself is a victim of his own abuse of history.  David M. Bergeron64 has made 
the connection between Falstaff, who has “a whole school of tongues in this belly” (2 Henry IV, 
4.3.18) and the grotesque personification of Rumour, “painted full of tongues.”  In this reading, 
Falstaff is “ahistory,” a subversive force destabilizing Shakespeare’s literary intervention into 
national history.  His exploitation of dead Percy, as a sort of embodied empirical fact, dramatizes 
his own distorting effect.65  What needs to be emphasized here is not so much, as Bergeron says, 
“the difficulty of establishing credible history,”66 but the problem of history as a rhetorical 
product, founded in desires and bodies as much as the historical record.  Falstaff, ever a hybrid, 
collective persona, stands in for what have been called “standpoint epistemologies,” critical 
processes situated in subject positions, often subaltern ones.  Against the grand strategies of the 
Lancastrian historical machine, Falstaff offers tactical critiques, local interventions, all informed 
by a utopian social vision, and all of this rendered through the perspective of the social power it 
would challenge.  Of course, in the eyes of the drama, Falstaff is fundamentally wrong; his 
misunderstanding of the prince is a failure of his own utopian historical sensibility. 
 The questions of history, theft, essence and sovereignty are crystallized in the scene of 
Hal’s self-coronation.  Like the first dramatic audience between the prince and his father in 1 
Henry IV 3.2, this scene has an earlier echo in a tavern exchange between Hal and Falstaff.  In 
this their final encounter, the prince finds the king asleep and, first addressing the crown, places 
it on his own head and leaves the room, only to have his father awaken and find the crown 
“stolen.”  This is the dramatic twin to the picking of the sleeping Falstaff’s pockets, through 
which Sir John claims he has lost “Three or four bonds of forty pound apiece and a seal ring of 
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 my grandfather’s” (1 Henry IV, 3.3.80-1).  The seal ring is a particular marker of identity, 
presumably even Falstaff’s identity as a knight – always an unstable proposition in the play.  
This is supported by the prince’s assessment of its value, “A trifle, some eightpenny matter” 
(3.3.82) and “I say ‘tis copper” (3.3.115).  Falstaff’s dubious patrimony is base metal, while the 
English crown is, in Hal’s words, a “golden rigol” or circle. Then again, Falstaff’s ring may well 
have belonged to his grandfather, while Hal cannot make the same claim. 
 “Thou hast  stol’n that which after some few hours / Were thine without offence” the king 
says in his final conversation with his son.  This is the cycle of robberies come full circle: Hal’s 
taking of the crown is made to be the perfect analogy of the Gad’s Hill robbery: the prince steals 
the proceeds of an earlier robbery from the original thief.67  He symbolically disrupts the 
principle of primogeniture, “This lineal honor,” even as he verbally invokes it (4.2.176).  Indeed, 
this action cannot help but recall his father’s taking the crown in the deposition of Richard II.  
Further, it is a metadramatic echo of the prince in The Famous Victories, where the specter of 
parricide is raised when the prince approaches his father with a drawn dagger, only to excuse his 
own conduct with skillful rhetoric (The Famous Victories, 6.1-30).  All of this suggests what is 
never stated between Henry IV and his son: the problem of the broken succession, the king’s 
culpability in the state of the realm, the rift in their own relationship. 
 The prince rescues the situation through a similarly adept and perhaps entirely sincere 
exercise of rhetoric: 
I spake unto this crown as having sense, 
And this upbraided it: ‘The care on thee depending 
Hath fed on the body of my father; 
Therefore thou best of gold art worse than gold, 
Other, less fine, in carat more precious, 
Preserving life in med’cine potable; 
                                                 
67 This is quite close to Hapgood’s understanding, p. 96, but Hapgood does not really understand why this final theft 
is necessary to the play’s construction of Henry V’s legitimacy. 
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 But thou, most fine, most honored, most renowned, 
Hast eat thy bearer up.’  Thus, my most royal liege, 
Accusing it, I put it on my head, 
To try with it, as with an enemy 
That had before my face murdered my father, 
The quarrel of a true inheritor. (4.2.286-297) 
 
It is clear that the prince speaks here from the heart of Lancastrian ideology.  The sickness of the 
king and realm, whose cause has been located in Henry’s usurpation, is displaced on the crown, 
the crime of the thief turned on the object of the theft.  Emphasis is placed on the onus of 
kingship, assumed as an obligation by reluctant sons of Lancaster, consistent with the king’s own 
favored understanding of his accession: 
Though then, God knows, I had no such intent 
But that necessity so bowed the state 
That I and greatness were compelled to kiss.  (3.1.71-3) 
 
Hal’s defense of his conduct wins over his father through its articulation of the fundamental 
tenets of Lancastrian dogma.  If it is a Falstaffian improvisation, it is one in the service of 
dominant ideology, not in contest against it.  It is effective and affecting because of its erasures: 
the king is willing to grant precisely what the prince has excluded, the “indirect, crooked ways / I 
met this crown” (4.2.312-3), but only to suggest that the guilt that his politic son dares not speak 
will be cleansed by his own expiatory sacrifice, “For all the soil of the achievement goes / With 
me into the earth” (4.2.317-8).  This is hardly a principle of law, and this quasi-religious claim is 
complicated by the action that follows.  On the brink of death, the king asks the name of the 
room where he had collapsed, and is told that it is named “Jerusalem”: 
Laud be to God, even there my life must end. 
It hath been prophesied to me, many years, 
I should not die but in Jerusalem, 
Which vainly I supposed the Holy Land. 
But bear me to that chamber, there I’ll lie: 
In that Jerusalem shall Harry die. (4.2.362-7) 
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 In the dramatization of Henry’s death, the Jerusalem room has been transferred from 
Westminster Abbey, where it is located by Holinshed, to the royal palace.68  This assimilation to 
the nation of traditionally religious signifiers occurs again and again in Shakespeare’s 
representation of the Lancastrian kings.  In a dramatic inversion of the usually-understood nature 
of secularization, the Henries have endeavored to consecrate their state.  There is an ambivalence 
to Henry’s death in the “Jerusalem” room: either it is the failure of the king’s dream of crusade 
and a self-sacrifice that would cleanse him of his guilt with regard to Richard, or it is the 
peripatetic culmination of that desire in a new Jerusalem. 
 If the prince’s rationale for his actions is suspect because of its perfect congruence with 
Lancastrian discourses of their own legitimacy already questioned by the drama, there must be 
some other way of accounting for the staging of seeming theft and self-coronation.  Leonard 
Tennenhouse would situate Hal’s theft in the dramatization of the performed acts of power in 
which “authority goes to the contender who can seize hold of the symbols and signs legitimizing 
authority and wrest them from his rivals to make them serve his own interests.”69  The prince’s 
act is perfectly symmetrical with that of his father’s usurpation, demonstrating, “that power is an 
inversion of legitimate authority which gains possession, as such, of the means of self-
authorization.”70  Such an understanding of a “self-authorizing” power has what is probably an 
untenable corollary, for it invests the usurper Henry IV with a legitimacy that has been 
extensively contested at many social levels in the drama, even tacitly by his own son. 
 The problem addressed by Hal’s theft is precisely the one raised by the question of “self-
authorization”: whether sovereign power  actually contains Negri’s “constituting power,” the 
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University Press, 1989), n. p. 151. 
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 sempiternal force authorizing rule.  Giorgio Agamben has argued that it must,71 the New 
Historicist emphasis on power as fundamentally a performance requires that this be the case.  If 
the prince’s taking of the crown is an act of legitimization, why seize it in a manner that 
complicates the argument from lineal descent?  It can only be because that descent has been 
tainted, that it has a residue of illegitimacy, the metaphorical bastardy repeatedly invoked by 
Falstaff and others.  In this instance, the prince has the crown not through his father but through 
his mother, the vierge ouvrante, the England of which he has shown himself the proper son.  
What happens when Hal puts on the crown is the sort of constituting moment described by 
Negri, “the act of choice, the punctual determination that opens a horizon, the radical enacting of 
something that did not exist before. . .”72  Hal’s self-coronation is a new covenant that, in this 
tainted historical moment, could only be accomplished by a final theft, a last cozening of the 
devil.  Thus, his father is partly right when he says that “God put in thy mind to take it hence” 
(4.2.306).  In what is fundamentally a private act, like Hal’s magnanimity toward Harry Percy, 
value is recuperated not through inheritance or public performance but through essence.  The fact 
that Hal is perfectly willing to hand the crown back to his father makes no difference here.  The 
tangible crown, “best of gold,” has an intangible part of greater consequence.  In this respect, the 
drama seems to be playing on that theoretical corollary of the king’s two bodies, the doctrine of 
the “invisible crown”: 
There was a visible, material, exterior gold circle or diadem with which the prince was 
vested and adorned at his coronation; and there was an invisible and immaterial crown—
encompassing all the royal rights and privileges indispensable for the government of the 
body politic—which was perpetual and descended either from God directly or by the 
dynastic right of inheritance.73 
 
                                                 
71 Agamben, p. 43. 
72 Negri, p. 31. 
73 Kantorowicz, p. 337. 
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 Trivially, Hal returns the material crown to his father, but he cannot return its invisible twin 
because it has already passed to him.74  Indeed, the failure of the metaphysical aspect of the 
crown that should function as “medicine potable” may be implicated in the sickness the king 
shares with his realm.  From the point of view of a mythologized national history, we know 
without doubt that the relationship of Henry V to that crown will be of a different order.  The 
difficulty for the performance model of power invoked by Tennenhouse is the private nature of 
Hal’s taking of the crown, which is public only in the sense that it takes place within the gaze of 
the audience.  The strange fact is that we endorse Hal’s theft of the crown, though it is outside 
the law, outside of unblemished succession, outside of participatory institutions.  This is not a 
moment of representative government, but a reinstitution of the divine guarantee.  Henry V will 
recuperate the “lineal honor” with regard to the Lancastrian dynasty, but in the future. 
 The transfer of the crown is marked by a change in the realm.  Since A. C. Bradley at 
least, the critical intervention into the rejection of Falstaff by the new king has emphasized affect 
and audience response.  Bradley himself thought the rejection of Falstaff just and proper, yet 
asked, “What do we feel, and what are we meant to feel, as we witness this scene?”75  For Dover 
Wilson, the rejection of Falstaff is not only “fine and appropriate,”76 but partakes of the sort of 
gradual development that he locates in the character of Hal, though “in the end he springs it upon 
[the audience] in the most striking and unexpected fashion possible.”77  The question of the 
dramatic, moral or historical rightness of this rejection seems to elide important questions of 
                                                 
74 Hapgood misunderstands the import of this scene arguing “Hal does not keep what he has taken; He of course 
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75 A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London: MacMillan, 1909), p. 249. 
76 Dover Wilson, p. 122. 
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 agency raised by a character like the prince, who seems to embody at different times both 
carnival and calculation, to exist both in a given dramatic moment and in his own future state. 
 Further, the question of rejection demands an assessment of just what is rejected.  Falstaff 
has been celebrating with his Gloucestershire death’s-heads, Justices Silence and Shallow.  
Trading on his recent good fortune, Falstaff has graduated from corrupt officer to influence 
peddler.  Falstaff clearly expects a dilation of his opportunities with the accession of his protégé, 
the Prince of Wales, and greets the news of the king’s death with delight: 
Master Shallow, my Lord Shallow, be what thou wilt: I am fortune’s steward. . . . 
Boot, boot, Master Shallow!  I know the young king is sick for me.  Let us take any 
man’s horses, the laws of England are at my commandment.  Blessed are they that have 
been my friends, and woe to my Lord Chief Justice! (5.3.106-7, 110-3). 
 
In the context of this play, the language of sickness is no accident; in a sense, Falstaff is the 
prince’s sickness.  Falstaff’s speech is an incoherent but familiar mixture.  There is the echo of 
Christian communism dramatized as theft, “Take any man’s horses,” the ambition to displace the 
magistrate, in this case, the chief judge of England.  The egalitarian inclination of earlier 
speeches is translated into the familiar trope of the corruption of the aristocracy with unworthy 
types like Shallow, a taint already figured in Falstaff’s risen status after Shrewsbury.  Jack 
Falstaff’s “The laws of England are at my commandment” has more than a little resonance with 
Jack Cade’s “my mouth shall be the parliament of England.”  Then again, Falstaff is not Cade, 
not an advocate of violent revolt.  His crimes may involve a culpable degree of  lèse-majesté, but 
he remains in spirit a Lancastrian loyalist.  With regard to the house of Lancaster, Jack Cade and 
Falstaff represent two points of equilibrium within an instability analogous to that of the 
historical Oldcastle: can the egalitarian utopia of Christian fellowship be achieved through a 
benevolent sovereign as the Vicar of God, or must it be seized by violent revolutionary means? 
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  Hal’s accession is a sort of revolution, albeit a conservative one, representing a 
fundamental change in the commonwealth as a body in its relationship the body of its king.  One 
of the reagents of this alchemy, still incomplete when the prince crowns himself, is the Lord 
Chief Justice.  His apologium to the new king is a point of conjunction between the discourses of 
the body in the Henry plays and the recurrent metadramatic references to another dramatic 
Henry, the Prince of Wales from The Famous Victories.  Here, Lord Chief Justice: 
. . .Whiles I was busy for the commonwealth, 
Your highness pleased to forget my place, 
The majesty and power of law and justice, 
The image of the king whom I presented, 
And struck me in my very seat of judgment; 
Whereon, as an offender to your father, 
I gave bold way to my authority 
And did commit you.  If the deed were ill, 
Be you contented, wearing now the garland, 
To have a son set your decrees at nought? 
To pluck down justice from your awful bench?. . . 
Nay, more, to spurn at your most royal image, 
And mock your workings in a second body? (2 Henry IV 5.2. 75-85, 88-9) 
 
For the Lord Chief Justice, juridical power is subordinated to the king, it is his image and acts 
only in his interest.  It is interesting to note the extent to which justice is assimilated to “power” 
and “authority” without dilution from concepts like equity or common law.  We should further 
note that “image” in this passage is not immaterial and visual, the ocular phantasm of 
iconoclastic discourses.  Image is embodied, both in the Lord Chief Justice and the prince as 
images of the king.  The incoherence of the hierarchal relationship between king, the law 
embodied in the Lord Chief Justice, and the prince is figured as a confusion of bodies.  This is 
picked up in the splendid ambiguity of the clause “[to] mock your workings in a second body.”  
Is that body the prince or the Lord Chief Justice, the agent of the mockery or its object?  It is 
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 both: the dispersal of unitary majesty into a grotesque knot of conflicting bodies; indeed, it is 
only a bit of a stretch to imagine Falstaff somewhere in the scrum. 
 The dramatic choice between the Lord Chief Justice and Falstaff is a choice between two 
competing modes of social existence for the nation.  Claire McEachern invites us to read the 
Prince of Wales less as a modern, psychologically “deep” character and more as the locus of 
larger social collectivities, 
Henry’s characterization, “the ‘person-ality’ of Henry as sharing in the Elizabethan 
personification of the crown, sharing not so much in a discourse of personal subjectivity 
as in the tropes of subjectivity used to produce a particular Elizabethan political affect – 
that of corporate identity, of what we might call ‘the nation.’”78 
 
Falstaff too has this larger-than-individual quality, an essentially plebian character associated 
with “the world” who “multiples and refracts his identity to blend with ‘every man jack.’”79  The 
Henry plays have posed the problem of a choice between two alternative fathers, both them 
tainted, as alternative images of the nation.  
 The solution for the new king is the reinstitution of law in the person of the Lord Chief 
Justice, but in a different relationship with sovereignty: 
. . .There is my hand: 
You shall be as father to my youth, 
My voice shall sound as you do prompt mine ear, 
And I will stoop and humble my intents 
To your well-practised wise directions. . .(5.2.116-20) 
 
In the Lord Chief Justice, Hal is offered a purified image of his father, “Th’unstainèd sword” 
(5.2.113), authority without the taint of Henry’s sin.80 This is clear from the new relationship 
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 between law and sovereignty that the new king proposes.  While in the old regime law was an 
extension of the king’s power, in the new there will be reciprocity, the king placing himself 
under a law that is theoretically his own image.  The curious extra-legal manner of the prince’s 
self-coronation stands in a peculiar relationship to this invocation of law, resonant with 
Agamben’s reflections on that relationship: 
The paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact that the sovereign is, at the same time, 
outside and inside the juridical order. . . .This means that the paradox can also be 
formulated in this way: “the law is outside itself,” or : “I, the sovereign, who am outside 
the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law. . .”81  
 
Henry V ultimately places himself on the side of law and property against the threat to those 
things embodied in Falstaff.  This is posed as a sort of radical choice, constitutive of the new 
king, disentangling him from his grotesque connections, his metaphorical bastardy.  Falstaff 
repeated chorus of “when thou art king—” constructs sovereignty as a perfect, almost anarchic 
agency.  The new king seizes upon a characteristically Pauline alternative.  Writing to his fellow 
Christians from prison, the Paul of the epistles styles himself a “prisoner of Christ”:82 “I 
therefore, the prisoner of the Lord, beseech you that ye walk worthy of the vocation wherewith 
ye are called” (Ephesians 4:1).  The strictures of earthly life are redeemed by a vision that places 
them in the context of the eternal. The rejection of the “Martin drunk” pseudo-saint that is 
Falstaff may be an exercise more of such constraints than of the king’s unencumbered agency. 
 The treatment of Falstaff reflects the imposition of a new, Pauline order.  In Ephesians, 
St. Paul is the voice of a hierarchal social vision in family and the larger social world: “Servants, 
be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in 
singleness of your heart, as unto Christ” (6:5).  Mundane social relations are enforced with 
divine sanction under the light that makes manifest.  The new king means to put everything and 
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82 See Ephesians 3:1, 4:1, Philemon 1:1, etc.  
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 everyone in its place.  In the prince’s dispensation, Falstaff is not to be hung for the robbery at 
Gad’s Hill.  His status is set forth specifically: banished from the king’s company, but 
maintained on an austere allowance (5.5.59-63).  He is placed under the power of his rival, the 
Lord Chief Justice, who says, “Go carry Sir John Falstaff to the Fleet, / Take all his company 
along with him” (5.5.84-5).  Their incarceration has as its explicit aim the correction of their 
behavior.  As John of Lancaster observes, “all are banished till their conversation / Appear more 
wise and modest to the world” (5.5.93-4).  For those who cannot implement a Pauline moral 
vision for themselves, it will be imposed in the form of moral surveillance from the organs of 
justice.  In strange consistency with the prince’s essentially comic action after the double robbery 
at Gad’s Hill, Falstaff will be fundamentally undone by the prince’s making everything manifest 
and visible.  Where Falstaff once resisted providing an account of himself “upon compulsion” (1 
Henry IV, 2.4.191-4), it is on this basis that he will be forced to reform.  Such reformation is 
understood almost completely in terms of deportment, “Reply to me not with a fool-born jest,” 
and “leave gourmandizing” (2 Henry IV 5.5.51, 48).  Conduct and proper deference to authority 
appear more important here than intangibles like souls. 
 Falstaff’s political status with regard to the sovereign has been changed.  Where earlier 
he existed in an extension of the sovereign exception, potentially outside of law under the license 
of the prince, he is now to be maintained in the custodial capacity of that very law, in a sort of 
extra-legal confinement.  Of all the rebels in the Henry plays, Falstaff in his abasement is the 
other who defines the new state, translated into a status that Agamben has identified with the 
“sovereign ban”: 
This relation is more original than the. . .opposition between friend and enemy, fellow 
citizen and foreigner.  The ‘estrarity” of the person held in the sovereign ban is more  
intimate and primary that the extraneousness of the foreigner. . .The ban is the force of 
simultaneous attraction and repulsion that ties together the two poles of the sovereign 
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 exception. . . .Because of this alone can the ban signify both the insignia of sovereignty. . 
.and expulsion from community.83 
 
The banishment of Falstaff is a more fundamental act than the choosing of the Lord Chief Justice 
as a new father; really, the latter act is the mechanism by which Falstaff’s dénouement is made 
possible, which accounts for the fact that the Lord Chief Justice ceases to exist dramatically after 
this scene.84  The possibility of a certain mode of communal life, devalued from the outset, has 
been disciplined.  In this connection, G. C. Thayer is correct in the claim that “Shakespeare often 
asks us to imagine an England ruled, improbably, by that Lord of Misrule. . .”85  The rejection of 
witty, iconoclastic, hybrid Falstaff is a rejection of the “popularity” of which he is the 
embodiment.  In contemplating the nature of his new state, Henry V says, 
Let us choose such limbs of noble counsel,  
That the great body of our state may go, 
In equal rank with the best governed nation. . . (2 Henry IV 5.2.134-6) 
 
In its emphasis on nobility and rank, Henry’s is the most conservative possible revolution, a 
ruling class purged of Falstaff’s hybridity.  It is a vision of the commonwealth perfectly 
consistent with Paul’s image of the Church as the body of Christ: 
. . .the head, even Christ, 
From whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that which every 
joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh 
increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love.  
(Ephesians 4:15-6) 
 
As the nation goes, so goes its metaphysical counterpart, the body of the king.  In Henry V, the 
archbishop of Canterbury offers a retrospective account of the prince’s transformation: 
Consideration like an angel came, 
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 And whipp’d th’ offending Adam out of him, 
Leaving his body as a paradise, 
To envelop and contain celestial spirits. 
Never was such a sudden scholar made; 
Never came reformation in a flood, 
With such a heady currance, scouring faults; 
Nor never Hydra-headed willfulness 
So soon did lose his seat—and all at once— 
As in this king. (Henry V, 1.1.28-37) 
 
Why should it be that the prince’s former misconduct should be figured as “Hydra-headed” 
willfulness?   In the Lancastrian cycle, Hydra is associated with uprising, specifically in its 
spontaneous, popular dimension.  It is to this sense that the Archbishop of York appeals when he 
says, 
The time misordered doth, in common sense, 
Crowd us and crush us to this monstrous form. . . 
Whereon this Hydra son of war is born (2 Henry IV, 4.2)86 
 
This is one of the monstrous births, and it spawns a true grotesque: a mass of humanity acting 
with a common purpose.  The figure of Hydra, as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker have 
argued in a later historical context,87  is the specter of a subaltern political consciousness become 
action, as seen from the perspective of dominant social power.  Since such an organizing  
popular consciousness cannot even be imagined to exist from the heights of social power, it must 
be translated into the action of a single grotesque organism.  Thus in Heywood’s Appius and 
Virginia (a play that contains a direct reference to Falstaff), 
The world is chang’d now.  All damnations 
Seize on the Hydra-headed multitude, 
That only gape on innovation. 
O, who would trust a people?  (Appius and Virginia, 5.3) 
 
                                                 
86 Of course, the Archbishop is disclaiming much of his own agency in this “spontaneous” rebellion; it is not an act 
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 In Canterbury’s plaudit, the young Henry is associated with Hydra through his improper mixing 
with drawers and thieves, a “vile participation” that carries the threat that the social order will be 
overturned in the new reign by a sovereign who is the voice of the wrong social strata.  Small 
wonder that Canterbury associates this figure with Adam, that ancestor of Cade, Ball and 
Falstaff, who must be whipped out of the Eden that the king’s body has become.  Like the mob 
in Brown’s Pseudodoxia, the Hydra body is multiple, “farraginous,” transected by various axes 
of difference.  The sacramental royal body is pure, “double” perhaps in Kantorowicz’ sense yet 
un-mixed, the polar opposite to Falstaff’s hybridity.  What Canterbury celebrates is the purifying 
away of that tendency in the prince that would incline him to be the agent of a “ventriloquism” of 
the vulgar mob, for “who would trust a people?”  “Innovation,” in the form of a renegotiation of 
relations of power and property, will not be contemplated.  Of course, such an assertion requires 
an ideological denial, conditioned as it is by a historical moment when such relations were in 
flux. 
Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield have argued that Shakespeare’s Henry V is not a 
seamless argument for the sort of royal prerogative that it represents: “Henry V  can be read to 
reveal not only the strategies of power but also the anxieties informing both them and their 
ideological representation.”88  If Shakespeare’s Henry V, striving for a monologism that 
endorses the legitimacy of Lancastrian rule, cannot help but enact critiques of the power that it 
promotes, the farrago of the two parts of Henry IV, deeply imperfect in this sense if artistically
superior, can ultimately certify that power in the body of the king only at the price of a fractu
of the social body.  This crack may not be new, but it is reified in the body of the new king, just 
 
re 
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 as it is conceptually in ourselves, insofar as we celebrate Henry’s reformation, whatever our own 
social positions may be. 
What Henry V cannot tolerate, it would seem, is the intrusion of Sir John Falstaff into its 
dramatic world.  For whatever reasons, the promise made in the epilogue to 2 Henry IV to 
continue the history “with Sir John in it” was not fulfilled.  J. H. Walter has argued that a pattern 
of errors and repetitions in the Folio text indicates an alternative version of the play in which 
Falstaff was indeed a part of the “low” action, culminating in a conflict between Sir John and 
diluted Welshman Fluellen.89  This may or may not be the case, but it certainly makes sense of 
what remains, which appears to be a hole left where Falstaff has been removed.  What remains is 
a reported account of what might be a fumbling deathbed repentance, and a final quibble on 
Protestant doctrine.  On the claim that Falstaff denounced women on his deathbed, the Boar’s 
Head denizens have the following exchange: 
Boy: Yes, that ‘a did, and said they were dev’ls incarnate. 
Hostess: ‘A could never abide carnation—‘twas a color he never liked.  
(Henry V, 2.4.31-4) 
 
The flesh of Falstaff, the Lollard who could not abide incarnation, leaves the world as he came 
into it: an anti-Eucharist, and now emphatically dead meat.  What is notable about the fobbing 
off of Falstaff in Henry V is the complete absence of his body and his voice, as if even these 
would represent too great a contamination.  The void where Falstaff’s voice should be is made 
painfully clear by the use of the Hostess as an intermediary, delivering mostly reported speech:  
“‘a babbled of green fields” (2.3.16-7).  The coup de grâce in the death of Sir John is the 
sentimentalism of the scene, pathos expended on a fundamentally carnivalesque object.  A 
Falstaff reduced to nostalgic memory is no Falstaff at all.  It is a marked contrast to the prince’s 
                                                 
89 J. H. Walter. “With Sir John in It,” The Modern Language Review, vol. 41, no. 3 (July, 1946), pp. 237-245. 
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 more appropriate comment on Falstaff’s “death” at Shrewsbury, “Could not all this flesh keep in 
a little life?” (1 Henry IV, 5.4.102-3). 
 What is missing from Henry V is the embodied critique of Lancaster that had tempered 
the plays that preceded it.  Falstaff may be too morally compromised for Battenhouse’s category 
of “holy fool” to apply easily, but the drama has developed a dynamic of temptation that works 
in two directions.  Behind the self-conscious irony, there is an element of truth in Falstaff’s 
claim, “Before I knew thee, Hal, I knew nothing; and now am I, if a man should speak truly, little 
better than one of the wicked” (1 Henry IV, 1.2.72-3).  The radical Protestant positions attributed 
to Falstaff are consistently inflected by a dominant social power that rejects them as amoral and 
antinomian.  Falstaff is morally compromised but, as Hapgood has argued, “his thieving is of a 
piece with his lying; both are appealingly childlike in their uninhibited expansiveness.”90  There 
is nothing of Lancastrian calculation about him: he is a small fish that feeds on the leavings of 
larger predators.  A tactically resourceful critic of Henry IV, there is a distinct injustice in his 
being forced to bear the culpability not only of noble rebels nobly eulogized, but of the prince’s 
own denied indictment of his natural father.  In this respect, the prince’s reading of Saint Paul is 
every bit as willfully partial as Sir John’s.  Ephesians chapter six tells us, 
. . .we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, 
against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high 
places. (Ephesians, 6:12) 
 
 For all his endorsement of social hierarchy, Saint Paul locates the responsibility for the evil of 
the times at the heights of power.  Such evil exists, and is dramatized throughout the Lancastrian 
cycle, but is rarely if ever subjected to the same rancor as subaltern revolt, or even dissidence.  
The greatest scorn is reserved for the hybrid, the contaminating margin, particularly when it 
speaks in its own voice, even more singularly when it does so with eloquence.  What is curious 
                                                 
90 Hapgood, p. 94. 
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 about Falstaff in his final erasure from the dramatic text is that even such an undermined 
critique, emerging from a gross body whose soul is ever in doubt, must ultimately be whipped 
like Adam from the Garden. 
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